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I. INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, an appeal can only be taken from a final judgment. The final judgment rule in Nebraska is grounded in sections
25-1911 and 25-2728. Section 25-1911 allows appeals from the judgments and final orders of the district courts, while section 25-2728 allows appeals from the judgments and final orders of county courts.' A
final judgment or order is one that ends the case. As the Nebraska
Supreme Court has often said, a final order "dispose[s] of the whole
merits of the case. When no further action of the court is required to
dispose of a pending cause, the order is final. If the cause is retained
2
for further action, the order is interlocutory."
But not all "final orders" are actually final orders. Some are interlocutory. For example, orders that are made in a special proceeding
and affect a substantial right are final, appealable orders regardless of
whether they dispose of the whole merits of the case. 3 They are final,
appealable orders because section 25-1902 classifies them as such.
Section 25-1902 provides:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in
an action after judgment, is a final order which may be vacated, modified, or
reversed ....

4

It is by no means clear, however, what constitutes a special proceeding and what constitutes a substantial right. The case law is a
confusing collection of slogans and contradictions. The cases say that
special proceedings are civil 5-yet there are special proceedings that
7
are criminal. 6 The cases say that special proceedings are statutory 1. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1911 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (addressing appeals from judgments and final orders of the district courts); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2728 (Cum.
Supp. 2000) (stating that appeals from judgments and final orders of the county
courts may be taken to the district courts).
2. Burke v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Neb., 251 Neb. 607, 610, 558 N.W.2d 577, 580
(1997); see, e.g., Larsen v. Ralston Bank, 236 Neb. 880, 883, 464 N.W.2d 329, 332
(1991); Curtis v. Sec. Accept. Corp., 166 Neb. 815, 823, 91 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1958);
Anson v. Kruse, 147 Neb. 989, 990, 25 N.W.2d 896, 897 (1947).
3. See State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. 177, 182, 542 N.W.2d 424, 429 (1996); Levin v.
Muser, 107 Neb. 230, 231-32, 185 N.W. 431, 432 (1921); Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb.
321, 323, 11 N.W. 300, 301 (1882); Pearson v. Lincoln Tel. Co., 2 Neb. Ct. App.
703, 704, 513 N.W.2d 361, 363 (1994).
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1995).
5. The court has repeatedly said that "[s]pecial proceedings entail civil statutory
remedies not encompassed in chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes." Neb.
Nutrients, Inc. v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 744, 626 N.W.2d 472, 494 (2001); see
also State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 708, 587 N.W.2d 325, 331 (1998) (same); Hull
v. Aetna Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 713, 718, 529 N.W.2d 783, 788 (1995) (same).
6. See State v. Jones, 258 Neb. 695, 699, 605 N.W.2d 434, 438 (2000) (holding that
an order finding criminal defendant incompetent to stand trial and committing
him to mental health facility until he becomes competent was made in a special
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yet there are special proceedings that are nonstatutory.S The cases
say that special proceedings are not encompassed in chapter 25 of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes 9-yet there are special proceedings that
are encompassed in chapter 25.10 The cases say that orders affect a
substantial right when they diminish a defense"-yet there are orders that reject a defense but do not affect a substantial right.12
This confusion is not good for anyone. It makes it hard for judges
to resolve jurisdictional challenges to appeals. 13 It also makes it hard
for lawyers to know when to appeal, which is something that lawyers
need to know. If an order is a final order within the meaning of section 25-1902, then one cannot wait until the end of the case to appeal.
The appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order.14

7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

proceeding); State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 245, 570 N.W.2d 326, 330 (1997) (holding that an order denying motion to discharge based on speedy trial statutes was
made in a special proceeding); State v. Lynch, 248 Neb. 234, 239, 533 N.W.2d
905, 909 (1995) (holding that an order denying plea in bar based on collateral
estoppel and res judicata was made in a special proceeding).
See cases cited supra note 5.
See Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 314, 506 N.W.2d 682, 685 (1993) (holding
that an order granting motion to vacate dismissal pursuant to the court's inherent power to vacate its own judgments during term was an order made in a special proceeding).
See cases cited supra note 5.
Garnishment and revivor are both special proceedings. See W. Smelting & Ref.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Neb. 477, 483-84, 35 N.W.2d 116, 121 (1948) (garnishment); Levin v. Muser, 107 Neb. 230, 232-33, 185 N.W. 431, 432 (1921)
(revivor). Yet both of them are governed by chapter 25. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§
25-1001 to 25-1056 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000) (attachment and garnishment); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1403 to 25-1420 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000)
(revivor). Summary judgment is a special proceeding when it adjudicates a cause
of action. See O'Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 124-25, 582 N.W.2d 350, 354
(1998). Summary judgment is also governed by chapter 25, however. See NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 25-1330 to 25-1336 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
See, e.g., Airport Auth. v. Dugan, 259 Neb. 860, 865, 612 N.W.2d 913, 918 (2000);
State v. Meese, 257 Neb. 486, 494, 599 N.W.2d 192, 198 (1999); Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 253 Neb. 917, 921, 573 N.W.2d
460, 465 (1998).
See State v. Lauck, 261 Neb. 145, 149, 621 N.W.2d 515, 518 (2001) (holding that
order rejecting defense that charges were based on conduct not criminalized by
statute did not affect a substantial right); Holste v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 256
Neb. 713, 726, 592 N.W.2d 894, 905 (1999) (holding that order rejecting personal
jurisdiction defense did not affect a substantial right).
See In re Interest of Jaden H., 10 Neb. Ct. App. 87, 625 N.W.2d 218 (2001). The
Jaden case is discussed infra in note 248.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (appeals from the district
courts); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2729 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (appeals from the county
courts). The requirement of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g., Breeden v. Neb. Methodist Hosp., 257 Neb. 371, 374, 598 N.W.2d
441, 443 (1999); Fackler v. Genetzky, 257 Neb. 130, 138, 595 N.W.2d 884, 891
(1999); Tri-County Landfill, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 247 Neb. 350, 353,
526 N.W.2d 668, 670 (1995).
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Otherwise, one waives any right to appeal the order.1 5 If an order is
not a final order within the meaning of section 25-1902, however, then
one has to wait until the end of the case. The appeal must be filed
within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or final order. Jumping
the gun by filing a premature appeal is a waste of time and money.
6
Such an appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.1
In an attempt to reduce the confusion, I will first survey the court's
current approach to the special proceedings clause of section 25-1902.
I will then explore the historical roots of the statute. Those roots twist
their way from Nebraska to Ohio to New York, where they end in the
Field Code. The roots are worth exploring because they indicate that
the keystone of the statute was not "substantial right," but was instead finality. That in turn forms the keystone of my proposal: to read
finality back into the statute.
What that involves will vary with the nature of the proceeding.
For some proceedings (which I call "single-faceted" special proceedings), a final order should be one that ends the proceeding. For others
(which I call "multifaceted" special proceedings), a final order should
be one that ends a distinct phase of the proceeding. For still others
(which I call "policy based" special proceedings), a final order should
be one that does not end either the proceeding or a discrete phase of
the proceeding, but instead resolves a matter sufficiently important
and separate from the merits to justify an interlocutory appeal.
After discussing the "special proceedings clause" of section 251902, I will turn to the "summary application" and the "prevents a
judgment" clauses. The "summary application" clause applies to postjudgment motions, although in contemporary practice the clause
seems to have been absorbed by the "special proceedings" clause. The
"prevents a judgment" clause has been used to fill various holes in the
statutory scheme but suffers from an incurable malady: lack of meaning. The clause did not make any sense when it first appeared on the
statute books in New York in 1851 and, unlike good wine, it has not
improved with age. It is best ignored.

15. See State v. Marshall, 253 Neb. 676, 682, 573 N.W.2d 406, 410-11 (1998) (holding
that the court lacked jurisdiction to review order denying plea in bar because
appeal was filed after conviction rather than within 30 days of the order); State v.
Trevino, 251 Neb. 344, 346, 556 N.W.2d 638, 640-41 (1996) (same); In re Interest
of Z.R., 226 Neb. 770, 777, 415 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1987) (holding that the court
could not review adjudication order because appeal was filed after the order terminating parental rights rather than within 30 days of the adjudication order).
16. See, e.g., Gordon v. Cmty. First State Bank, 255 Neb. 637, 646, 587 N.W.2d 343,
350-51 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 (1999); State ex rel. Keener v. Graff, 251
Neb. 571, 574-75, 558 N.W.2d 538, 540 (1997); In re Adoption of Krystal P., 248
Neb. 907, 911-12, 540 N.W.2d 312, 315 (1995).
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CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF THE KEY STATUTORY TERMS

The key terms in section 25-1902 are "action," "special proceeding,"
17
and "substantial right." None of these terms are defined by statute.
They are instead defined by case law. The supreme court has not yet
settled on a single definition of any of these terms, however. For example, the court has defined "action" in two ways. First, the court has
said that an action is "a civil action"iS-in other words, "a cause
brought under the provisions of chapter 25 of our statutes."x9 Second,
the court has said that an action "involves prosecuting the alleged
rights between the parties and ends in a final judgment."20 While the
first definition encompasses only civil proceedings, the second encompasses both civil and criminal proceedings.
The court has defined "special proceeding" in three ways. First,
the court has said that a special proceeding is any "civil statutory remedy which is not encompassed in chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised
Statutes."2 1 Second, the court has said that a special proceeding is
22
any "special statutory remedy which is not in itself an action."
Third, the court has said that "[wlhere the law confers a right and
authorizes a special application to a court to enforce the right, the proceeding is special, within the ordinary meaning of the term 'special
proceeding.'" 23 The first two definitions seem to be variations on a
common theme: special proceedings are civil proceedings that are not
17. There is a statutory definition of "action" in section 49-801. That section provides: "Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, words and phrases in the
statutes of Nebraska hereafter enacted are used in the following sense: ... (2)
Action shall include any proceeding in any court of this state." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 49-801(2) (Reissue 1998) (enacted 1947) (emphasis added). There are two reasons why that definition does not apply to section 25-1902. First, the context
indicates that an action is different than a special proceeding; section 25-1902
uses "action" when discussing two types of final orders and uses "special proceeding" when discussing a third type of a final order. Therefore, the context shows
that "action" does not mean 'any proceeding." Second, by its own terms, section
49-801 only applies to later enacted statutes. Section 25-1902, however, was enacted long before section 49-801. See infra note 61.
18. In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 413, 470 N.W.2d 780, 787 (1991).
19. Jaramillo v. Mercury Ins. Co., 242 Neb. 223, 237, 494 N.W.2d 335, 345 (1993).
20. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 253, 570 N.W.2d 331, 336 (1997).
21. Sid Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan, 251 Neb. 722, 734, 559
N.W.2d 740, 748 (1997); see also Slaymaker v. Breyer, 258 Neb. 942, 946, 607
N.W.2d 506, 510 (2000) (same). This definition was first used in 1991. See In re
Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 413, 470 N.W.2d 780, 787 (1991).
22. State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 708-09, 587 N.W.2d 325, 331 (1998) (quoting State
v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 245, 570 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1997)). This is the original
definition of "special proceeding" in Nebraska and was first used in 1882. See
Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb. 321, 323, 11 N.W. 300, 301 (1882).
23. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 253, 570 N.W.2d 331, 335 (1997). This definition
was first used in 1952. See Sullivan v. Storz, 156 Neb. 177, 180, 55 N;W.2d 499,
502 (1952). The court took it from the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in
Schuster v. Schuster, 87 N.W. 1014, 1015 (Minn. 1901).
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governed by the Code of Civil Procedure-in other words, special proceedings are civil proceedings that are not civil actions. The third definition seems to be much broader.
The court has defined "substantial right" in two ways. The first
definition focuses on the importance of the right. The court has said
that a substantial right is "an essential legal right, not a mere technical right."2 4 The second definition focuses on the effect of the order.
The court has said that "[a] substantial right is affected if the order
affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim
or defense that was available to the appellant prior to the order from
which the appeal is taken." 25 The court sometimes uses both of these
definitions together and sometimes uses only one of them. 26
Perhaps no opinion has shaped these various definitions more than
Justice Boslaugh's concurrence to a 1953 decision, Rehn v. Bingaman.2 7 That case involved a claim against an estate. After the administrator of the estate denied the claim, the claimant appealed to
the district court. The administrator subsequently moved for summary judgment, only to have the district court deny the motion. The
administrator then appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court treated
the proceeding below as an action and held that the order denying the
motion was not a final order because it failed to satisfy the requirements of the first clause of section 25-1902 (an order that affects a
substantial right, determines the action, and prevents a judgment).
Justice Boslaugh agreed that the order was not a final order but
thought that the second clause (an order affecting a substantial right
made in a special proceeding) rather than the first clause of section
25-1902 applied. Claims against an estate were adjudicated without
24. Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 253 Neb. 917, 921,
573 N.W.2d 460, 465 (1998). This definition appeared for the first time in 1896.
See Clarke v. Neb. Nat'l Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 802, 69 N.W. 104, 104 (1896).
25. Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 253 Neb. at
921, 573 N.W.2d at 464. This definition appeared for the first time in 1993. See
Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 314, 506 N.W.2d 682, 685 (1993). The definition
traces its roots to Justice Boslaugh's concurrence in a 1953 decision. See Rehn v.
Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 481, 59 N.W.2d 614, 621-22 (1953) (Boslaugh, J.,
concurring).
26. The court has not yet decided whether either definition is the exclusive definition.
See State v. Schlund, 249 Neb. 173, 176, 542 N.W.2d 421, 423 (1996). Although
the court usually includes both definitions in its opinions, see, e.g., State v. Lauck,
261 Neb. 145, 148, 621 N.W.2d 515, 517 (2001); In re Estate of Peters, 259 Neb.
154, 159, 609 N.W.2d 23, 26 (2000), it sometimes only includes the first (essential
legal right). See Sid Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan, 251
Neb. 722, 734, 559 N.W.2d 740, 748 (1997); Rohde v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins.
Co., 244 Neb. 863, 869, 509 N.W.2d 616, 623 (1994). That happens most often in
juvenile cases. See, e.g., In re Interest of Clifford M., 258 Neb. 800, 806, 606
N.W.2d 743, 748 (2000); In re Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52, 56, 601 N.W.2d
780, 783 (1999).
27. 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953).

2001]

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

using the procedures that the Code established for civil actions.
Therefore, the proceedings on such claims were special proceedings
rather than actions.
The code does not contain a definition of an action or a special proceeding
but it does declare that there is but one form of action to be called a civil
action, and the procedure for commencing and pursuing it to a final conclusion
is prescribed. The civil action of the code includes all such proceedings as
prior to its enactment were regarded as actions at law and suits in equity, and
any such action since recognized and authorized by statute.
Any proceeding in a court by which a party prosecutes another for enforcement, protection, or determination of a right or the redress or prevention of a
wrong involving and requiring the pleadings, process, and procedure provided
by the code and ending in a final judgment is an action. Every other proceeding by which a remedy is sought by original application to a court is a special
proceeding. A special proceeding within the meaning of the statute defining a
final order must be one that is not
an action and is not and cannot be legally a
28
step in an action as a part of it.

Justice Boslaugh went on to say that actions and special proceedings were not necessarily mutually exclusive. A special proceeding
could be part of an action, provided that it was not an integral part of
the action.
None of the many steps or proceedings necessary or permitted to be taken in
the action to commence it, to join issues in it, and conduct it to a final hearing
and judgment can be a special proceeding within the terms of the statute. A
special proceeding may be connected with an action... as for instance garnishment or attachment-but it is not an integral part of or a step in the
action or as 2it9 is sometimes referred to in such a situation [,] a part of the
"main case."

The court embraced part of Justice Boslaugh's reasoning in 1991
when it decided In re Interest of R.G.30 That case involved an appeal
from two detention orders that had been entered in a juvenile proceeding. The first was an ex parte order that gave the Department of Social Services (now the Department of Health and Human Services)
custody of a child for no more than 8 days. The second was an order,
entered after notice and hearing, that gave the Department custody of
the child pending an adjudication hearing. The court held that the
first was not a final order but that the second was.
The court held that both orders had been made in a special proceeding. After quoting at length from Justice Boslaugh's concurrence
in Rehn, the court said that his method of analysis was "more helpful
28. Id. at 478-79, 59 N.W.2d at 620-21 (Boslaugh, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 479, 59 N.W.2d at 621.
30. 238 Neb. 405, 411-13, 470 N.W.2d 780, 786-87 (1991). The court had relied on
Justice Boslaugh's concurrence in Rehn once before. See In re Estate of Snover,
233 Neb. 198, 201-02, 443 N.W.2d 894, 897-98, (1989) (holding that a proceeding
to remove a personal representative for cause under section 30-2454 is a special
proceeding). R.G. was the first non-probate case to rely on it, however.
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than some we have employed." 3 1 The court then noted that civil actions are governed by Chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes
and said that "this court has, for nearly 110 years, construed the
phrase [special proceeding] to mean every civil statutory remedy
which is not encompassed in what is now chapter 25."32 Juvenile proceedings were therefore special proceedings because they were encompassed in Chapter 43 rather than Chapter 25.
The court then discussed the requirement that the order must affect a substantial right and indicated that the requirement has two
aspects: (1) the right must be substantial and (2) the effect on the
right must be substantial. The court acknowledged the right at issue
in R.G.-a parent's right to raise her children-was substantial.3 3
The court added, however, that whether the right had been substantially affected depended on the purpose and duration of the order. 3 4
The court did not explicitly analyze the appealability of the orders at
issue in R.G., however. It instead analyzed the parent's due process
challenges to those orders and said that its due process analysis explained why the ex parte order was not a final order while the preadjudication detention order was.
The court said that the absence of a hearing on the ex parte order
did not violate the due process clause for three reasons: (1) the state
had an interest in protecting endangered children, (2) the ex parte order did not play any role in determining whether to issue a pre-adjudication detention order, and (3) the ex parte order had a short
duration. 35 The ex parte order would last only for a few days, which
presumably explains why it did not affect a substantial right. The
pre-adjudication detention order, however, would last much longer.
At the time that R. G. was decided, the statutes specified that the adjudication hearing could be held as late as 6 months after the petition
was filed.36 The long duration of the order explains why due process
31. Id. at 413, 470 N.W.2d at 787.
32. Id. After making that statement, the court gave six examples of special proceedings. Two of its examples-garnishment and summary judgment-are matters
encompassed in what is now chapter 25. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1001 to 251056 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000) (attachment and garnishment); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 25-1330 to 25-1336 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000) (summary
judgment). The contradiction between the court's standard (proceedings not encompassed by chapter 25) and the court's examples (proceedings encompassed by
chapter 25) is symptomatic of the content-free analysis that the court has sometimes used in applying section 25-1902.
33. R.G., 238 Neb. at 414, 470 N.W.2d at 788.
34. Id. at 415, 470 N.W.2d at 788.
35. Id. at 417-18, 470 N.W.2d at 789-90; see also In re Interest of Borius H., 251 Neb.
397, 401, 558 N.W.2d 31, 34 (1997) (restating the reasoning of R.G.).
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-278 (Reissue 1988) (amended 1992). The statute now specifies that the adjudication hearing should be held within 90 days of the filing of
the petition. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-278 (Reissue 1998). The failure to hold the
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required a hearing before the order could be issued, 3 7 and presumably
explains why the order affected a substantial right.
Although the court in R.G. quoted extensively from Justice Boslaugh's concurring opinion in Rehn, it did not quote from the portion of
the opinion in which Justice Boslaugh discussed what kind of order
affects a substantial right. According to Justice Boslaugh, whether an
order affected a substantial right depended on whether it affected the
subject matter of the litigation and could be meaningfully reviewed at
the end of the case.
An order in a special proceeding which does not affect the subject matter
thereof or which will not deprive the complaining party of any legal right if an
appeal is delayed until after final judgment ... does not affect a substantial
right within the meaning of the statute defining a final order. 3 8

The court picked up on this language a few years later when it
decided Jarrettv. Eichler.39 In Jarrett,the plaintiff filed a negligence
action for the injuries she suffered in a car accident. The district court
eventually dismissed the action for want of prosecution. 40 By that
time, the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiffs claim. The
plaintiff later moved within term for an order vacating the dismissal
on the ground that her pregnancy prevented her from undergoing the
medical exams necessary to complete discovery in the case. After the
district court vacated the order of dismissal, the defendant appealed.
The Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of a
final order. In doing so, the court acknowledged that the supreme
court had previously entertained an appeal from an order vacating a
dismissal in Gutchewsky v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co.41 The court of
appeals distinguished Gutchewsky on the ground that it involved an
appeal from an order granting a new trial, an order that was immediately appealable under section 25-1315.03.42

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

hearing within the statutorily-specified period does not require dismissal of the
petition, however. See In re Interest of Brandy M., 250 Neb. 510, 524, 550
N.W.2d 17, 26 (1996) (observing that dismissing petition for lack of prompt adjudication is a discretionary decision).
238 Neb. at 422, 470 N.W.2d at 792.
Rhen v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 481, 59 N.W.2d 614, 621-22 (1953) (Boslaugh,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993).
The trial had dismissed the action twice before. Each time the action was reinstated by agreement of the parties. See id. at 311-12, 506 N.W.2d at 684.
Id. at 314, 506 N.W.2d at 685 (citing Gutchewsky v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co.,
219 Neb. 803, 366 N.W.2d 751 (1985)).
Jarrett v. Eichler, No. A-91-110, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 96, at *4 (March 2, 1993).
Section 25-1315.03 provides that an order "granting or denying a new trial is an
appealable order." NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1315.03 (Reissue 1995). The statute
does not make an order granting or denying a new trial a final order. It remains
an interlocutory order. The statute instead creates an exception to the final judgment rule for such an order. See Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 171 Neb.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:239

In reality, the order at issue in Gutchewsky was not really an order
granting a new trial; there had not been a trial in the first place. The
case had been dismissed for want of prosecution well before it ever
reached trial. The plaintiff then filed what he called a "motion for new
trial" but what was in substance a motion to vacate the order of dismissal. After the district court denied the motion, the plaintiff filed a
motion for reconsideration of his so-called new trial motion. The district court agreed to reconsider its earlier order, granted the plaintiff's
motion for a new trial, and vacated the dismissal. 43
If the court of appeals was correct when it said that the order
granting the plaintiffs "new trial" motion is what distinguished
Gutchewsky from Jarrett, then not much would be left of the final
judgment rule. A party could immediately appeal any interlocutory
order by simply filing a "new trial" motion and then appealing from
the order ruling on that motion. 44 Not surprisingly, the supreme
court rejected the court of appeals' distinction. 45 The court then had a
choice to make. It could hold that the order in Jarrettwas not a final
order, which would require the court to say that it made a mistake in
reviewing the order in five cases: Gutchewsky plus four similar
cases. 4 6 Alternatively, the court could hold that the order in Jarrett
was a final order, which would require the court to do something it
had never done before: explain why an order vacating a dismissal for
failure to prosecute was immediately appealable.
The court decided to hold that the order in Jarrettwas a final order
and to explain why. The court's opinion, however, is an exercise in
verbal gymnastics, most likely because there is no satisfactory way to
explain why an order vacating a dismissal is immediately appealable.
In one breath, the court defined a special proceeding as "every civil

43.
44.

45.

46.

148, 150, 105 N.W.2d 583, 585 (1960), overruled on othergrounds by O'Connor v.
Kaufinan, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998).
See Gutchewsky, 219 Neb. at 804, 366 N.W.2d at 752.
Although the court did not mention this point in its opinion, the court was certainly aware of it. The defendant made the point in its petition for further review. See Petition for Further Review by the Supreme Court at 5, Jarrett v.
Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993) (No. 91-110).
The court did not actually mention the distinction that the court of appeals drew.
It simply said that "we are compelled to correct errors made by the court of appeals regarding motions for new trial." Jarrett,244 Neb. at 312, 506 N.W.2d at
684. The court went on to say that "unless the proceedings leading up to the
motion for new trial constitute a trial, the order granting a new trial does not
afford a right to appeal." Id. at 312, 506 N.W.2d at 684.
See Vacca v. DeJardine, 213 Neb. 736, 331 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (appeal from order
vacating default judgment); A. Hirsh, Inc. v. Nat'l Hair Co., 210 Neb. 397, 315
N.W.2d 236 (1982) (appeal from order vacating dismissal); Fanning v. Richards,
193 Neb. 431, 227 N.W.2d 595 (1975) (same); Jones v. Neb. Blue Cross Hosp.
Serv. Ass'n, 175 Neb. 101, 120 N.W.2d 557 (1963) (appeal from order vacating
default judgment).
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statutory remedy which is not encompassed in chapter 25."47 In the
next breath, the court said that a proceeding to vacate a dismissal
within term fit that definition because a "court's authority to vacate
its prior decisions within term does not derive from chapter 25; rather,
it is an inherent authority and is derived from common law."48 In
other words, the proceeding to vacate the dismissal was a statutory
proceeding because it was not a statutory proceeding.
Things did not get much better when the court tried to explain why
the order affected a substantial right. The court redefined the term
"substantial right" by reworking Justice Boslaugh's language in Rehn.
The court needed to do that because Justice Boslaugh's language
would not allow the court to say that the order at issue in Jarrettaffected a substantial right. Simply put, an order vacating a dismissal
does not "deprive the complaining party of any legal right if an appeal
is delayed until after final judgment."4 9 The party is free to challenge
such an order on an appeal from the final judgment. If the appellate
court concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
the motion, it can vacate the final judgment and remand the case with
instructions to dismiss.
Therefore, the court dropped the idea of rights being lost and replaced it with the idea of claims or defenses being diminished. "A substantial right is affected," the court said, "if the order affects the
subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim or defense
that was available to the appellant prior to the order from which he or
she is appealing."50 The court went on to hold that the order in Jarrett affected a substantial right because, if the district court had not
vacated the order of dismissal, the defendant could have invoked the
statute of limitations to defeat any new lawsuit that the plaintiff
might have filed.
47. Jarrett,244 Neb. at 314, 506 N.W.2d at 685 (emphasis added).

48. Id. at 314, 506 N.W.2d at 685 (emphasis added); see also Emry v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., Inc., 214 Neb. 435, 441-42, 334 N.W.2d 786, 791 (1983) (stating that

the district court's inherent power to vacate its own judgments during term exists
independent of any statute); Moackler v. Finley, 207 Neb. 353, 357, 299 N.W.2d
166, 168 (1980) (same). The 2000 amendments to section 25-2001 recognized the
inherent power and extended it to motions filed after term but within six months
of the entry of the judgment or order. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2001(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2000). After expiration of the six month period, a district court can modify
or vacate its own judgments pursuant to either NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2001(3)-(4)
(Cum. Supp. 2000) or its general equity powers. See, e.g., Thrift Mart, Inc. v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 251 Neb. 448, 453, 558 N.W.2d 531, 535 (1997);
Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Neb. 833, 840-41, 229 N.W.2d 629, 633 (1947).
49. Rhen v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 481, 59 N.W.2d 614, 621-22 (1953) (Boslaugh,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
50. Jarrett,244 Neb. at 314, 506 N.W.2d at 685. Justice Boslaugh's concurrence in
Rehn was the only support that the court cited for this statement.
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The court's explanation seems to be somewhat of a stretch. The
requirement that the order must affect "the subject matter of the litigation" suggests that the order must diminish a claim or defense that
could have been asserted in the very litigation in which the order was
entered. Otherwise, the loss of the claim or defense would not affect
"the subject matter of the litigation." The order at issue in Jarrett,
however, did not diminish a claim or defense; it simply allowed the
litigation to go forward. To the extent that it affected any defenses, it
affected a statute of limitations defense in another case-and a hypothetical case at that.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Jarrett'sdefinition of "substantial right" is just a collection of malleable words that have no real
meaning. Yet the court continues to invoke the words as though they
actually mean something. For example, take the court's 2001 decision
in State v. Lauck.51 Lauck was charged with willfully providing false
information on an application for a handgun certificate. The basis for
the charge was the false answer Lauck gave to a question about prior
convictions. Lauck filed a plea in abatement on the ground that,
under a proper interpretation of the relevant statute, it was not illegal
to provide false information about prior convictions. He claimed it
was only illegal to provide false information about one's name, address, social security number, and date of birth. The district court
overruled the plea, and Lauck appealed.
The court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order. The court
said that order did not affect a substantial right because it did not
diminish any claim or defense available to Lauck at trial.
Lauck may still present all of the defenses that he could have presented before
the order overruling his plea in abatement. Lauck can argue, through the
rules of statutory interpretation, that he did not commit any crime at all or
that he did not commit the crime of false information under § 69-2408. Lauck
is not precluded from making a motion to dismiss after the State rests its case
.... If Lauck were convicted of the charge against him, he would not be
prohibited from raising on appeal the issue of whether there was sufficient
52
evidence to convict him.

What the court seems to be saying is that the order rejecting Lauck's
no-such-crime defense did not diminish his no-such-crime defense because he could continue asserting it (and presumably the trial court
could continue rejecting it) at successive points in the litigation. That
just makes no sense. For all practical purposes, the defense no longer
exists at the trial court level. The trial court squarely rejected the
defense when it denied Lauck's plea in abatement. If an order denying such a plea does not affect the subject matter of the litigation by
diminishing a defense, then it is hard to imagine what kind of order
would.
51. 261 Neb. 145, 621 N.W.2d 515 (2001).
52. Id. at 149, 621 N.W.2d at 518.
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Given the problems the court had in explaining why the order did
not affect a substantial right, the court might have been better off had
it taken a different track. Rather than beginning with the question of
whether the order affected a substantial right, the court might have
begun with the question of whether the order was made in a special
proceeding. The answer to that question seems much clearer. The order was made in a criminal action, not a special proceeding. Therefore, it was not a final order regardless of whether it affected a
substantial right.
But nothing is clear in the world of special proceedings. The
court's various definitions of "special proceeding" are so malleable that
just about any proceeding can be classified as a special proceeding. A
plea in abatement fits two of the three definitions of "special proceeding." A plea in abatement is a statutory proceeding. Section 29-1809
authorizes the plea "when there is a defect in the record which is
shown by facts extrinsic thereto." Therefore, a plea in abatement is a
"special statutory remedy which is not in itself an action." Putting
things another way, the law not only confers a right to an abatement
when there is a defect in the record but also authorizes a special application to a court to enforce the right. Therefore, "the proceeding is
special, within the ordinary meaning of the term 'special proceeding.'"
The court's 1997 decision in Sid Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan5 3 provides an even better illustration of how malleable the court's definitions are. Sullivan was unhappy with the
service he received at Sid Dillon Chevrolet so he mounted a public
relations campaign that accused Sid Dillon of being a dishonest
dealer. Sid Dillon struck back by suing Sullivan for violation of the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.54 On the same day that the
suit was filed, the district court entered a temporary restraining order
against Sullivan, restraining him from saying anything that might
damage Sid Dillon.5 5 Sullivan unsuccessfully moved to dissolve the
53. 251 Neb. 722, 559 N.W.2d 740 (1997).
54. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act is codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87301 to 87-306 (Reissue 1999). Sid Dillon also asserted a common law claim for
libel and slander. The claim was dismissed at some point in the litigation and
was a not a basis for the issuance of the temporary injunction. See Brief of Appellant at 1, Sullivan, 251 Neb. 722, 559 N.W.2d 740 (1997) (No. A-94-1176).
55. The temporary restraining order remained in effect for well over two years. It
was entered on June 8, 1992 (the day on which the petition was filed) and remained in effect until November 10, 1994. See 251 Neb. at 727-28, 550 N.W.2d at
744. That should not have happened. A temporary restraining order given without notice can remain in effect for no longer than 10 days unless (1) the court
finds that there is good cause for extending the order for up to another 10 days or
(2) the restrained party consents to an extension for a longer period of time. See
NEB. REv.STAT. § 25-1064(3) (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000). Unless Sullivan consented to extending the life of the order (which seems unlikely given that
he moved to dissolve it seven days after it was entered), the temporary re-
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temporary restraining order, and the case eventually proceeded to
trial. The district court found for Sid Dillon and entered a permanent
injunction against Sullivan. It also found that Sullivan had violated
the temporary restraining order on more than one occasion. The court
therefore held him in contempt. 56
On appeal, the supreme court held that both the temporary restraining order and the permanent injunction were unconstitutional
prior restraints on speech. The court invoked the collateral bar rule,
however, to uphold the district court's order finding Sullivan in contempt. Under the collateral bar rule, a party who violates a court order cannot defend a subsequent contempt charge by attacking the
validity of the underlying order. 5 7 There are a number of exceptions
to the collateral bar rule, including, for example, the exception that
applies when a party lacks an effective means of challenging the order.58 The court in Sullivan closed the door to that exception by rewriting Nebraska law. It held that Sullivan could have appealed the
order denying his motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order.
The order was appealable, the court said, because it was made in special proceeding and affected a substantial right made in a special
proceeding.
straining order that the district court entered was invalid. Perhaps the only way
to have salvaged the validity of the order would have been to treat the hearing on
the motion to dissolve the order as a hearing on a motion for temporary injunction and to treat the order denying the motion as an order granting a temporary
injunction. Even then there would have been a problem because the order denying the motion to dissolve was not entered until over two months after the temporary restraining order was issued. See 251 Neb. at 727, 559 N.W.2d at 744.
56. The district court fined Sullivan $25,000. Although the opinion does not identify
the type of contempt, it was presumably coercive civil contempt. The district
court's order provided that Sullivan could purge himself of the fine if he did not
violate the permanent injunction for approximately one year after the injunction
was issued. See 251 Neb. at 727-29, 559 N.W.2d at 744-45. The presence of a
purge plan is a hallmark of civil contempt. See, e.g., Jessen v. Jessen, 5 Neb. Ct.
App. 914, 567 N.W.2d 612 (1997).
57. See Sullivan, 251 Neb. at 733, 559 N.W. at 748; see also Evans v. Williams, 206
F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 153-59
(2d ed. 1993) (discussing the collateral bar rule). The collateral bar rule normally
applies only to criminal contempt proceedings. The reason is that, while a criminal contempt conviction survives even if the underlying order is vacated, a civil
contempt conviction does not survive. See, e.g., Collins v. Barry, 841 F.2d 1297,
1299-1300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175,
1182 (3d Cir. 1976). But one might argue that coercive civil contempt, like criminal contempt, is designed to vindicate the authority of the court and should therefore survive even if the underlying order falls. Whether that reflects the court's
thinking in Sullivan is unclear; the court did not explain why the collateral bar
rule applied to Sullivan's civil contempt conviction.
58. See In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991); 13A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3537, at 546-47 (2d ed.
1984).
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The district court grounded its denial of Sullivan's motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order on the fact that, in part, the action was brought and
the order was entered under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: a
statutory civil remedy not encompassed in chapter 25. Further, the temporary restraining order completely prohibited Sullivan from speaking about
Dillon; thus, the order clearly affected an essential legal right. 5 9

The logical implication of this passage is startling. If the order at
issue in Sullivan was made in a special proceeding because the action
was based on the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, then any
order that affects a statutory cause of action would be an order made
in a special proceeding. That would include everything from an order
denying a motion to strike in a wrongful death action to an order
granting a motion to compel in a UCC case. Furthermore, if Sullivan
means what it says, then a number of the court's earlier decisions
would no longer be valid, namely its decisions holding that orders dissolving or continuing temporary injunctions are not final, appealable
60
orders.
It is hard to believe the court meant what it said. It seems far
more likely that, for whatever reason, the court wanted to affirm Sullivan's contempt conviction and wrote its opinion accordingly. The
court apparently did so, however, without considering what effect its
virtually unlimited language could have in the future. So far, the language has not had any effect; the court has not cited Sullivan in any of
its subsequent cases that address the question of what constitutes a
special proceeding. But there is no guarantee that Sullivan will remain dormant as the court continues to struggle with section 25-1902.
Perhaps the major reason why the court continues to struggle with
section 25-1902 is that while the court has articulated a number of
definitions, it has neither explained why those are the correct definitions nor identified the policies that the statute serves. As a result,
the definitions have become malleable, the analysis has become
wooden, and the area has become a morass. That is not surprising.
To paraphrase an old adage, bad statutes make for bad law. What
makes section 25-1902 a bad statute is that it uses words that have no
59. 251 Neb. at 734, 559 N.W.2d at 748.
60. See Guar. Fund Comm'n v. Teichmeier, 119 Neb. 387, 229 N.W. 121 (1930); Meng
v. Coffee, 52 Neb. 44, 71 N.W. 975 (1897); Bartram v. Sherman, 46 Neb. 713, 65
N.W. 789 (1896); Einspahr v. Smith, 46 Neb. 138, 64 N.W. 698 (1895); Clark v.
Fitch, 32 Neb. 511, 49 N.W. 374 (1891); Scofield v. State Nat'l Bank, 8 Neb. 16
(1878). At the time that these cases were decided, a temporary injunction could

be issued without notice to the defendant if (s)he had not yet answered at the
time that the temporary injunction was sought. See NEB. ComP. STAT. §§ 20-1064
to 20-1066 (1930). If the injunction was issued without notice to the defendant
(s)he could move to dissolve the injunction. See NEB. CoMP. STAT. § 20-1075
(1930). In 1986, the legislature added what is now section 25-1064(2). That section specifies that a temporary injunction cannot be issued without notice to the
adverse party. NEB. Ray. STAT. § 25-1064(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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plain meaning and fails to provide any context or points of reference to
help a court interpret those words. That raises the question of
whether the words ever meant anything.
The answer is "yes"--and "no." History indicates that Justice Boslaugh was on the right track when he said that the difference between
actions and special proceedings was procedural. His analytical train
derailed, however, when he said that a special proceeding could occur
within an action. Actions and special proceedings were originally created as mutually exclusive categories. History also indicates that the
words "substantial right" worked their way into the statute, not because they meant anything, but because they were handy. That is
worth knowing; it is much easier for a court to work with an incoherent statute when the court knows that there is no well-understood definition lurking in the background, waiting to be discovered. That
knowledge allows a court to create coherence by focusing on fundamental policies rather than to perpetuate incoherence by focusing on
meaningless words.
III.

THE NEW YORK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The operative language of section 25-1902 has remained unchanged since it was adopted by the Territorial Legislature in 1858.61
Like much of the Nebraska Code of Civil Procedure, section 25-1902
was copied verbatim from the 1853 Ohio Code of Civil Procedure.62
The Ohio Code was in turn copied in large part from the New York
Code of Procedure, 63 which is also known as the "Field Code."64 Like
61. What is now section 25-1902 was originally section 521 of the 1858 Code of Civil
Procedure. Section 521 provided:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in
effect determines the action and prevents a judgment; and an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, is a final order which may
be vacated, modified or reversed as provided in this title.
NEB. CODE CrV. P. § 521, 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 197. The only changes over time
have involved the last clause of the statute. In the 1913 revision, "as provided in
this title" was changed to "as provided in this chapter and chapter 19." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 8176 (1914). Chapter 19 involved the vacation or modification of judgments at subsequent term. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8207-8215 (1914) (now codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2001 through 25-2009 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000)).
In the 1943 revision, the clause was changed to "as provided in this chapter."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1943).
62. Compare NEB. CODE CIV. P. § 521, 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 197, with OHIO STAT. ch.
87, § 512 (Swan Comp. 1854). See Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb. 321, 323, 11 N.W.
300, 301 (1882); CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE
PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 102 (Cincinnati, W. H. Anderson & Co.
1897).
63. See HEPBURN, supra note 62, at 100.
64. See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 22 (2d ed.
1947).
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the Nebraska Code, the Ohio Code
did not contain definitions of either
"action" or "special proceeding." 65 But the New York Code did. The
New York Code opened with a series of general definitions that focused on remedies in the courts of justice. As used in the Code, the
term "remedies" did not refer to damages, injunctions, orders, or other
forms of relief. It instead referred to the means of enforcing rights. In
other words, "remedies in the courts
of justice" was just another way
66
of saying "judicial proceedings."
The Code divided judicial proceedings into two categories: actions
and special proceedings. 6 7 Actions were in turn divided into two categories: civil and criminal. 68 The Code defined an action as "an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which a party prosecutes
another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress
or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offence." 609
The Code then defined a special proceeding as "every other remedy."7
In other words, a special proceeding was any judicial proceeding65. The terms "action," "special proceeding," and "substantial right" now have statutory definitions in Ohio. "An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court ofjustice,
involving process, pleadings, and ending in a judgment or decree, by which a
party prosecutes another for the redress of a legal wrong, enforcement of a legal
right, or the punishment of a public offense." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.01
(Anderson 1998) (effective 1953). A special proceeding is "an action or proceeding
that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an
action at law or a suit in equity." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02(A)(2) (Anderson 1998) (effective 1998). A substantial right is "a right that the United States
Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect." OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2505.02(A)(1) (Anderson 1998) (effective 1998).
66. See In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 87 (1860); Belknap v. Waters, 11 N.Y. 477, 478
(1854). Historically, the term "remedies" referred to the "judicial means of enforcing a right or redressing a wrong." Stratton v. European and N. Am. Ry., 74
Me. 422, 428 (1883); see, e.g., United States v. Layman, 26 F. Cas. 1024, 1031
(C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 15,647); Missionary Soc'y of the Methodist Episcopal
Church v. Ely, 47 N.E. 537, 538 (Ohio 1897); California v. Poulterer, 16 Cal. 515,
527 (1860).
67. Amended Code § 1, 1849 N.Y. Laws 614.
68. Amended Code § 4, 1849 N.Y. Laws 614. The Code defined a criminal action as
one "prosecuted by the people of the state as a party, against a person charged
with a public offence, for the punishment thereof." Amended Code § 5, 1849 N.Y.
Laws 614. A civil action was defined as every other action. Amended Code § 6,
1849 N.Y. Laws 614.
69. Amended Code § 2, 1849 N.Y. Laws 614. The definition in the original Code was
the same except that the original Code used the term "regular judicial proceeding" rather than "ordinary proceeding." Code § 2, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. The New
York Commissioners on Practice & Pleadings originally proposed a slightly different definition. The Commissioners defined an action as "a judicial proceeding,
between party and party, for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress
of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offence." FIRST REPORT OF THE CO1,SIISsIoNERS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS 2 (Albany, Charles Van Benthuysen, 1848)

[hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
70. Amended Code § 3, 1849 N.Y. Laws 614.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:239

whether civil or criminal-that was not an ordinary proceeding. The
Code, however, did not contain any concrete examples of ordinary proceedings-or at least none that were specifically identified as such.
The Code also did not include any concrete examples of special proceedings. The term "special proceeding" appeared only three times in
the original Code, twice in the portion that contained the Code's general definitions and once in the section that governed the jurisdiction
of the New York Court of Appeals.71 The term was never used in the
context of particular proceedings that were specifically labeled as special proceedings. Yet those concrete examples exist, primarily in the
legislative history of the Code. The reason why they are not in the
Code itself is that the Code was never finished-or at least not in the
way that the drafters envisioned. It was just the first installment of
what the drafters envisioned as a comprehensive code of procedure
that would encompass "the whole law of the State, concerning reme72
dies in the courts of justice."
A.

The Distinction Between Actions and Special
Proceedings

The Code was drafted by the New York Commissioners on Practice
and Pleadings. When the Commissioners were appointed in 1847, law
and equity were still separate procedural systems in New York. There
had been some changes over time. For example, the New York Constitution of 1846 abolished the separate court of chancery and gave the
supreme court both legal and equitable jurisdiction. 7 3 Yet the basic
procedural rules for actions at law and suits in equity were still different.7 4 The differences were especially pronounced in the area of
71. See Code §§ 1, 3, 11, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 499. The term also appeared once in
the Facilitating Act. See Facilitating Act § 9, 1848 N.Y. Laws 568 (governing appeals from the special to the general terms of the supreme court in existing suits).
72. FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at v.
73. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 3; art. XIV, §5.
74. The Constitution of 1846 did take one step toward merging law and equity. Prior
to the adoption of the Constitution, witnesses in actions at law testified orally in
open court while witnesses in suits in equity testified before an examiner who
transcribed their testimony for use at trial. See GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK IN
EQUITY ACTIONS, ADAPTED TO THE CODE OF PROCEDURE 13-15 (Albany, Weare C.

Little 1860). The constitution changed that by specifying that testimony in equity cases would be taken in the same way as it was taken in law cases. N.Y.
CONST. of 1846, art VI, § 10.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the constitution was the provision that
required the legislature to appoint three commissioners "whose duty it shall be to
revise, reform, simplify and abridge the rules of practice, pleadings, forms and
proceedings of the courts of record of this State" subject to adoption and modification by the legislature. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 24. Those commissioners
became known as the Commissioners on Practice & Pleadings and were responsi-
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pleading. The common law pleading system was built around the
forms of action and was designed to tender a question of law or fact for
decision. 75 The equity pleading system was more free-flowing and
was designed in part to give the plaintiff an opportunity to obtain discovery from the defendant.76
The basic marching orders that the Commissioners received from
the legislature were to abolish the "forms of actions and pleadings in
cases at common law" and to create "a uniform course of proceeding in
all cases, whether of legal or equitable cognizance." 77 Yet the Commissioners had grander ideas. They saw their task as nothing less
than preparing a comprehensive code of procedure that would "make
full provision for every proceeding in the judicial tribunals from the
78
beginning to the end of every controversy."
Making full provision for every proceeding involved more than
drafting uniform procedural rules for actions at law and suits in equity. It also involved redrafting the rules of evidence, the rules of procedure for criminal cases, and the rules of procedure for a variety of
statutory proceedings that the Commissioners called "special proceedings." Those proceedings included, among others, arbitration, habeas
corpus, discharge of insolvent debtors, and lien enforcement. 7 9 What
ble for drafting the Code of Procedure. The appointment of the Commissioners is
discussed infra in note 143.
75. There were a number of different forms of action. They included, among others,
Assumpsit, Covenant, Debt, Trespass, and Trespass on the Case. Although the
major difference between the various forms of action was substantive, there were
also incidental procedural differences between them. Most of those procedural
differences involved traverses (denials), the procedural device for tendering issues of fact. For further discussion of common law pleading, see JOSEPH H. KoFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COIrnON LAw PLEADING (1969); HENRY
WINTRmop BALLANTINE & BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMION-LAW

PLEADING (3d ed. 1923); R. Ross PERRY, COMMON LAWV PLEADING: ITS HISTORY AND
PRINCIPLES (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1897).
76. The plaintiffs initial pleading in equity was called a "bill." A bill had nine parts:
the address, the introduction, the stating part, the confederating part, the charging part, the jurisdictional part, the interrogating part, the prayer for relief, and
the prayer for process. See VAN SArvooRD, supra note 74, at 11. The stating
part contained a narrative of the facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action
and was the model for the Code's provisions on fact pleading. See id. at 11-12; see
also CLARK, supra note 64, at 16-17 (noting the contents of the stating part).
The interrogating part was a discovery device and contained general and special interrogatories. The general interrogatory was a prayer that the defendants
admit or deny the allegations of the bill according to their knowledge, information, and belief. The special interrogatories were essentially requests for admission on matters relevant to the plaintiffs cause of action. For further discussion
of equity pleading, see BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EQUITY

PLEADING (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1897); C.C. LANGDELL, A StmmiARY OF
EQUITY PLEADING (2d ed., Cambridge, Charles W. Sever and Co. 1883).
77. Act of Apr. 8, 1847, ch. 59, § 8, 1847 N.Y. Laws 67.
78. FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at iv.
79. FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 2.
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made those proceedings special was their procedure. They were all
regulated by statutes that prescribed procedural rules different than
the procedural rules for either actions at law or suits in equity.
In short, there were really three categories of civil proceedings
with which the Commissioners were concerned: (1) actions at law, (2)
suits in equity, and (3) everything else. What the Commissioners essentially did was collapse those three categories into two. Actions at
law and suits in equity became civil actions and were given a new set
of uniform procedural rules. The procedural leftovers-in other
words, the proceedings that were not governed by the uniform procedural rules-became special proceedings.
The Commissioners submitted their first report to the legislature
in 1848. This report-which the Commissioners described as "but a
report in part"so-did not include rules of evidence, rules of criminal
procedure, or rules of procedure for what the Commissioners called
"the immense mass of special proceedings known to our law."8 1 Those
would all be the subject of future reports. The first report instead focused on the most pressing concern: the distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity.
What the Commissioners proposed in their first report was nothing
short of a procedural revolution. Part II of their proposed code abolished law and equity as separate procedural systems and built a new
procedural system around a new form of action: the civil action. From
the standpoint of the Commissioners, all of their proposed reforms
rested on the following section:
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all
such actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished; and, there shall be
in this state, hereafter, but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress2 or prevention of private wrongs, which
8
shall be denominated a civil action.

Because not all actions implicated the same considerations, the
Commissioners proposed a few specialized rules for particular actions.8 3 Yet the hallmark of the new procedural system was uniformity. The same basic procedural rules would apply to all civil actions,
80. FIRST

REPORT, supra note 69, at iv.
81. FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at v.
82. Code § 62, 1848 N.Y. Laws 510. Here is how the Commissioners described this
section when they first proposed it:
The chief object ... is to declare the leading principles which lie at the
foundation of the whole proposed system of legal procedure, and without
which, in our judgment, very few, if any essential reforms can be effected
in remedial law. We refer to the abolition of the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and of the forms of such actions and
suits.
FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 67-68.
83. For example, there were specialized rules for pleading publication in libel and
slander actions, for pleading satisfaction of conditions precedent in contract ac-
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regardless of whether they were legal or equitable: all civil actions
84
would be brought in the name of the real party in interest, com85
menced by service of a summons, and governed by the same rules of
joinder, pleading, and discovery.8 6 The judgments in all civil actions
would be reviewed by appeal and governed by the same rules of
87
execution.
Although most of the Commissioners' proposals were procedural,
some of them were jurisdictional. Part I of their proposed code rewrote a number of the statutes governing the civil jurisdiction of the
New York courts. That was necessary because those statutes were
cast in terms of the old forms of action.8 8 In rewriting the jurisdictional statutes, the Commissioners gave the court of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from, among other things, judgments in actions and
final orders in special proceedings.8 9
The legislature made some changes to the Commissioners' proposed code before enacting it into law. One of those changes made it
clear that the Code did not apply to special proceedings. Section 390
of the Code specified that, "[u]ntil the legislature shall otherwise provide, this act shall not affect . . . any special statutory remedy not
heretofore obtained by action [i.e., any proceeding that was not an action at law or a suit in equity]."90 There was a good reason for includ-

84.

85.
86.

87.

88.
89.
90.

tions, and for obtaining provisional relief in replevin actions. See Amended Code
§§ 162, 164, 206-17, 1849 N.Y. Laws 648-49, 656-58.
See First Report, supra note 69, at 123-25; Code § 91, 1848 N.Y. Laws 515. The
purpose of the real party in interest requirement was to allow contract assignees
to sue. Although equity recognized their right to do so, law did not. See GEORGE
VAN SANTvooRD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS
UNDER THE NEW YORK CODE OF PROCEDURE 64-65 (Albany, John D. Parsons, Jr.
1873); FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 123-25.
See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 131-32; Code § 106, 1848 N.Y. Laws 518.
The Code's provisions on joinder of parties were based on the equity rules. See
VAN SANTvooRD, supra note 74, at 74-82. The initial provisions on joinder of
causes of action were based on the common law rules; like the common law rules,
the Code's provisions focused on the nature of the action. Compare KOFFLER &
REPPY, supranote 75, at 96-98 with Code § 143, 1848 N.Y. Laws 525. Those provisions were later expanded in 1852 to allow joinder when the causes of action
arose out of the same transaction. See Amended Code § 162, 1852 N.Y. Laws 655.
The Code's discovery provisions were fairly limited by modem standards. The
Code allowed requests to admit the genuineness of a document, requests for a
court order to inspect documents, and depositions of adverse parties. Amended
Code §§ 388-97, 1849 N.Y. Laws 690-92.
See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 197-203 (execution), 213-31 (appeals); Code
§§ 238-57, 271-324, 1848 N.Y. LAws 541-44, 547-55. Prior to adoption of the
Code, writs of error were used to review judgments in law actions while appeals
were used to review decrees in equity. See infra text notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 8.
FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 11; see Code § 11, 1848 N.Y. Laws 499.
Code § 390, 1848 N.Y. Laws 565.
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ing that section. The Code was a work in progress and the operative
provisions that would affect special proceedings had not yet been
written.
It soon became apparent that there were problems with the Code,
problems that led to a series of amendments in the years that followed.91 Those problems in turn torpedoed the Commissioners' plans
for a comprehensive code of procedure. The Commissioners submitted
their final report in 1850. Their final report included a four-part proposed code of civil procedure as well as a proposed code of criminal
procedure.92 Parts one and two of the proposed code of civil procedure
were an expanded version of what had already been enacted. Part
three was a proposed codification of rules of procedure for various special proceedings. Part four was a proposed codification of the rules of
evidence.
The legislature did adopt some of the proposed revisions to the
original code. But because of its dissatisfaction with the original code,
the legislature did not adopt the proposed code of criminal procedure,
the proposed rules of procedure for special proceedings, or the proposed rules of evidence. 9 3 The end result was a Code whose general
definitions recognized three categories of proceedings-civil actions,
criminal actions, and special proceedings-but whose operative provisions only addressed civil actions.
Although the legislature did not adopt the portion of the Commissioners' final report that dealt with special proceedings, that portion
again reflects the Commissioners' understanding that the line between civil actions and special proceedings rested on procedural differences. The major differences were that, unlike civil actions, special
proceedings did not involve the use of formal pleadings to frame the
issues and the service of a summons on the defendant. They instead
involved the use of motions and the service of notices or court orders.
In other words, the proposed procedural rules of special proceedings
resembled the procedural rules for motions.
For example, take mandamus. The plaintiff in a mandamus proceeding filed a motion for a writ of mandamus-which is another way
91. The Code was substantially amended in 1849. The original code contained 391
sections; the Code as amended in 1849 contained 473 sections. See Amended
Code, 1849 N.Y. Laws 613-705; Code of Procedure, 1848 N.Y. Laws, 497-565. The
Code was again amended in 1851. See Amended Code, 1851 N.Y. Laws, 876-904.
92. See COMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT]; COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCE-

OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850) [hereinafter FINAL CRIMINAL REPORT]. The reports were dated December 31, 1849. Presumably they were submitted after New Year's Day 1850.
93. See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT 194 (1981).
DURE
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of saying that the plaintiff filed a motion for a court order. 94 By contrast, the plaintiff in a civil action filed a complaint which, among
other things, included a statement of the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. 9 5 The defendant in a mandamus proceeding was
served with a court order in the form of either a peremptory writ or an
alternative writ. The peremptory writ ordered the defendant to perform the act at issue. The alternative writ ordered the defendant, at
the time and place specified in the writ, to show cause why (s)he had
not performed the act at issue. 96 By contrast, the defendant in a civil
action was served with a summons that, among other things, required
the defendant to serve an answer within 20 days after service of the
97
summons.
A defendant served with an alternative writ could show cause by
filing an answer. The writ and the answer framed the issues for decision. No other pleadings or written allegations were allowed. 98 By
contrast, the parties' pleadings framed the issues in a civil action.
Those pleadings included the plaintiffs complaint, the defendant's answer or demurrer to the plaintiffs complaint, the plaintiffs reply or
demurrer to new matter alleged in the defendant's answer, and the
99
defendant's demurrer to new matter alleged in the plaintiffs reply.
The proposed rules for mandamus were atypical in that they contemplated the use of one (but not all) of the pleadings that were used
in civil actions. In the case of mandamus, that pleading was the answer. But the proposed rules for most special proceedings did not contemplate the use of any pleadings. That was true of, among others,
the proposed rules for habeas corpus proceedings, probate proceedings, condemnation proceedings, contempt proceedings, conservatorship proceedings, corporate dissolution proceedings, and summary

94. See FINAL REPORT, supranote 92, at 536-37, 539 (section 1287). The Commissioners proposed changing the name of mandamus to "mandate." Id. at 537-38 (section 1282).
95. Amended Code § 142, 1849 N.Y. Laws 645.
96. FnNAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 538-39 (section 1285).
97. Amended Code § 128, 1849 N.Y. Laws 641. Under the 1849 amendments, a copy
of the complaint did not have to be served with the summons. If the defendant
made a written demand within 10 days after service of the summons, however,
the plaintiffwas required to serve a copy of the complaint on the defendant. The
defendant was then required to serve the answer within 20 days after service of
the complaint. Amended Code § 130, 1849 N.Y. Laws 642.
98. FnNAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 539-40 (section 1290).
99. Amended Code §§ 140-55, 1849 N.Y. Laws 645-47. The original Code did not include demurrers to the defendant's answer or to the plaintiffs reply. The legislature added them in 1849. See FniNAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 265 (proposing
elimination of demurrers to answers or replies on the ground they encouraged
delay and increased expenses).
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proceedings to foreclose on a mortgage. They instead contemplated
the use of motions only.OO
In short, the Commissioners' reports indicate that, at least from
the standpoint of the Commissioners, civil actions had two major characteristics that special proceedings of a civil nature did not. Civil actions involved (1) the service of a summons and (2) the use of the
pleadings prescribed by the Code. Because those characteristics were
procedural rather than historical, the classification of a particular proceeding at any given point in time was not written in stone. Classifications changed as procedures changed. For example, quo warranto
was a special proceeding when the Code was first adopted in 1848.101
It became a civil action in 1849, however, when the legislature abolished the old procedures for quo warranto (writs and informations)
and replaced them with the new procedures of the Code.102
100. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 541 (explaining applications for writs of assessment of damages for private property taken by the state for public use), 546
(explaining applications for writs of deliverance, the new name that the Commissioners gave to writs of habeas corpus), 584-85 (explaining applications for orders
confirming sale of property in summary foreclosure proceedings), 619-20 (explaining warrants of arrest, notices, or orders to show cause in indirect contempt
proceedings), 633-35 (explaining applications for orders to show cause in corporate dissolution proceedings), 651-66 (disallowing pleadings in surrogates' courts,
which would include probate proceedings and conservatorship proceedings
(known at the time as proceedings in cases of insanity or habitual drunkenness)).
That was even true, at least to some extent, of the proposed rules for forcible
entry and detainer, the special proceeding that most closely resembled a civil action. The defendant in forcible entry and detainer proceedings was not served
with a summons. The defendant was instead served with either an order to show
cause or a notice of motion. See id. at 594-95. The proposed rules provided for
the use of complaints and answers, but not demurrers or replies. See id. Although the complaint may have served an issue-framing function, it also served
another function. The complaint (which had to be verified) provided the evidentiary basis for the order to show cause. See id. at 594.
Forcible entry and detainer proceedings were designed to be conducted
quickly. The notice or order to show cause could be served as little as two days
before the appearance date, which was also the answer date. See id. at 595. In
actions, however, the answer date could not be less than 20 days after service of
the summons. See Amended Code §§ 128-30, 1849 N.Y. Laws 641-42. That suggests that adherence to the timing.provisions of the Code was another essential
attribute of an action.
101. See Code § 390, 1848 N.Y. Laws 565 (stating that Code does not affect quo warranto proceedings).
102. See Amended Code § 428, 1849 N.Y. Laws 698; People v. Cook, 8 N.Y. 67, 71
(1853);

THIRD REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS

16 (Al-

bany, Weed Parsons & Co., 1849) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT]. The 1849 amendments also included specialized provisions for quo warranto actions, provisions
that were substantially identical to the provisions the Commissioners proposed in
their Third Report. CompareAmended Code §§ 429-47, 1849 N.Y. Laws 698-701,
with THIRD REPORT, supra, at 50-56.
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Appellate Jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals

All of this would be of passing historical interest had the distinction between actions and special proceedings not worked its way into
section 11 of the Code, the section that governed the jurisdiction of the
New York Court of Appeals. But the distinction did work its way into
section 11-and section 11 in turn worked its way westward to Nebraska by way of Ohio. It is therefore worth exploring the history of
section 11 in order to determine what meaning, if any, the Commissioners attached to its key terms.
Section 11 gave the court of appeals jurisdiction to review on appeal "every actual determination" made at the general term (i.e., appellate term) of certain courts' 0 3 in the following cases:
1. In a judgment in an action... ; and upon the appeal from such judgment,
to review any intermediate order involving the merits, and necessarily affecting the judgment:
2. In an order affecting a substantial right, made in such action, when such
order in effect determines the action, and prevents a judgment from which an
appeal might be taken:
3. In a final order, affecting a substantial right made, in a special
proceed10 4
ing, or upon a summary application, in an action after judgment.
103. The courts were the New York Supreme Court, the Court of Common Pleas for
the City and County of New York, and the Superior Court of the City of New
York. Those courts had both appellate and original jurisdiction. They could only
exercise appellate jurisdiction at what was called "general term." The general
term of the supreme court consisted of at least three judges. N.Y. CONST. of 1846,
art. VI, § 6. The general term of the court of common pleas and the superior court
consisted of two judges. Amended Code § 36, 1849 N.Y. Laws 622.
The general terms had jurisdiction to hear appeals from special terms of the
same court. Unlike a general term, a special term was held by one judge. See 1
HENRY WHITTAKER, PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE CODE 20-21 (New York,
E.G. Jenkins 1854). For example, if a single judge of the supreme court directed
the entry of judgment, then the aggrieved party could appeal that judgment to
the general term of the supreme court. Amended Code § 348, 1849 N.Y. Laws
684.
The general terms of the supreme court and the court of common pleas also
had jurisdiction to hear appeals from inferior courts. See Amended Code §§ 344
(providing for appeals to supreme court from judgments of county courts, mayors'
courts, and recorders' courts), 352 (providing for appeals to the court of common
pleas from judgments of the marine court and justice's courts of New York City),
1849 N.Y. Laws 683, 685.
104. Amended Code § 11, 1851 N.Y. Laws 876-77. The 1851 amendments added a
fourth subsection which gave the court of appeals the power to review an order
granting a new trial except in cases that had been originally commenced in a
justice's court or in the marine court of New York City. Id. The fourth subsection
was not incorporated into the original Ohio Code or the original Nebraska Code.
The provision in the Nebraska Code that allows appeals to be taken from orders
granting or denying new trials in civil cases was added in 1947. Act of May 31,
1947, ch. 85, § 1(2), 1947 Neb. Laws 263 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1315.03 (Reissue 1995)).
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The first and third subsections were included in the original CodelO5
and are discussed here. The second subsection was added in 1851 and
is discussed in section VI.
Some background is necessary before going any further. The court
of appeals was created in 1847 and replaced the court of errors as the
court of last resort in New York.106 Prior to the adoption of the Code,
there were two methods for obtaining review as a matter of right.
Writs of error were used to review final judgments and determinations
rendered at law. Appeals were used to review orders and decrees
made in equity.10 7 While finality was a requirement for seeking review by writ of error, it was not a requirement for seeking review by
appeal. Interlocutory orders and decrees in equity were immediately
appealable. 0 8 Furthermore, if they were to be appealed at all, they
had to be appealed immediately. They could not be challenged on an
appeal from the final decree.1 0 9
The Code changed all of that. Under the Code, writs of error were
out and appeals were in. The Code expressly provided that judgments
105. Here is the original version of section 11:
The court of appeals, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, upon
appeal, every actual determination hereafter made, at a general term, by
the supreme court, by the superior court of the city of New-York, or by
the court of common pleas for the city and county of New-York, in the
following cases, and no other:
1. In a judgment in an action commenced therein, or brought there
from another court; and upon the appeal from such judgment, to review any intermediate order involving the merits, and necessarily
involving the judgment.
2. In a final order, affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action, after
judgment:
But such appeal shall not be allowed in an action originally commenced
in a court of a justice of the peace, or in the marine court of the city of
New-York, or in an assistant justice's court of that city, or in the municipal court of the city of Brooklyn, or in a justice's court of the cities of
Albany, Troy, and Hudson, respectively.
Code § 11, 1848 N.Y. Laws 499. The version of section 11 that the legislature
enacted in 1848 was identical to the version that the Commissioners proposed in
their first report. Compare id. with FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 11.
106. The official name of the court of errors was the court for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors. See FRANcis BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 1847-1932 19 (1985). As noted in the text, the
court of appeals replaced the court of errors. The creation of the court of appeals
was mandated by the 1846 New York Constitution. See N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art.
VI, §§ 2, 25. The legislation creating the court was passed in May 1847. See Act
of May 12, 1847, ch. 280, 1847 N.Y. Laws 319-23. For further discussion of the
creation of the court of appeals, see BERGAN, supra, at 15-38.
107. See Act of May 12, 1847, ch. 280, §§ 11, 17, 1847 N.Y. Laws 322, 324.
108. See 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. pt. III, ch. I, tit. II, § 98 (1846) (appeals from vice-chancellor
to chancellor) & pt. III, ch. IX, tit. 3, §§ 78-79 (1846) (appeals from orders and
decrees of court of chancery to court of errors).
109. See VAN SANTvooan, supra note 74, at 664.
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and orders in civil actions could only be reviewed by appeal. 1 0 The
Code also eliminated the historic distinction between judgments at
law and decrees in equity as well as the historic distinction between
interlocutory decrees and final decrees in equity.ii, Under the Code,
there were only orders and judgments. The Code defined an order as
"[elvery direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and
not included in a judgment."11 2 The Code defined a judgment as "the
final determination of the rights of the parties to an action."" 3
The first subsection of section 11 was yet another aspect of the
merger of law and equity. By allowing an appeal from a judgmentwhich, as previously discussed, meant a final judgment-the first subsection applied to all civil actions the rule of finality that previously
applied only to actions at law.114 Although the Commissioners intended to eliminate appeals from interlocutory orders in equity cases,
they did not intend to eliminate appellate review of those orders.
They instead intended to defer review until an appeal from a final
judgment and to limit the types of orders subject to review. That explains why the Commissioners included the clause that allowed the
court of appeals, on an appeal from a judgment, to review any intermediate orders that involved the merits and necessarily affected the
15
judgment.1
The third subsection dealt with both special proceedings and actions. It allowed an appeal from a final order that affected a substantial right and that was either made in a special proceeding or on a
summary application in an action after judgment. To borrow a line
from Winston Churchill, the third subsection is "a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma."li 6 The Commissioners did not define or
explain what they meant by the terms "final order," "substantial
right," or "summary application in an action after judgment." The
only explanation they offered was that the statute made the real test
110. Code § 271, 1848 N.Y. Laws 547.
111. An interlocutory decree in equity was one that determined some of the rights of
the parties but directed further proceedings, usually before a referee. One of the
more common interlocutory decrees was one that determined that the plaintiff
was entitled to equitable relief but referred the matter to a referee for an accounting and reserved future directions until receipt of the referee's report. A final
decree was one that finally disposed of the case. See VAN SANrvooRD, supra note
74, at 512-18, 578-79.
112. Code § 357, 1848 N.Y. Laws 561. That is still the current definition of"order" in
Nebraska. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-914 (Reissue 1995).
113. Code § 201, 1848 N.Y. Laws 535. That is still the current definition of'judgment"
in Nebraska. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1301 (Reissue 1995).
114. See HENRY COHEN & ARTHuR KARGER, THE PowERs OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF

APPFAS 66 (rev. ed. 1952).
115. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 15-16, 19.
116. OxFoRD DicTIoNARY OF QuOTATIONs 149 (3d ed. 1979). Mr. Churchill coined that
phrase in 1939 to describe the Soviet Union.
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of appealability whether there had been "an actual and final determi7
nation of a matter, involving a substantial right."1'
Yet there may be some clues to the riddle. The statutes that governed the jurisdiction of the court of appeals prior to the adoption of
section 11 were substantially the same as the statutes that had governed the jurisdiction of the old court of errors.11 8 The Commissioners
were not fond of those statutes. According to the Commissioners,
nothing under the old system had "presented so many embarrassments" and "led to so much diversity in the court itself' as the statutes
that governed the jurisdiction of the court of errors.11 9 The time had
come to eliminate those embarrassments by providing a "tangible and
convenient rule"1 20 for determining the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals.
Among the embarrassments that the Commissioners discussed
were the conflicting results the court of errors had reached in five
cases. 1 21 The basic question in those cases was whether writs of error
were available to review final determinations made in a summary
117. FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 19.
118. See id. at 12-13.
119. Id. at 13. The Commissioners discussed three such embarrassments. One of
them was the inability of the court of errors to develop a clear standard for determining the types of interlocutory orders that were appealable in equity cases.
See id. at 15-16. The Commissioners attempted to eliminate that embarrassment
through the last clause of section 11(1). See supra text accompanying notes 11415.
Another of the embarrassments stemmed from the language of the old statutes that authorized the court of errors to correct all errors. Despite that language, the court of errors had limited its review to actual determinations made by
the court below. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 16-17. According to the
Commissioners, the court had interpreted the statute in a way "not called for by
its language, or even its spirit." Id. at 17. The Commissioners attempted to eliminate that embarrassment by including language in section 11 that expressly limited review to actual determinations made by the general term from which the
appeal was taken. See supra text accompanying note 103.
The last of those embarrassments was the uncertainty surrounding the availability of writs of error to review final determinations made in summary manner.
As explained in the text, the Commissioners attempted to eliminate that embarrassment through section 11(3). See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
120. FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 13.
121. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dikeman v. President and Trs. of Brooklyn, 13 Wend. 130
(N.Y. 1834) (dismissing writ of error from order denying writ of mandamus); In re
Negus, 10 Wend. 34 (N.Y. 1832) (quashing writ of error from order denying motion to set aside award made by trustees to creditor in absconding debtor proceedings); Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. 484 (N.Y. 1820) (quashing writ of error from
order refusing to set aside writ of execution); Clason v. Shotwell, 12 Johns. 31
(N.Y. 1814) (allowing writ of error from judgment awarding plaintiff possession of
property in forcible entry and detainer proceedings); Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 337
(N.Y. 1810) (allowing writ of error from determination in habeas corpus proceedings that petitioner's confinement was lawful). For the Commissioners' discussion of these cases, see FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 13-16.
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manner-in other words, final determinations made in proceedings
that were conducted without the formal pleadings and procedures
used in actions at law. The court of errors allowed the writ in two of
the cases but quashed the writ in the other three.
That suggests the Commissioners wrote the third subsection of section 11 to eliminate any uncertainty about the power of the court of
appeals to review final determinations in proceedings that involved
the use of motions and orders to show cause rather than pleadings.
Four of the five cases involved orders made in proceedings that the
Commissioners would have classified as special proceedings: habeas
corpus, forcible entry and detainer, absconding debtor, and mandamus. 1 2 2 As previously discussed, special proceedings involved the use
of motions or orders to show cause rather the use of the pleadings prescribed by the Code.
The other case involved an order denying a motion to set aside a
writ of execution, a writ that had been issued to execute a judgment in
an action at law.123 Presumably, the Commissioners would have classified that order as one made on a summary application (i.e., on a motion) in an action after judgment. The term "summary application in
an action after judgment" most likely encompassed any motion for
post-judgment relief, including, for example, a motion in proceedings
supplementary to execution, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution more than five years after the entry of judgment, a motion to
set aside a judgment, and a motion to set aside an execution.124 That
may in turn explain why the Commissioners lumped special proceedings and summary applications together in the same subsection. Both
were procedurally different from actions in that both involved the use
of motions rather than the use of pleadings.
Assuming that this solves the riddle of summary applications, the
mystery and enigma remain: what is a "final order" and what is a
"substantial right"? The five cases from the court of errors provide
122. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 2; supra notes 94-100 and accompanying
text.
123. See Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. 484 (N.Y. 1820). The judgment debtor in Brooks
moved to set aside the writ on the ground that, under the state insolvency laws,
he had been discharged of all liability on the judgment. See id. at 484. The Commissioners' discussion of Brooks indicates that the Commissioners believed that
the order was final and should have been reviewed. The Commissioners said that
the order "in effect, finally determined (the judgment debtor's] liability to pay the
judgment; and yet the court of errors, with but two dissenting voices, quashed the
writ of error, on the ground that it was not a final determination, but only a
decision upon a collateral or interlocutory point." FIRST REPORT, supranote 69, at

14.
124. The courts later took the position that orders granting or denying motions to vacate a judgment were not orders made on a summary application in an action
after judgment. See infra note 383 and accompanying text. There is nothing in
any of the Commissioners' reports that supports that position.
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some clues-but not much more than that. The Commissioners
opened their discussion of those five cases by saying that the first case
had established the following rule: writs of error were available when
the lower court made a decision that "[wias final, and of which a record [could] be made, and which... decide[d] the rights of property or
2
personal liberty."1 5
The Commissioners' discussion of those cases indicates that the
Commissioners believed that the determinations in all five should
have been subject to review. Three of them involved orders that ended
the proceedings,1 26 one of them involved an order that denied a motion to set aside a nonjudicial determination of liability,12 7 and one of
them involved an order that denied a party's post-judgment motion to
quash an execution. 128 It is hard to articulate a definition of "final
order" based on these cases. Perhaps the most that can be said is that
the Commissioners thought that an order was final if it finally determined a party's right to relief. At the very least, that would include
(1) an order that ended the proceeding and (2) an order that denied a
motion to set aside a prior determination of a party's right to relief in
a proceeding.
Less, however, can be said about "substantial right." Four of the
cases involved determinations that affected rights of personal liberty
or rights of property.1 29 But the fifth did not. It involved a decision
125. FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 13. The rule was not really a rule that the court
of errors had adopted and followed. It was simply a statement that one of the 28
members of the court made in Yates v.People. See 6 Johns. 337, 402 (N.Y. 1810)
(opinion of Justice Spencer). By a 16-12 vote, the court in Yates refused to quash
a writ of error taken from the supreme court's determination in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
126. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dikeman v. President and Trs. of Brooklyn, 13 Wend. 130
(N.Y. 1834) (denying peremptory writ of mandamus after failure to plea to return
of alternative writ); Clason v. Shotwell, 12 Johns. 31 (N.Y. 1814) (awarding plaintiff possession of property in forcible entry and detainer proceedings with writ of
re-restitution); Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1810) (holding that petitioner's
confinement was lawful in habeas corpus proceeding).
127. See In re Negus, 10 Wend. 34 (N.Y. 1832) (denying debtor's motion to set aside
trustee's award to creditor in absconding debtor proceedings). The order in this
case could also be classified as one that ended the proceedings because there was
only one creditor in the case.
128. See Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. 483 (N.Y. 1820) (issuing an order denying motion
to set aside writ of execution).
129. The four were In re Negus, 10 Wend. 34 (N.Y. 1832) (involving property right;
order at issue denied motion to set aside award made by trustees to creditor in
absconding debtor proceedings); Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. 483 (N.Y. 1820) (involving property right; order at issue refused to set aside writ of execution; writ of
error quashed); Clason v. Shotwell, 12 Johns. 31 (1814) (involving property right;
writ at issue awarded plaintiff possession of property in forcible entry and detainer proceedings); Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1810) (involving personal
liberty right; judgment at issue was made in habeas corpus proceeding and determined that petitioner's confinement was lawful).
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denying a writ of mandamus to compel village officials to file a report
with the county clerk, a decision that the Commissioners described as
a final determination that settled "most important rights."13o If the
Commissioners wrote the third subsection against the background of
the five cases discussed in their report-which is as good a theory as
any-then they may have chosen the term "substantial right" simply
because it seemed to work. The term was broad enough to cover determinations that affected "most important rights" (whatever those are)
as well as determinations that affected rights of property and personal
liberty. In other words, the term may have been chosen, not because it
had any concrete meaning, but because it covered all five of the deter1
minations on which the Commissioners were focusing. 31
130. FiRST REPORT, supranote 69, at 15. The case was People ex rel. Dikeman v. President and Trustees of Brooklyn, 13 Wend. 130 (N.Y. 1834). The report included
the amount of assessed compensation that would be paid to the various property
owners, including the realtors, whose property would be taken in order to open a
street. See People ex rel. Dikeman v. President and Trs. of Brooklyn, 1 Wend.
318, 318-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828). The applicable statutes required the village
trustees to file the report with the clerk of the court of common pleas. Id. at 321.
The court could then confirm or reject the report. The village trustees effectively
discontinued the proceedings, however, by refusing to file the report.
One of the key issues at the supreme court level was whether the relators had
a vested right to the compensation assessed in the report; if so, then the village
trustees could not abandon their plans to open the street with impunity. See id.
at 321-25. In other words, the case arguably involved property rights. The Commissioners did not discuss the case in those terms, however, perhaps because
they were unaware of the details. The details do not appear in the opinion of the
court of errors that the Commissioners discussed in their report. They instead
appear in the earlier opinion of the supreme court.
131. There is no indication that "substantial right" was a commonly used term with a
well-understood meaning at the time that the Code was adopted. During the period from 1799 to 1848, the term appeared in a grand total of 15 opinions. See In
re Negus, 10 Wend. 34, 48 (N.Y. 1832) (opinion of Sen. Tracy); Livingston's Ex'rs
v. Van Rensselaer's Adm'rs, 6 Wend. 63, 75 (N.Y. 1830); Bridge v. Johnson, 5
Wend. 342, 348 (N.Y. 1830); Waters v. Stewart, 1 Cai. Cas. 47, 51 (N.Y. 1805)
(opinion of the President); Shepard v. Hoit, 7 Hill 198, 200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845);
Webber v. Shearman, 6 Hill 20, 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); People ex rel. Barry v.
Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend.
436, 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Michaels v. Shaw, 12 Wend. 587, 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1834); Barney v. Keith, 6 Wend. 555, 557-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831); Salisbury v.
Parker, 7 Cow. 150, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Beekman v. Satterlee, 5 Cow. 519,
527 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826); Lion ex dem. Eden & Wood v. Burtis, 18 Johns. 510, 512
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821); Hatten v. Speyer, 1 Johns. 37, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806); Van
Alen v. Rogers, 1 Johns. Cas. 281, 283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1800). The cases reveal no
clear pattern of usage. Sometimes the term was used alone and sometimes it was
used in conjunction with form. The word "form" was used in reference to clerical
mistakes, parts of documents, and the forms of action.
After the Code was adopted, judges could not agree on the meaning of "substantial right." Some judges interpreted the term to mean matters of substance
as opposed to matters of form. Others interpreted it to mean a legal right. See
People v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 29 N.Y. 418 (1864). In that case, the court of appeals
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To the extent that the Commissioners understood the term "substantial right" to mean anything, the most that can be said is that
they understood it to mean matters of substance rather than form.
The Commissioners apparently borrowed the term from Senator
Tracy's dissenting opinion in In re Negus,132 the only opinion in those
five cases in which the term appeared. In Negus, the court of errors
dismissed a writ of error taken from an order in an absconding debtor
proceeding. 13 3 One reason cited for dismissing the writ was that summary proceedings could not be reduced to the type of formal record
that the common law required.134 The absence of formal record was of
no consequence to Senator Tracy, however. He said that the order determined "most important rights of property" and also said that dismissing the writ because of the absence of a formal record would "be
held that an order awarding the defendant $20,000 in additional costs affected a
substantial right and was therefore appealable. Chief Justice Denio wrote:
In a general way it may be said that every order which may be made in a
cause affects the rights of the parties in some appreciable manner.
What, then, is meant by the term substantialright? In my opinion it is
distinguished from a formal right ....

[Ilt is sufficient to say that an

order which peremptorily and finally charges a party with the payment
of a sum of money, great or small, which he ought not to pay, or with a
greater amount than he ought to pay, affects his rights, not in a manner
of form but in substance ....
Id. at 421.
In his dissent, Justice Hogeboom said that the order did not affect a substantial right because the award of additional costs was a matter committed to the
discretion of the lower court. As Justice Hogeboom explained:
A substantial right is something to which, upon proved or conceded facts,
a party may lay claim as a matter of law-which a court may not legally
refuse-and to which it can be seen that the party is entitled within well
settled rules of law. There is many a point of practice and matter of
discretion, the decision of which may directly or indirectly affect a
party's pecuniary interests to the amount of thousands of dollars, and in
a loose and general sense may be said to affect a substantial right, but
which has never been pretended to be embraced within this language.
Id. at 430 (Hogeboom, J., dissenting). Justice Hogeboom's interpretation represented the weight of earlier authority. See, e.g., People ex rel. Vanderbilt v.
Stilwell, 19 N.Y. 531, 532 (1859) (holding that an order quashing a writ of certiorari did not affect a substantial right; allowance or refusal of certiorari was a
matter of discretion); Moncrief v. Moncrief, 10 Abb. Pr. 315, 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1860) (holding that an order granting or refusing temporary alimony did not affect a substantial right; awards of temporary alimony were discretionary); Tallman v. Hinman, 18 How. Pr. 89, 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854) (holding that an order
denying motion to set aside judgment did not affect substantial right; "[a] party
cannot be said to have a right to what a court has discretion to grant or withhold"). The court of appeals specifically rejected that interpretation in 1877. See
Martin v. Windsor Hotel Co., 70 N.Y. 101, 102-03 (N.Y. 1877) (holding that the
earlier view defining substantial right as an absolute legal right was erroneous).
132. 10 Wend. 34 (N.Y. 1832).
133. The order denied a motion to set aside an award that the trustees made to a
creditor.
134. See id. at 40 (opinion of the Chief Justice).
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sacrificing substance to form-sustainingformal objections to defeat
13 5
substantialrights."
The Commissioners may have done more than simply borrow the
term "substantial right" from Negus. They may have done the
equivalent of a cut-and-paste job, taking bits and pieces from Negus
and wrapping them around the terms "order" and "special proceeding." For example, in his opinion in Negus, the Chancellor said:
"There are a great variety of cases where error will not lie on adjudications affecting the rights of the parties."'3 6 The Commissioners may
have cut the phrase "the rights of the parties," pasted in the more
catchy phrase from Senator Tracy's opinion--"substantial rights"and ended up with a statute that allowed an appeal from a "final order, affecting a substantialright."
To take another example, in his opinion in Negus, the Chief Justice
described the decision of the lower court as one "made on a summary
application."13 7 That phrase apparently caught the Commissioners'
attention. The statute allowed an appeal from a final order "made on
a summary applicationin an action after judgment." To take yet another example, Senator Tracy said that the denial of the motion at
issue in Negus was "a final determination of the rights of the parties
in controversy."1 3 s He added that the denial was "a final determination of the matter"even though, in theory, the losing party could renew
135. Id. at 48 (opinion of Sen. Tracy). The notion that the Commissioners understood
the term "substantial right" to refer to matters of substance rather than form
draws further support from Section 151 of the Code. Section 151 provided: "The
court shall, in every stage of the action, disregard any error, or defect in the
pleadings or proceedings, which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error
or defect." Code § 151, 1848 N.Y. Laws 526.
Section 151-which appeared in the chapter of the Code that governed variances and amendments-was apparently based on the old statutes that governed
amendments in actions at law. The old statutes drew a distinction between defects of form and defects of substance. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. VII, tit. V,
§ 1 (1846). Section 4 of the old statutes provided that, after judgment, defects of
form could be "rectified and amended by the court, in affirmance of the judgment,
so that such judgment shall not be reversed or annulled." 2 N.Y. REv. STAT., pt.
3, ch. Vfl, tit. V, § 4 (1846). Section 8 provided that the specified defects "and all
others of the like nature, not being against the right and justice of the matter of
the suit, and not altering the issue between the parties, or the trial, shall be
supplied and amended" either by the trial court or by reviewing court. 2 N.Y.
REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. VII, tit. V, § 8 (1846).
It seems as though section 151 was a combination of old sections 4 and 8 but
used different phrasing, most notably the term "substantial rights." Cf Vandenburgh v. Van Valkenburgh, 8 Barb. 217, 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (observing that
section 176 of the Code added "little, if any thing," to the power of amendment
under old section 8).
136. See Negus, 10 Wend. at 38 (opinion of the Chancellor) (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 40 (opinion of the Chief Justice) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 47 (opinion of Sen. Tracy).
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the motion.i 39 The Commissioners apparently incorporated that
phrasing into their description of the statute. In their first report, the
Commissioners said that the statute made the real test of appealability whether there had been "an actual and final determination of a
i4
matter, involving a substantial right." 0
While all of this is just speculation, it does make a certain amount
of sense. At the time the Commissioners wrote the third subsection,
they had not yet begun to focus on the specifics of special proceedings;
they planned to do that later.'-4 They were instead focusing on the
specifics of civil actions, which in many ways opened a Pandora's box.
The Commissioners found themselves addressing a wide array of subjects, including, among others, jurisdiction, statutes of limitation, pro142
visional remedies, right to jury trial, attorneys' fees, and appeals.
Under the circumstances, it would have made perfect sense for the
Commissioners to have drafted the third subsection by reworking a
few phrases from an old case without giving any real thought to what
they were doing. They had bigger fish to fry at the time, namely the
old systems of law and equity. And they fried those fish in short order;
they drafted the original Code in about five months.J43
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. (emphasis added).
FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 19 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
See FIRST REPORT, supranote 69, at 5-66 (jurisdiction of the courts), 92-122 (statutes of limitation), 161-76 (provisional remedies), 184-85 (expanding right to jury
trial beyond constitutional provisions), 204-12 (abolishing fee bills, repealing all
statutes regulating attorneys' fees in civil actions or restricting right of attorney
and client to agree on amount of attorney's compensation, and providing for limited indemnification of prevailing party's attorneys' fee through cost awards),
213-31 (appeals). For a discussion of the significance of the attorneys' fees provisions of the Code, see John Leubsdorf, Toward A History of the American Rule on
Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).
143. The legislature appointed the Commissioners on April 8, 1847. Act of Apr. 8,
1847, ch. 59, § 8, 1847 N.Y. Laws 67. The three Commissioners were David Graham, Nicholas Hill, and Arphaxed Loomis. See id. The man with whom the Code
is most often associated-David Dudley Field-was not appointed at first, apparently because he was too much of a procedural radical. See COOK,supra note 93,
at 190; DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
LAw 34 (1974). Commissioner Hill later resigned, and, on September 29, 1847,
Field was appointed to replace him. Joint Res., 70th Sess., 1847 N.Y. Laws 744.
The three members of the reconstituted commission first met as a group on
November 10, 1847. ARPHAXED LoOMIs, HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE NEW YORK SysTEM OF LAW REFORM IN PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 15, 17 (Little Falls, J.R. & G.G.
Stebbins 1879). During their 10 day meeting, the Commissioners
compared notes and opinions, examined the work already laid out by the
old members, discussed the expediency of making their work in the form
of a code and calling it by that name... [and] adjourned to meet in ...
January [1848] with the understanding that each member should proceed to write up such parts as he might choose.
Id. at 15.
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In conclusion, section 11 was drafted with an eye toward finality.
The Commissioners gave the court of appeals jurisdiction to hear appeals from a judgment-i.e., from the "final determination of the
rights of the parties in the action'- 4 4 -and from a "final order, affecting a substantial right" and made in a special proceeding. But they
did not think through what "final" meant other than in a very general
sense. They also did not think through what "substantial right"
meant or how it would apply in practice. That is an important point; it
underscores the futility of attempting to interpret "substantial right"
on the basis of its plain meaning or its intended meaning. The term
did not have either type of meaning.
IV.
A.

GO WEST, YOUNG CODE

Ohio

Given the lack of care with which it was drafted, section 11 was not
the kind of statute that other states should have blindly incorporated
into their own codes. But that is what Ohio did. Procedural reform in
Ohio followed much the same course as procedural reform in New
York. In March 1852, the Ohio legislature appointed three commissioners and instructed them to abolish the common law forms of action
and to develop "a uniform mode of proceeding, without reference to
any distinction between law and equity."i45 In January 1853, the
Ohio Commissioners submitted their report to the legislature and, a
few months later, the legislature enacted the Commissioners' propos46
als into law.'
The work of the Ohio Commissioners was shaped in large part by
the earlier work of the New York Commissioners.147 Like the New
Each commissioner came to the January 1848 meeting with "his own draft of
the more important parts of the work on civil actions. The principles and leading
features of the system were so well understood and agreed upon, that there was
no essential difference in them, except in the arrangement and phraseology." Id.
at 17. In their day-to-day work, the Commissioners tended to rely primarily on
Field's manuscripts. See id. at 22.
Perhaps part of the reason why there was so much agreement among the
Commissioners was that they were not writing on a completely clean slate; parts
of the code that the Commissioners eventually proposed had been included in two
bills that the legislature rejected in 1842. See HEPBURN, supra note 62, at 83.
"But, with all allowances, it is seldom that so great a work is accomplished in so
short a time." Id. The Commissioners submitted their first report to the legislature on February 29, 1848. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at v. That was five
months after Field was first appointed.
144. Code § 201, 1848 N.Y. Laws 535.
145. Act of Mar. 4, 1852, § 1, 50 Ohio Laws 115 (1852). The appointment of the Commissioners was mandated by the Ohio Constitution. See OHIO CONST. of 1851,

art. XIV, § 2.
146. See HEPBURN, supra note 62, at 100.
147. See id. In their report, the Ohio Commissioners wrote:
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York Commissioners, the Ohio Commissioners divided civil proceedings into two categories: civil actions and special proceedings.14 8 Civil
actions replaced actions at law and suits in equity and were governed
by the uniform procedures of the Code. Civil actions all would be commenced the same way (summons), pled the same way (facts constituting the cause of action), proven the same way (oral testimony), and
end the same way (judgment).149
But this procedural uniformity did not extend to special proceedings. Special proceedings were statutory proceedings that involved
procedures different than the normal procedures for actions at law or
suits in equity. Although the Commissioners tinkered with a few special proceedings-for example, mandamus-they left most special proceedings alone. Those proceedings continued to be governed by the
procedures specified in the statutes that created them.150
It is worth emphasizing that simply because a proceeding was authorized by statute did not mean that it was a special proceeding.
There were a number of statutorily-created actions in Ohio at the
The undersigned would say, that keeping constantly in view our existing
system and statutes upon practice, they have been guided and greatly
aided by reforms of the same kind, which have been proposed and
adopted, elsewhere. While they have been chiefly indebted to the extraordinary labors of the New York commissioners upon practice and
pleadings, they have been assisted by those of [other states], where the
example of New York has been in a great degree followed.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGs at the two unnum-

bered pages preceding the Table of Contents (Columbus, Osgood & Blake 1853)
[hereinafter OHIO REPORT].
148. In their report, the Commissioners said that the civil action
only provides a substitute for the actions at law, so called, and what are
recognized as suits proper in equity; and this single action takes their
place, and does no more. Any proceedings in either court, not begun by
an action in a court of law, or by a suit in a court of chancery, will be
begun and conducted, hereafter as formerly, unless otherwise provided.
. . A civil action under this code will comprehend, therefore, every
proceeding in court heretofore instituted by any and all the forms hereby
abolished. Every other proceedings will be something else than an action, say a special proceeding.
OHIO REPORT, supra note 147, at 9.
149. See id. at 8-12.
150. See id. at 219-20. Section 604 of the Code provided:
Until the legislature shall otherwise provide, this code shall not affect
proceedings on habeas corpus, quo warranto, or to assess damages for
private property taken for public uses; nor proceedings under the statutes for the settlement of estates of deceased persons; nor proceedings
under statutes relating to dower, divorce, or alimony; or to establish, or
set aside a will; nor proceedings under statutes relating to apprentices,
arbitration, bastardy, insolvent debtors; nor any special statutory remedy not heretofore obtained by action; but such proceedings may be prosecuted under the code whenever it is applicable.
OHIO STAT. ch. 87, § 604 (Swan Comp. 1854). Section 604 was patterned after
Section 390 of the New York Code. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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time. Most of them authorized the use of a particular action at law to
enforce a statutory right.15' For example, the 1831 Act for the Prevention of Gambling (which those of us who have been to Las Vegas
can appreciate) allowed individuals who lost money gambling to recover their losses from the winner by bringing an "action of debt
founded on this act."15 2 But some of them simply authorized the use
of an action to enforce the right without specifying the form of action.
For example, the 1851 wrongful death statute authorized the decedent's personal representative to bring "an action and recover
5
damages."'1 3
It is also worth emphasizing that simply because a proceeding was
governed by provisions in the Code did not mean that it was an action.
For example, mandamus was the subject of one of the chapters of the
Code154 even though the Commissioners specifically identified mandamus as a special proceeding to which the procedural rules for civil
actions were inapplicable.15 5 The reason that the Commissioners included the chapter on mandamus is that the statutory provisions that
previously governed mandamus were part of the civil practice act that
they planned to repeal upon adoption of the Code.156 The Commis151. See OHIO REPORT, supra note 147, at 220. These statutes created a problem for
the Commissioners because they authorized forms of actions that the Commissioners planned to abolish. Rather than amending all of these statutes, the Commissioners added section 605 to the Code. Section 605 provided that, if a statute
authorized an action and prescribed the mode of proceeding-in other words, if
the statute authorized bringing a specific form of action such as an action on the
case or action of debt and specified the use of the old procedures-then the parties could use the old procedures or, if they saw fit, use the new procedures. If the
statute did not specify the mode of proceeding, then the action was treated as a
civil action governed by the Code. OHiO STAT. ch. 87, § 605 (Swan Comp. 1854);
see Chapman v. Rannells (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1859) (explaining that the Code governed actions brought under lien statutes authorizing recovery in actions for
money had and received), reprinted in 2 OHIO DECISIONS SERIES 245 (Norwalk,
Lansing Printing Co. 1896).
152. OHIO STAT. ch. 51, § 11 (Swan Comp. 1854).
153. OHIO STAT. ch. 87, § 636 (Swan Comp. 1854).
154. Mandamus was the subject of Title XVIH, chapter IV of the Code. See OHIO STAT.
ch. 87, §§ 569-80 (Swan Comp. 1854).
155. OHIO REPORT, supranote 147, at 9; see Chinn v. Trustees, 32 Ohio St. 236 (1877)
(explaining that the Code provides for mandamus but does not recognize it as a
civil action). Unlike civil actions, mandamus proceedings involved the use of a
motion rather than a petition and the service of motion or an order to show cause
rather than the service of a summons. See OHIO STAT. ch. 87, § 573 (Swan Comp.
1854).
Although the mandamus statutes in Nebraska mirrored the statutes in Ohio,
mandamus in Nebraska evolved into an action in which many of the normal rules
of pleading apply. See State ex rel. Krieger v. Bd. of Supervisors, 171 Neb. 117,
120-21, 105 N.W.2d 721, 724-25 (1960); State ex rel. Moore v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R.R., 19 Neb. 476, 482, 27 N.W. 434, 437 (1886). I have been
told by a number of lawyers that summonses are served in mandamus actions.
156. See OHIO REPORT, supra note 147, at 213.
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sioners therefore had to put mandamus back in somewhere-and the
Code was just as good a place as any.
So to make a long story short, "actions" and "special proceedings"
were simply terms of art used to describe the proceedings for which
the procedures at the trial court level changed and those for which the
procedures did not change. Civil actions were proceedings that once
employed the procedures used in actions at law or suits in equity and
that now employed the uniform procedures of the Code. Special proceedings were everything else and continued to be governed by their
own peculiar procedures as set by statute.
But the procedures on appeal were another story. Prior to the
Code, decisions were reviewed by bills of review, writs of error, and
writs of certiorari.157 The Commissioners replaced those three forms
of review with one form: the petition in error.15 8 To identify what civil
matters could be reviewed by petition in error, the Commissioners
modified section 11 of the New York Code to fit the Ohio court system.
For each of the three courts in Ohio that exercised appellate jurisdiction,' 5 9 the Commissioners wrote a section giving that court the power
to review a "judgment rendered or final order made" by an inferior
court.160 The Commissioners then wrote another section to define "final order." Section 512 of the Ohio Code provided:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in
an action after judgment, is a final order which may be vacated, modified, or
161
reversed as provided in this title.

Section 512 is really nothing more than a combination of sections
11(2) and 11(3) of the New York Code. There is one possible substantive difference, however. Section 11(3) of the New York Code allowed
an appeal from "a final order, affecting a substantial right made, in a
special proceeding."162 If "final order" meant an order that finally determined a party's right to relief (which is not clear), then the Ohio
Commissioners changed the meaning. Under the Ohio Code, any order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding-even
157. See id. at 194.

158. See OHIO STAT. ch. 87, §§ 515, 530 (Swan Comp. 1854).
159. Those courts were the supreme court, the district court, and the court of common
pleas. See OHIO STAT. ch. 87, §§ 511, 513-14 (Swan Comp. 1854).
160. Id. For example, section 511 provided:
A judgment rendered or a final order made by a probate court, justice of
the peace, or any other tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial
fimctions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the court of common pleas, may
be reversed, vacated, or modified by the court of common pleas.
OHIO STAT. ch. 87, § 511 (Swan Comp. 1854) (now codified as amended at OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02(B) (Anderson 1998)).

161. See OHIO STAT. ch. 87, § 512 (Swan Comp. 1854).
162. Amended Code § 11, 1851 N.Y. Laws 877.
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an order that did not finally determine a party's right to relief-was
by definition a final order.
Assuming that the Ohio Commissioners made a substantive
change, they most likely made that change by accident.63 The deletion of the finality requirement seems to have been a result of the way
in which the Ohio Commissioners structured their statutes. The Ohio
Commissioners did not clutter each section with specific language
about the types of orders that were reviewable. They instead wrote
three sections that all used the term "final order" and then wrote a
separate section to define that term. The consequence of making "final order" a defined term rather than a free-standing term was to read
finality out of the statute. That does not seem to have been the intent
of the Commissioners, however. In their report, the Commissioners
said that "a final determination of any controversy between parties
1 64
hereafter are called judgments and final orders."
B.

Nebraska

In 1858, the Territorial Legislature enacted the Nebraska Code of
Civil Procedure. Much of the Nebraska Code was copied from the
Ohio Code, although there were some differences. The major difference was that the Nebraska Code only applied to actions at law. It did
not affect suits in equity.' 6 5 That difference was short-lived, however.
In 1867, soon after Nebraska became a state, the Legislature amended
the Code to abolish actions at law and suits in equity and replace
them with the civil action.' 66 When the legislature created the civil
action in 1867, it also specified that judgments and final orders in civil
actions could only be reviewed by appeal.' 6 7 In 1871, however, the
legislature changed its mind and returned to petitions in error as the
method for reviewing judgments and final orders in civil actions.
But the petition in error did not enjoy a long reign. In 1873, appeals became the method for reviewing district court judgments and
163. There is no indication that the Commissioners gave much thought to the question
of finality. The portions of their report that discussed appellate review focused on
the reasons why they selected petitions in error to replace the various modes of
review that existed prior to the merger of law and equity. See OHIO REPORT,
supra note 147, at 194.
164. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
165. The Code abolished the various actions at law and substituted the civil action in
their place. NEB. CODE CIV. P. § 3, 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 109. Suits in equity
apparently were not regulated by statute until the 1864 when the Territorial Legislature passed an act that specifically addressed chancery practice. See 1864
Neb. Terr. Laws 152-64.
166. See Act of June 19, 1867, § 1, 1867 Neb. Laws 71.
167. See Act of June 19, 1867, § 6, 1867 Neb. Laws 72.
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final orders in equitable actionsl6S and, in 1905, appeals became the
method for reviewing district court judgments and final orders in all
civil cases.1 6 9 The methods also changed in criminal cases. Until recently, criminal cases were originally reviewed on a writ of error, a
writ that the clerk issued upon the filing of a petition in error.1 70 In
1961, the petition in error was replaced by the notice of appeall7i and,
in 1982, the writ of error was eliminated.1 7 2
The one constant through all these changes has been the statutory
definition of "final order." Since 1858, a final order has been "an order
affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting
a substantial right made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary
application in an action after judgment." 73 Even though the definition was written for error proceedings in civil cases, the supreme court
has applied the definition to appeals in both civil and criminal
cases.1 74 But the fact remains that the definition is really not much of
a definition. It is simply a collection of words that only take on meaning in light of procedural reforms that occurred long ago.
168. See Act of Mar. 3, 1873, § 1 (appeals in equity actions), reprintedin 2 COmPLETE
SESSION LAWS OF NEBRASKA 781 (Lincoln, Journal Co. 1887).
169. See Act of Mar. 30, 1905, § 1, 1905 Neb. Laws 657. That provision is the ancestor
of what is now section 25-1912. Although 1905 marked the end of petitions in
error as a means of reviewing district court judgments and final orders in civil
cases, they lived on as an alternate means of reviewing county court judgments
and final orders. See In re Estate of Berg, 139 Neb. 99, 102-06, 296 N.W. 460,
461-63 (1941) (discussing the history of the error statutes). That came to an end
in 1974, however, when the legislature amended section 25-1902 to eliminate
county court judgments and orders from the types of matters that could be reviewed on error. See LB 733, § 2, 1974 Neb. Laws 503.
170. Although the Code abolished the writ of error in civil cases, see NEB. CODE CIv. P.
§ 539, 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 200, the writ continued to be used in criminal cases.
See 1866 Neb. Crim. Code §§ 205-06, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE SESSION LAWS OF
NEBRASKA 227-28 (Lincoln, Journal Co. 1887); 1855 Neb. Crim. Code §§ 524-32,
1855 Neb. Terr. Laws 292. From 1883 until 1961, the clerk issued the writ upon
the filing of a petition in error. See Act of July 23, 1883, § 1, 1883 Neb. Laws 332
(amending section 508 of the Criminal Code, the ancestor of what is now section
29-2306). From 1961 until 1974, the clerk issued the writ upon the filing of the
notice of appeal. See LB 394, § 3, 1961 Neb. Laws 390 (amending section 292306).
171. See LB 394, §§ 1, 3, 1961 Neb. Laws 388-90.
172. See LB 722, §§ 3-5, 7-9, 11-12, 1981-82 Neb. Laws 657-61.
173. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1995); NEB. CODE Crv. P. § 521, 1858 Neb.
Terr. Laws 197.
174. See State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 506, 299 N.W.2d 538, 542 (1980) (holding
that hearing to determine competency of accused in a criminal case is a special
proceeding); Aspinwall v. Aspinwall, 18 Neb. 463, 464-65, 25 N.W. 623, 624
(1885) (noting that the definition of"final order" for error proceedings also applies
to appeals because it is the only definition of "final order" in the statutes).
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V. REFOCUSING THE LAW OF SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Now that the cobwebs have been cleared off the historical record, it
is time to assess what the record tells us. It tells us five things. First,
the distinction between actions and special proceedings was based on
procedure. Second, actions and special proceedings were mutually exclusive categories. Third, the term "action" as originally used in the
statute was designed to cover both civil and criminal actions. Fourth,
to be an appealable order, an order made in a special proceeding had
to (a) affect a substantial right and (b) be final. Fifth, the finality requirement was inadvertently removed from the statute as a consequence of the drafting techniques of the Ohio Commissioners.
Although the substantial right requirement survived, it was not really
much of a requirement. The term "substantial right" was a makeweight term that meant "a matter of substance rather than form," if it
meant anything at all.
My proposal is that we use the lessons of history to interpret section 25-1902. That would not require a major shift in thinking. It
would instead involve fleshing out the details of the current thinking.
Many of the court's definitions of the key statutory terms are not fundamentally different than the historical definitions; they are really
just shorthand for the historical definitions. For example, the court
has said that an action is "a civil action"175-in other words, "a cause
brought under the provisions of chapter 25 of our statutes."17 6 The
court has also said that an action "involves prosecuting the alleged
rights between the parties and ends in a final judgment."'7 7 That is
close to the historical definition of a civil action: an adversarial proceeding that involves the service of a summons and the use of pleadings. The historical definition is more complete, however. As a result,
it is easier in terms of application, more predictable in terms of outcome, and more sensible in terms of content.
For example, the shorthand definitions indicate that divorce is a
special proceeding because it is encompassed by chapter 42 rather
than chapter 25. Where the Revisor of Statutes happens to put a proceeding, however, does not alter the nature of the proceeding. Divorce
is an adversarial proceeding in which one spouse asserts a claim for
relief against the other spouse. It requires the service of a summons,
whether by personal service or publication.1 7 s It also involves the use
of pleadings.1 7 9 The petitioner will file a petition for dissolution of
marriage, not a motion. Unless the respondent defaults, (s)he will file
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 413, 470 N.W.2d 780, 787 (1991).
Jaramillo v. Mercury Ins. Co., 242 Neb. 223, 237, 494 N.W.2d 335, 345 (1993).
State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 253, 570 N.W.2d 331, 336 (1997).
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-352 (Reissue 1998).
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-352 to 42-354 (Reissue 1998).
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an answer that may include a counterclaim for divorce. Although the
divorce statutes specify what must be in the petition-in other words,
although they specify what must be pled to state a cause of actionthey still contemplate the use of pleadings rather than motions. In
short, divorce is an action, pure and simple.180
Like the current definitions of "action," the court's current definitions of "special proceeding" are shorthand for the historical definition. The court has said that special proceedings are (1) civil statutory
remedies not encompassed in chapter 25, (2) statutory proceedings
which are not actions, or (3) applications authorized by law to enforce
rights conferred by law.iSi These are all variations of the historical
definition: a stand-alone proceeding that does not involve the service
of a summons and the use of pleadings. Again, however, the historical
definition is more complete. As a result, it is easier in terms of application, more predictable in terms of outcome, and more sensible in
terms of content.
For example, assume that Al plans to sue Barb for fraud but has no
money. Al therefore filed an application (i.e., motion) to proceed in
forma pauperis, an application which the court denied. Although in
forma pauperis is encompassed in chapter 25,182 the proceeding is in
fact a special proceeding. It is a nonadversarial proceeding that is
conducted without any pleadings. The applicant does not file a petition; (s)he instead files an application for a leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.1 8 3 Although the proceeding may be a prelude to an action,
it is not part of the action. It is a stand-alone proceeding-in other

180. The court originally considered divorce to be an equitable action. See Aspinwall
v. Aspinwall, 18 Neb. 463, 465, 25 N.W. 623, 624 (1885). The court now considers
divorce to be a special proceeding. See In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 413,
470 N.W.2d 780, 787 (1991) (including divorce in a list of special proceedings); cf
State ex rel. Reitz v. Ringer, 244 Neb. 976, 980, 510 N.W.2d 294, 299 (1994) (holding that custody determinations are special proceedings because they are governed by chapter 42), overruled on othergrounds by Cross v. Perreten, 257 Neb.
776, 600 N.W.2d 780 (1999). The case that is usually cited for the proposition
that divorce is a special proceeding is Ropken v. Ropken, 169 Neb. 352, 99 N.W.2d
480 (1959). The case does not stand for that proposition, however. The issue in
Ropken was whether the district court had jurisdiction to partition real estate
once it determined that the parties were never married. In holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction, the court said that "[allthough a divorce action is
tried as in equity, it is a special proceeding provided by statute." Id. at 356, 99
N.W.2d at 484. In other words, the court said that, although divorce is an equitable action, the types of claims that can be asserted in the action are limited by
statute. That is a far cry from saying that divorce is a special proceeding for
purposes of section 25-1902.
181. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
182. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2301 to 25-2310 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
183. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2301.01 (Cum.Supp. 2000).
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will end with the orwords, it exists independent of any action-and
84
der either granting or denying the motion.'
To take another example, assume that Carla threatened to sue
Don for negligence. Don learned that one of the key witnesses had
plans to leave the country. Don therefore filed a motion to perpetuate
the witness's testimony pursuant to Rule 27 of the Nebraska Discovery Rules,' 8 5 a motion which the court denied. Was the order denying
the motion made in a special proceeding? There is some room to argue
under the shorthand definitions. One might say that the proceeding
was encompassed within chapter 25 because the court promulgated
the Discovery Rules pursuant to section 25-1273.01.186 But there is
no room to argue under the historical definition. A proceeding to perpetuate testimony is a stand-alone proceeding that does not involve
the service of a summons or the use of any pleadings. That makes it a
87
special proceeding.'
To take yet another example, assume that Ellen sued Frank for
breaching a contract for the sale of goods. Frank promptly filed a special appearance on the ground that he did not have minimum contacts
with Nebraska. The court overruled the special appearance. Was the
order denying the special appearance made in a special proceeding?
184. The court entertained an appeal from an order denying leave to proceed in forma
pauperis in Jacob v. Schlichtman, 261 Neb. 169, 622 N.W.2d 852 (2001). The
court did not discuss why the order was appealable, however.
185. Rule 27 allows a person to seek a court order to perpetuate evidence when that
person "expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a court" of Nebraska "but
is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought." NEB. Disc. R. 27(a)(1).
The court can order oral depositions under Rule 30, depositions on written interrogatories under Rule 31, document production under Rule 34, or medical examinations under Rule 35. NEB. Disc. R. 27(A)(3). The rule states that a person
seeking such an order should file a verified petition. A Rule 27 petition is not a
pleading, i.e., a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-804 (Reissue 1995). There has been no action filed yet. The petition is instead a motion, i.e., an application for an order. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-908 (Reissue 1995).
186. Section 25-1273.01 authorizes the supreme court to "promulgate rules of procedure for discovery in civil cases, which rules shall not be in conflict with laws
governing such matters." NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1273.01 (Cure. Supp. 2000).
187. The court has held that orders granting Rule 27 motions are appealable. See
Gernstein v. Lake, 259 Neb. 479, 484, 610 N.W.2d 714, 718 (2000). In doing so,
however, the court did not rely on any Nebraska statutes. It instead relied on
federal cases. The court said that the federal cases were relevant because Rule
27 of the Nebraska Discovery Rules was modeled on Rule 27 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See id. at 483, 610 N.W.2d at 718. That is not quite right.
The question of what the words of the rule mean is different than the question of
whether an order granting or denying the relief under the rule is appealable. The
appealability question turns on the Nebraska statutes that govern appealability,
more specifically, on section 25-1902. While the federal cases may provide insight into the concept of finality, that concept is relevant only if the Nebraska
statutes make it relevant (which section 25-1902 does).
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The answer is not clear if one uses the shorthand definitions. On the
one hand, special appearances are encompassed in chapter 25, more
specifically, in section 25-516.01.188 On the other hand, the substantive law that will govern the special appearance comes not from chapter 25 but from the cases interpreting the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.is 9 The Due Process Clause creates the right
not to be subjected to a binding judgment absent sufficient contacts
with the forum state.1 90 Section 25-516.01 authorizes a special application to a court to enforce that right. "Where the law confers a right
and authorizes a special application to a court to enforce the right, the
proceeding is special, within the ordinary meaning of the term 'special
proceeding."" 9 1 Furthermore, a special appearance is not in itself an
action. Therefore, it is a special proceeding-or so the argument goes.
Things are much easier if one uses the historical definition. A proceeding that is part of an action cannot be a special proceeding; actions and special proceedings are mutually exclusive categories.
Special proceedings are stand-alone proceedings that do not involve
the service of a summons and the use of pleadings. A special appearance, however, is not a stand-alone proceeding. It is instead part of
(rather than separate from) the action in which it is filed-just as motions for a continuance, motions for summary judgment, or motions for
leave to file an amended pleading are part of the actions in which they
are filed. Therefore, a special appearance is not a special proceeding.
Treating actions and special proceedings as mutually exclusive categories is not only easier but is also more sensible from a policy standpoint. The current definitions are so malleable that they invite
interlocutory appeals. If there is some basis for arguing that an order
was made in a special proceeding, then the losing party might as well
file an immediate appeal. The worst case scenario for the appealing
party is that the court will find that the order was not final and dismiss the appeal. That means that the expenses of the appeal, includ188. Section 25-516.01 allows a party to file a special appearance to challenge personal jurisdiction or service. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-516.01 (Reissue 1995). For
further discussion of the statute, see Rodney M. Confer, Responsive Pleadings

and Motions 2-3, in NEBRASKA "How To" PRACTICE

MANUAL

(Civil Procedure) (2d

ed. 1995).
189. The Nebraska long-arm statute authorizes courts to assert personal jurisdiction
whenever doing so would be constitutional. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536(2) (Reissue
1995). The assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the defendant (1) engages in continuous and systematic activities in the forum state (general jurisdiction) or (2)
has minimum contacts with the forum state and the claim arises out of those
contacts (specific jurisdiction). See, e.g., Dunham v. Hunt Midwest Entm't, Inc., 2
Neb. Ct. App. 969, 973, 520 N.W.2d 216, 220 (1994).
190. See, e.g., Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, Inc., 254 Neb. 323, 328, 576
N.W.2d 760, 764 (1998).
191. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 253, 570 N.W.2d 331, 335 (1997).
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ing the attorney's fees, will be lost (which may not matter to a wellheeled litigant) and that no progress will have been made on the case
for well over a year (which may not matter to a defendant). The best
case scenario is that the court will find that the order is appealable
and reverse the trial court.
One way to discourage interlocutory appeals is to make finality an
explicit requirement for appeals under section 25-1902. That would
not be as significant a change as one might think. Although the court
has said that finality is not a requirement under section 25-1902, it
has often worked finality into the analysis. It did so, for example, in
Holste v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.192 In Holste, the court
held that an order overruling a special appearance is not a final order
within the meaning of section 25-1902. The court sidestepped the
messy issue of whether the order was made in a special proceeding
and instead focused on the substantial right requirement.1 93 The
court then did something quite significant. It tied the substantial
right requirement to the fundamental principle of finality. After first
explaining that the Due Process Clause protects the right not to be
subject to a binding judgment, the court said that
[Tihe rightnot to be bound by ajudgment can be vindicated in an appealfrom
the finaljudgment and is not a substantialright for the purpose ofdetermining
the appealabilityof an order; it does not affect the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim or defense that was available
to the appel1 94
lant prior to the order from which the appeal is taken.

The court made the right decision when it focused on finality. The
rule that appeals can be taken only from orders that end the casei.e., the final judgment rule-serves a number of purposes.1 9 5 First, it
192. 256 Neb. 713, 592 N.W.2d 894 (1999).
193. The court said that it was unnecessary to address the special proceeding issue
because the order did not affect a substantial right. Id. at 726, 592 N.W.2d at
905. An order that does not affect a substantial right is not appealable regardless
of whether it is made in a special proceeding.
194. Id. at 716, 592 N.W.2d at 905. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S.
517 (1988). In Van Cauwenberghe, the Supreme Court held that the denial of a
motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity from service of process or, in the alternative, forum non conveniens was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The decision in Holste, therefore, provides another example of how the
collateral order doctrine has shaped the law of special proceedings. See infra text
accompanying notes 254-92.
195. The court has said that the purpose of the final judgment rule "is to prevent repetitious and vexatious appeals, avoid jurisdictional conflicts between this court
and the District Courts in the decisional process, and to prevent delay by expediting the trial and the appellate judicial process." Burroughs Corp. v. James E.
Simon Constr. Co., 192 Neb. 272, 274-75, 220 N.W.2d 225, 227 (1974). For further discussion of the purposes of the final judgment rule, see JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CrViL PROCEDURE 602 (3d ed. 1999); 15A CHARLus ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
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promotes judicial efficiency. It allows an appellate court to avoid reviewing a case piecemeal. It also allows an appellate court to avoid
deciding issues that may be mooted by subsequent developments in
the litigation.19 6 Second, it allows the trial court to move forward on a
case rather than putting it on hold for a year or so while a party pursues an interlocutory appeal. Third, it prevents one party from using
the appellate process to wear down a financially weaker adversary by
filing one appeal after another. Finally, it reflects proper respect for
trial judges by allowing them to make their decisions without constant
appellate oversight.
The support for reading finality back into the statute comes not
only from policy but also from history. As previously discussed, the
statute in its original form only allowed appeals from orders that were
final and that affected a substantial right. The finality requirement,
however, was inadvertently dropped by the Ohio Commissioners. The
practical effect of that was to make "affecting a substantial right" the
only restriction on appeals from orders made in special proceedings.
That in turn has been a source of trouble because the substantial right
requirement has never had any real content. The court can give it
content, however, by interpreting the "substantial right" in light of the
polices that underlie the final judgment rule-which is exactly what
the court did in Holste.
Finality, however, cannot be an unbending rule. There are some
interlocutory orders that are so important that a party ought to appeal
them immediately rather than waiting for entry of the final judgment.
Allowing immediate appeals will not represent any change in practice;
it has been going on for over 50 years. The court has used the special
proceedings clause to review interlocutory orders that are made in
civil or criminal actions and that involve matters sufficiently important to warrant an immediate appeal. The problem is that, at the
same time, the court has used the clause to review orders made in
proceedings that are procedurally different than civil or criminal
actions.
Using the same language for two different types of orders is risky.
The risk is that, sooner or later, the line between the types of cases
will disappear and the language will spiral out of control. That seems
to be what happened in the 1990s, as the court found itself trapped by
its own language more than once. Sometimes the court bit the bullet
and forged ahead. Sometimes the court backtracked and attempted to
impose coherence on an increasingly incoherent area. It spent pages,
for example, trying to explain when summary judgment was a special
196. For example, the trial judge may change his or her mind, the parties may settle,
the complaining party may ultimately prevail, or additional evidence may emerge
that cures the error.
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proceeding and when it was not.197 Through it all, however, the court
usually reached the right results. That makes it much easier to solve
the problems that the has language created. The basic solution is to
change the language.
A.

Procedure-Based Special Proceedings

Many of the proceedings that the courts have identified as special
proceedings fall into the procedure-based category. Those include juvenile proceedings,198 probate,19 9 guardianship,20 0 election contests,2 0 1 workers' compensation, 20 2 condemnation, 2 03 habeas
corpus, 20 4 local government bond approvals, 2 05 and administrative
proceedings. 2 06 All of these use procedures different than those used
in civil actions. That does not mean, however, that all procedurebased special proceedings are the same. Some are single-faceted proceedings that are designed to resolve an issue. These are normally
adversarial proceedings. Others are multifaceted proceedings that
are designed to administer the affairs of a person. These are normally
nonadversarial proceedings. Whether a proceeding is single-faceted
or multifaceted matters because it affects the question of finality. A
final order in the context of a single-faceted proceeding is one that
ends the proceeding. A final order in the context of a multifaceted
proceeding is one that ends a distinct phase of the proceeding rather
than the proceeding itself.
197. See O'Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 124-27, 582 N.W.2d 350, 353-55 (1998).
198. See In re Guardianship of Rebecca B., 260 Neb. 922, 929, 621 N.W.2d 289, 295
(2000); In re Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52, 56, 601 N.W.2d 780, 783 (1999); In
re Interest ofBorinus H., 251 Neb. 397, 401, 558 N.W.2d 31, 34 (1997).
199. See In re Estate of Peters, 259 Neb. 154, 158, 609 N.W.2d 23, 26 (2000); In re
Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. 198, 202, 443 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1989).
200. See Hall v. Hall, 122 Neb. 228, 239-40, 239 N.W. 825, 829.30 (1932).
201. See Wilson v. Matson, 110 Neb. 630, 634, 194 N.W. 735, 736 (1923).
202. See Thompson v. Kiewit Constr. Co., 258 Neb. 713, 718, 603 N.W.2d 368, 372
(1999); Hull v. Aetna Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 713, 718, 529 N.W.2d 783, 788 (1995);
GA. Steinheimer Co. v. Podkovich, 122 Neb. 710, 711, 241 N.W. 287, 287 (1932).
203. See Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. I v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 253 Neb. 917,
921, 573 N.W.2d 460, 464 (1998); Higgins v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 159
Neb. 549, 552, 68 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1955); Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 155 Neb.
48, 53, 50 N.W.2d 533, 537 (1951).
204. See Flora v. Escudero, 247 Neb. 260,266, 526 N.W.2d 643, 647 (1995); Neudeck v.
Buettow, 166 Neb. 649, 652, 90 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1958); Williams v. Olson, 145
Neb. 282, 285, 16 N.W.2d 178, 179 (1944); In re Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 144 Neb. 820, 827, 14 N.W.2d 840, 843-44 (1944).
205. See Hayes v. Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 194, 196 Neb. 653, 660, 244
N.W.2d 505, 510 (1976).
206. See Garber v. Nebraska, 241 Neb. 523, 525, 489 N.W.2d 550, 551 (1992); In re
Application ofA-14137, 240 Neb. 117, 126, 480 N.W.2d 709, 714 (1992). It is not
clear why the court has invoked section 25-1902 in the context of administrative
appeals. Those appeals are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. See
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-917 to 84-919 (Reissue 1999).
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Single-FacetedProceedings

Some special proceedings are like actions in that their purpose is to
resolve a particular issue. That is true, for example, of a motion to
perpetuate evidence under Rule 27 of the Nebraska Discovery Rules.
The issue in the proceeding is whether the movant is entitled to perpetuate the evidence and, if so, in what manner. The proceeding will
end when the court resolves that issue, either by granting or denying
the motion. 20 7 The order granting or denying the motion affects a
substantial right because it ends the proceeding. It is therefore a final, appealable order.
To take another example, the issue in a habeas corpus proceeding
is whether the person is being unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty. The proceeding will end when the court resolves that issue, either by granting or denying the writ. The order granting or denying
the writ affects a substantial right because it ends the proceeding. It
is therefore a final, appealable order.2O8 Any earlier orders are merely
interlocutory orders that cannot be appealed until the entry of the final order. 20 9 In other words, the order granting or denying the writ is
the special proceedings equivalent of a final judgment in an action.
The analogy to an action, however, only goes so far. Special proceedings sometimes involve requests for which there is no analog in a
civil action. For example, a party to a workers' compensation case can
seek to have the claimant undergo a medical examination after the
workers' compensation court makes its award. 21 0 A party to a civil
action, however, realistically cannot force a plaintiff to undergo a medical examination after the entry of the final judgment. 2 1 1 Deciding
whether orders peculiar to special proceedings are appealable therefore requires doing more than making an analogy to a civil action. It
requires focusing on the policies that underlie the final judgment rule.
The court did that to some extent when it decided Thompson v.
Kiewit Construction Co.212 In Thompson, the court dismissed an appeal from an order requiring an employee in a workers' compensation
proceeding to undergo a functional capacity evaluation by a physical
therapist.213 The employer presumably sought to have an evaluation
207. See Gernstein v. Lake, 259 Neb. 479, 483-84, 610 N.W.2d 714, 718 (2000). Rule
27 motions are discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 185-87.
208. See In re Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 144 Neb. 820, 827, 14 N.W.2d
840, 843-44 (1944).
209. See Rhodes v. Houston, 172 Neb. 177, 179, 108 N.W.2d 807, 808 (1961).
210. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-134 (Reissue 1998).
211. The only way that could happen is if the losing party appealed and then moved
for an order to perpetuate evidence under Rule 27(b) of the Nebraska Discovery
Rules.
212. 258 Neb. 323, 603 N.W.2d 368 (1999).
213. Parties to a workers' compensation proceeding who are dissatisfied with the initial determination can file an application for review by the workers' compensa-
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done in order to develop evidence of a change in the employee's condition. That would have given it the support it needed to file a petition
to modify a previous order finding that the employee was permanently
and totally disabled. The employee claimed that the order regarding
the evaluation was invalid because no one other than a physician was
authorized to conduct the evaluation. The court held that the order
was not appealable because it did not affect a substantial right.
Although the court recited the shorthand definition of a substantial right,214 it did not focus on that definition. It instead focused on
whether the order could be reviewed at the end of the proceeding. As
the court explained, the employee's challenge to "the type of professional who can conduct the [functional capacity evaluation] does not
rise to the level of a substantial right. Such challenge can be effectively addressed on appeal from a bona fide final order." 215 The court
did not identify the order that would constitute the "bona fide final
order," but presumably it would be the order granting the petition to
modify.
The court's decision is debatable if one focuses on the shorthand
definition of a substantial right. The right not to undergo an evaluation by someone who is not authorized by law to conduct that evaluation may be an "essential legal right"-or it may be a "mere technical
right." The decision, however, is not debatable if one focuses on the
policies that underlie the final judgment rule. Allowing an immediate
appeal would expend appellate resources on an issue that might well
be rendered moot by subsequent developments in the litigation. The
employer might never file a petition to modify because the evaluation
might not provide an evidentiary basis for doing so. Even if the employer filed the petition, the employee might prevail at the hearing.
The issue would be alive only if the employee lost at the hearing. It
could also be reviewed at that point. If the evaluation was improperly
conducted and provided a basis for the modification, then the modification could be reversed and the original award reinstated.
2.

Multifaceted Proceedings

Not all special proceedings are designed to resolve an issue. Some
are designed to administer the affairs of a person. That is true, for
tion court. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-179 (Cum. Supp. 2000). After review,
parties can appeal the judgment, award, or final order of the workers' compensation court to the court of appeals. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-185 (Cum. Supp.
2000). For further discussion of appeals in workers' compensation cases, see NEBRASKA APPELLATE PRACTICE HANDBOOK 1OA-2 to 1OB-12 (1997).

214. See Thompson v. Kiewit Constr. Co., 258 Neb. 323, 329, 603 N.W.2d 368, 372
(1999); see also supra text accompanying notes 24-25 (discussing the two "substantial right" definitions enunciated by the Nebraska Supreme Court).
215. Thompson, 258 Neb. at 329, 603 N.W.2d at 373.
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example, of juvenile proceedings. 21 6 The proceedings are actually a
series of different phases involving different issues. At the very least,
a juvenile proceeding will consist of two phases: the adjudication hearing and the disposition hearing. The purpose of the adjudication hearing is to protect the juvenile 2 17 or, more specifically, to determine
whether the juvenile is without proper support or care and therefore
within the court's jurisdiction.218 The purpose of the dispositional
hearing is to determine the rights of the parties and the placement of
2 19
the juvenile.
The adjudication order will not end the proceeding if the court determines that the juvenile is without proper support or care. But the
order will end the adjudication phase of the proceeding. It is therefore
a final, appealable order. 2 20 A party who fails to appeal the order
within 30 days of its entry is precluded from subsequently attacking
that order. 2 21 Even though the proceeding is still on-going, the adjudication phase is over. Any attack on the adjudication order in an appeal from a later order is in effect an impermissible collateral
2
attack. 22

216. Appeals can be taken from "[a]ny final order or judgment entered by a juvenile
court." NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2,106.01(1) (Reissue 1998). The appeal goes to the
court of appeals. When the juvenile court orders a plan other than the plan submitted by the Department of Health and Human Services, then the appeal goes to
the juvenile review panel and from there to the court of appeals. See NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 43-287.01, 43-287.06 (Reissue 1998).
The discussion of juvenile proceedings in this Article focuses on abuse, neglect, and dependency cases (section 42-247(3)) rather than on law violation cases
(sections 42-247(1)-(2), (4)). For an excellent discussion of these two types ofjuvenile proceedings, see Roberta S. Stick, Juvenile Abuse, Neglect and Dependency
Cases, in 8 NEBRASKA "How To" PRACTICE MANUAL (General Practice) (2d ed.
1998) and Margene M. Timm, Juvenile Law Violations, in 8 NEBRASKA "How To"
PRACTICE MANUAL (General Practice) (2d ed. 1998).
217. See In re Interest of Amber G., 250 Neb. 973, 980, 554 N.W.2d 142, 148 (1996).
218. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-247(3), 43-278 (Reissue 1998).
219. See In re Interest of Amber G., 250 Neb. at 980, 554 N.W.2d at 148.
220. See In re Interest of Rachel M., 258 Neb. 250, 256, 603 N.W.2d 10, 15 (1999); In re
Interest of A.C., 239 Neb. 734, 738, 478 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1991); In re Interest of
Aufenkamp, 214 Neb. 297, 298, 333 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1983).
221. See In re Interest of C.W., 238 Neb. 215, 216, 469 N.W.2d 535, 535 (1991); In re
Interest of Z.R., 226 Neb. 770, 777, 415 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1987). Appeals from
final orders rendered by a juvenile court must be filed within 30 days of the entry
of the order. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1912(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-2,106.01 (Reissue 1998).
222. A collateral attack is normally defined as a challenge in one case to the validity of
the judgment entered in another case. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Dawes County Bd. of
Equalization, 259 Neb. 954, 960, 613 N.W.2d 810, 816 (2000). Although they are
technically part of the same case, each distinct phase of juvenile proceeding is
treated as a separate case for purposes of the rule against collateral attacks.
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The same is true of dispositional orders.2 2 3 For example, an order
adopting a rehabilitation plan will not end the proceedings. But it is a
final, appealable order.2 24 It resolves the issue of what the parents
must do in order to be reunited with their children. A party who fails
to appeal the order within 30 days of its entry is precluded from subsequently attacking that order. 2 25 Even though the proceeding is still
on-going, the "what's the plan" phase is over. The next phase of the
proceeding involves reviewing the parents' progress on a regular basis
and modifying the plan as necessary. Any significant modification of
the plan will be a final, appealable order. 22 6 Although the order modifying the plan will not end the juvenile proceedings, it will end the
modification proceeding within the juvenile proceedings. Any subsequent modification in effect will be its own proceeding and end with its
22
own final order. 7
223. See In re Interest of Tanisha P., 9 Neb. Ct. App. 344, 351, 611 N.W.2d 418, 423
(2000) (holding that dispositional orders are final, appealable orders); In re Interest of Bryce C., 8 Neb. Ct. App. 907, 911, 603 N.W.2d 684, 687 (2000) (same).
224. See In re Interest of Tabitha R., 255 Neb. 818, 827-28, 587 N.W.2d 109, 117
(1998).
225. See In re Interest of Joshua M., 251 Neb. 614, 629, 558 N.W.2d 548, 559 (1997); In
re Interest of J.H., 242 Neb. 906, 914, 497 N.W.2d 346, 353 (1993); see also In re
Interest of Clifford M., 6 Neb. Ct. App. 754, 577 N.W.2d 547 (1998) (observing
that child's mother could challenge plan provision on self-incrimination grounds
even though she did not file timely appeal from the order approving the plan
because the self-incrimination grounds could not have been raised on an appeal

from the order).
226. See In re Interest ofTeela H., 3 Neb. Ct. App. 604,529 N.W.2d 134 (1995) (involving an appeal from order modifying plan from unsupervised visitation of two
weekends per month to supervised visitation, with the amount and manner of the
supervised visitation to be set by a psychiatrist). But cf. In re Guardianship of
Rebecca B., 260 Neb. 922, 621 N.W.2d 289 (2000) (holding that order adopting
case plan that was almost identical to earlier case plan was not appealable; appeal was an impermissible collateral attack on the earlier order); In re Interest of
Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52, 601 N.W.2d 780 (1999) (holding that a previously approved plan was not appealable; appeal was an impermissible collateral attack on
the earlier order that had approved the plan).
227. When it comes to final orders, juvenile proceedings are much like divorce proceedings. Both of them are collections of separate yet connected proceedings that
can yield a number of appeals over the course of their lives. A divorce decree is a
final, appealable order. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-372 (Reissue 1998). But it is
not necessarily the final word on the rights and obligations of the parties. Either
party may later seek to modify the provisions of the decree.
In order to modify the decree, the party must establish that there has been a
material change in circumstances since the entry of the decree or, if the decree
has been modified, since the entry of the last modification order. See, e.g., Elsome
v. Elsome, 257 Neb. 889, 896, 601 N.W.2d 537, 543 (1999); see also Tworek v.
Tworek, 218 Neb. 808,809,359 N.W.2d 764, 765 (1984) (finding that modification
of support provisions was improper because father failed to show a material
change in circumstances; a modification proceeding "is not a retrial of the original
case or a review of the equities of the original decree"). The order that finally
resolves all of the issues raised in the modification proceeding is a final, appeala-
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Eventually, the state may seek to terminate a parent's parental
rights. The termination proceeding will involve factual issues similar
to those raised in the adjudication and earlier disposition hearings but
a different burden of proof and fundamentally different legal issue:
whether the parent's right should be terminated. 228 As such, it will be
yet another discrete phase of the juvenile proceeding. The order terminating the parents' parental rights will not end the juvenile proceeding-the juvenile will still be within the court's jurisdiction 2 29but it will end the termination phase of the proceeding. The order will
be a final, appealable order. 2 30
Juvenile proceedings are not the only special proceedings that are
in fact a collection of separate proceedings. Probate proceedings are
another. The purpose of probate proceedings is to manage and settle
the decedent's estate. 2 31 That may require the resolution of a number
of discrete disputes. One such dispute may be the appointment of the
personal representative. An order granting or denying a motion to appoint a personal representative will not end the probate proceedingbut it will end the dispute over who will be the personal representa-

228.

229.
230.
231.

ble order. See Schepers v. Schepers, 236 Neb. 406, 461 N.W.2d 413 (1990) (holding that order modifying decree by changing custody to the mother was not final
because it did not resolve all of the issues raised by the application to modify; the
district court had not yet ruled on the mother's request for child support);
Huffman v. Huffman, 236 Neb. 101, 459 N.W.2d 215 (1990) (observing that appeal from order refusing to modify the custody provisions of decree could only be
taken after the district court resolved the father's request to modify the visitation
provisions); Paulsen v. Paulsen, 10 Neb. Ct. App. 269, 634 N.W.2d 12 (2001)
(finding requirement that order must resolve all of the issues is necessary to prevent piecemeal review). But see Templeton v. Templeton, 9 Neb. Ct. App. 424,
622 N.W.2d 424 (2001) (holding that district court order modifying custody was
final even though court stayed visitation and support issues until Iowa juvenile
court terminated its jurisdiction over the children).
Although the order will end the modification proceeding, it will not preclude
the possibility of future modification proceedings-and the possibility of future
appeals from the orders ending each of those proceedings. For further discussion
of the modification of divorce decrees, see PETER T. HOFFMAN ET AL., NEBRASKA
PRACTICE DIVORCE MANUAL 471-510 (2d ed. 1998).
A number of the grounds for adjudicating a juvenile to be within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court under section 43-247(3) are similar to the grounds for terminating a parent's parental rights under section 43-292. For example, a juvenile
whose parent fails to provide the juvenile with necessary care falls within the
court's jurisdiction. The failure to provide that care also provides a basis for terminating parental rights if the parent was financially able to provide the care
and willfully neglected to do so. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-247(3)(a), 42-292(3) (Reissue 1998). The State's burden of proof in the adjudication hearing will be preponderance of the evidence. The State's burden in the termination proceeding will be
clear and convincing evidence. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-279.01 (Reissue 1998).
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-295 (Reissue 1998).
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-293 (Reissue 1998).
See In re Estate of Wilson, 8 Neb. Ct. App. 467, 472, 594 N.W.2d 695, 700 (1999).
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rive. It is therefore a final, appealable order. 232 The same is true
of an order removing or refusing to remove the personal
2 33
representative.
The court has said that an order refusing to remove a personal representative affects a substantial right because the Probate Code confers broad powers on the personal representative, many of which (s)he
can exercise without a prior court order. 23 4 It is not clear, however,
why the scope of the personal representative's power makes an order
refusing to remove him or her an order affecting a substantial right.
One explanation is that the order is an important one. A better explanation, however, is that an immediate appeal is consistent with the
policies that underlie the final judgment rule. The motion to remove
the personal representative is a discrete phase that comes to an end
with the entry of the order granting or denying the motion. There is
no meaningful risk of duplicative review; the issues raised by the motion are unlikely to arise in other phases of the probate proceeding.
While it is theoretically possible to delay review of the order until the
end of the probate proceeding, doing so would be inefficient and potentially harmful. The longer the personal representative fails to discharge his or her duties to the estate-whether it be by malfeasance
or inaction-the less likely it becomes that the resulting harms can be
undone.
This kind of reasoning explains why a number of other orders in
probate proceedings are final, appealable orders. They include, among
others, orders admitting or refusing to admit a will to probate (orders
that finally resolve the discrete issue of whether the will is valid),235
orders denying a motion to vacate an order admitting a will to probate
(orders that finally resolve the discrete issue of whether the earlier
order should be vacated), 23 6 orders construing a will (orders that fi232. See In re Estate of Casselman, 219 Neb. 653, 365 N.W.2d 805 (1985). Appeals in
matters arising under the Nebraska Probate Code can be taken from a judgment
or final order. The appeals go to the court of appeals. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 301601 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
233. See In re Estate of Seidler, 241 Neb. 402, 411, 490 N.W.2d 453, 459 (1992); In re
Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. 198, 203, 443 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1989).
234. See In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. at 202-03, 443 N.W.2d at 898; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-2465 (Reissue 1995).
235. See In re Estate of Foxley, 254 Neb. 204, 575 N.W.2d 150 (1998) (involving an
appeal from order admitting will and holographic codicil to probate); In re Estate
of Kleeb, 211 Neb. 763, 320 N.W.2d 459 (1982) (involving an appeal from order
admitting will to probate); In re Estate of Schrack, 183 Neb. 155, 158 N.W.2d 614
(1968) (involving an appeal from order refusing to admit will to probate).
236. See In re Estate of Seidler, 241 Neb. 402, 490 N.W.2d 453 (1992) (involving an
appeal from denial of order to vacate pursuant to section 30-2436 of the Probate
Code); In re Estate ofRolenc, 7 Neb. Ct. App. 833, 585 N.W.2d 526 (1998) (involving an appeal from denial of order to vacate pursuant to section 30-2437 of the
Probate Code).
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nally determine the discrete issue of what a particular provision
means), 23 7 orders allowing or disallowing claims against the estate
(orders that finally resolve the discrete issue of whether a particular
claim must be paid),238 orders allowing or disallowing a spouse's election for his or her statutory share (orders that finally resolve the discrete issue of whether the spouse has waived his or her right to the
share),23 9 and orders granting or denying homestead, exempt property, and spousal support allowances (orders that finally determine
the discrete issue of whether the allowances are available). 24 0 An immediate appeal of these orders is warranted because it is much more
efficient to review orders affecting the disposition of the estate's assets
before those assets leave the estate. 241
Not every order in a probate proceeding is immediately appealable,
however. An order granting a claimant leave to present a claim after
expiration of the statutory time limits, for example, is not a final order. 242 It is instead the opening salvo in a self-contained proceeding
to determine whether the claim must be paid. In other words, it
merely allows the proceeding to go forward. The personal representative may allow the claim (in which case the claimant will be paid) or
disallow the claim. If (s)he disallows the claim, the claimant can file a
petition for allowance of the claim. After the hearing on the petition,
237. See In re Estate of Johnson, 260 Neb. 91, 615 N.W.2d 98 (2000) (involving an
appeal from order construing will); In re Estate of Ritter, 227 Neb. 641, 419
N.W.2d 521 (1988) (same).
238. See In re Estate of Jackson, 7 Neb. Ct. App. 427, 583 N.W.2d 82 (1998) (involving
an appeal from allowance of claim); In re Estate of Krichau, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 398,
501 N.W.2d 722 (1992) (involving an appeal from disallowance of claim).
239. See In re Estate of Peterson, 221 Neb. 792, 381 N.W.2d 109 (1986) (involving an
appeal from order disallowing spouse's petition for an elective share on ground
that antenuptial agreement was valid); In re Estate of Kopecky, 6 Neb. Ct. App.
500, 574 N.W.2d 549 (1998) (involving an appeal from order allowing spouse's
petition for an elective share on ground that postnuptial agreement was invalid).
240. See In re Estate of Peterson, 254 Neb. 334, 576 N.W.2d 767 (1998) (involving an
appeal from order denying exempt property allowance); In re Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993) (involving an appeal from order granting all three allowances).
241. Probate is an on-going proceeding in which claims and bequests are paid on a
periodic basis. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2465 (Reissue 1995) (stating that personal representative "shall proceed expeditiously with the settlement and distribution" of the estate); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2489 (Reissue 1995) (stating that
personal representative may begin paying claims two months after date of first
publication of notice to creditors). One incentive for the prompt payment of general pecuniary devises is that they earn interest at the legal rate beginning one
year after the personal representative's appointment. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 3024,102 (Reissue 1995).
242. See In re Estate of Emery, 258 Neb. 789, 793, 606 N.W.2d 750, 754 (2000); In re
Estate of Golden, 120 Neb. 226, 229-30, 231 N.W. 833, 835-36 (1930). By contrast, an order denying a claimant leave to present a claim is a final, appealable
order. See Golden, 120 Neb. at 229, 231 N.W. at 835. That makes sense because
such an order finally resolves the issue of whether the claim must be paid.
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the court will enter an order either allowing or disallowing the claim.
That is the order that ends the proceeding because that is the order
that determines whether the claim must be paid. If the personal representative wants to challenge the court's order granting the claimant
leave, then (s)he can do so on an appeal from the order allowing the

claim.2 43

Admittedly, there are some advantages to allowing an immediate
appeal of the order granting the claimant leave. If the appellate court
on appeal determines that leave should not have been granted, then
the parties and the system would be spared the cost of unnecessary
litigation. Yet there would also have been some disadvantages. An
immediate appeal would delay the proceedings and squander judicial
resources on an issue that could be rendered moot if the personal representative or court subsequently decided to allow the claim. The advantages might outweigh the disadvantages if the order could not be
effectively reviewed at the end of the proceeding. But it can. As a
matter of policy, therefore, an immediate appeal is unwarranted.
The court used much the same kind of reasoning when it decided
In re Interest of Clifford M.244 In that case, the State filed a motion to
terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother in turn moved to
dismiss the State's motion on the ground that the motion was based
24 5
on an improper retroactive application of a statutory amendment.
243. See In re Estate of Golden, 120 Neb. at 229-30, 231 N.W. at 835-36. This kind of
reasoning seems to have been at work in the court's 2000 decision in In re Estate
of Peters,259 Neb. 154, 609 N.W.2d 23 (2000). After Peters's estate was closed,
the personal representative realized that a charitable bequest had not been paid
and that, as a result, excess payments had been made to the other beneficiaries.
He then sought to be reappointed as personal representative so that he could
recover the excess payments and pay the charitable bequest. The county court
entered an order reappointing him personal representative. The other beneficiaries appealed, claiming that the order was made in a special proceeding and
affected a substantial right. According to the beneficiaries, the order affected a
substantial right because it required them to defend distributions that had been
made years beforehand. The court disagreed.
The court first discussed a Michigan case in which the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that "the test of finality of a probate order is whether it affects with
finality the rights of the parties in the subject matter." Id. at 159, 609 N.W.2d at
27 (quoting In re Miller Estate, 307 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)) (emphasis added). The court then noted that the order reappointing the personal
representative in Petersdid not require the beneficiaries to pay anything back. It
also did not affect any of the defenses that they might have to the personal representative's claim. All it did was require them to defend themselves against that
claim. That was not enough to justify an immediate appeal. As the court said,
"[tihe fact that the heirs may be forced to defend a lawsuit does not affect a substantial right." 259 Neb. at 159, 609 N.W.2d at 27.
244. 258 Neb. 800, 606 N.W.2d 743 (2000).
245. The State's original motion to terminate the mother's parental rights was filed in
December 1996 and was based in part on section 43-292(7). At the time, section
43-292(7) provided that parental rights could be terminated if the child had been
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The juvenile court denied the mother's motion to dismiss and also denied her separate motion to renew visitation. On appeal, the court
held that, although the order denying the motion to dismiss was made
in a special proceeding, the order did not affect a substantial right.
The court based its holding on the traditional definition of a final
order: one that disposes of the whole merits of the case and leaves
nothing for further consideration of the court.2 46 That was not true of

the order denying the mother's motion to dismiss, however. The juvenile court had not yet resolved the issue of whether the mother's parental rights should be terminated. Once the juvenile court resolved
that issue-in other words, once the court entered a final order-the
mother could challenge the order on the same ground that she raised
in her motion to dismiss (improper retroactive application of statutory
amendment). As the court said, to the extent that there was any merit
to the mother's motion to dismiss, "the substance of her challenge...
can be preserved at the termination hearing, if any, and considered on
appeal therefrom."247
The court's decision in Clifford M. is a classic example of the final
judgment rule: orders entered during a proceeding are interlocutory
in out-of-home placement for 18 consecutive months and the parent had failed to
correct the conditions leading to the placement. See LB 1184, § 15, 1991-92 Neb.
Laws (amended 1998). The State's second motion to terminate was filed in July
1998 and was based on section 43-292(7) as amended. The amended version of
section 43-292(7) became effective on July 1, 1998, and provided that parental
rights could be terminated if the child had been in out-of-home placement for 15
or more of the most recent 22 months. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-292(7) (Reissue
1998).
246. See Clifford M., 6 Neb. Ct. App. at 806-07, 606 N.W.2d at 748.
247. Id. at 807, 606 N.W.2d at 749. The court also held that the order denying the
mother's motion for visitation was not a final order. The court said that the order

did not affect a substantial right because the State's motion to terminate the
mother's parental rights was not based on the mother's failure to stay in contact
with her children. The court added that the mother "remains free to regain visitation upon a showing that such visitation is in the best interests of the children."
Id. at 808, 606 N.W.2d at 749.
This decision is part of a line of decisions in which the court has declined to
review juvenile court orders that maintain the status quo. See In re Guardianship of Rebecca B., 260 Neb. 922, 930-31, 621 N.W.2d 289, 295-96 (2000); In re
Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52, 56, 601 N.W.2d 780, 783-84 (1999); In re
Joshua M., 251 Neb. 614, 627, 558 N.W.2d 548, 558 (1997). Declining review has
its advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it reduces the number of cases
on the court's docket, facilitates the orderly progress of the juvenile proceeding,
and eliminates the potential for collateral attacks on earlier orders from which no
appeal was taken. On the other hand, it leaves a parent without recourse when
the juvenile court consistently refuses to modify an order despite evidence that
circumstances have changed such that modification is in the best interest of the
child. It might be better to make an analogy to modifications in divorce proceedings, see supra note 227, and allow an appeal when the motion is based on
changed circumstances. A motion to modify based on changed circumstances assumes rather than attacks the validity of the prior order.
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orders that can only be appealed at the end of the case. But there is a
twist. In the context of multifaceted special proceedings that are designed to administer the affairs of a person, the word "case" means a
discrete phase of the proceedings. An order that ends a discrete phase
of the proceedings affects a substantial right because it finally resolves the issues raised in that phase. In short, the primary consideration is not whether the right at issue is important in some abstract
sense but whether the right has been finally determined. 248
There may be times, however, when a right is so important that it
warrants recognizing an order as final, or to put things differently,
recognizing the order as one that puts an end to a distinct phase of the
proceedings. That may explain the court's decision in In re Interest of
R. G. As previously noted, the court in R. G. decided to allow an immediate appeal from a pre-adjudication detention order in a juvenile proceeding. 2 49 At the time that the court made that decision, the statutes
specified that the adjudication hearing had to be held no later than 6
months after the petition was filed.250 If the parents could not appeal

until after the adjudication hearing, then they could lose up to six
months of time with their children, time that they could never recapture. Given the impact of the order on the parents "recognized liberty
interest in raising their children," 251 the court's decision to allow an
immediate appeal may well have been the correct decision at the time.
It is not clear, however, whether it would be the correct decision
today. The statutes now require that the adjudication hearing be held
248. Focusing on finality would have made it easier for the court of appeals to decide
In re Interest of Jaden H., 10 Neb. Ct. App. 87, 625 N.W.2d 218 (2001). Jaden
was a juvenile proceeding in which the State sought to terminate a couple's parental rights to one of their children, Jaden. The State filed a motion for partial
summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. Through its motion, the State
sought to preclude the parents from re-litigating various issues that had been
determined adversely to them in an earlier proceeding to terminate their parental rights to their other two children, Destiny and Suede. After the juvenile court
granted the State's motion, the couple appealed.
The appeal should have been dismissed because the order was not final. It did
not determine whether the couple's parental rights would be terminated; it
merely limited the issues that would be contested at the hearing to determine
whether the couple's parental rights would be terminated. The court of appeals,
however, had to work its way through a maze of decisions: (1) the decisions holding that juvenile proceedings are special proceedings, (2) the decisions holding
that partial summary judgment proceedings are not special proceedings, (3) the
decisions holding that specific statutes control over general statutes (with the
court of appeals substituting "holdings" for "statutes"), and (4) the decisions holding that orders affect a substantial right when they diminish defenses. See id. at
91-93, 625 N.W.2d at 225-26. The court of appeals lost its way and held that the
order was appealable.
249. R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1999), is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 30-37.
250. See supra note 36.
251. In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 414, 470 N.W.2d 780, 788 (1991).
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within 90 days (three months) of the filing of the petition. 2 52 As a
result, the potential impact of the order on the parents' rights is less
than it once was and may no longer be sufficient to offset the costs of
allowing an immediate appeal. An appeal will take at least a year and
divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction to proceed with the disposition
hearing. 2 53 In addition to delaying the proceedings, an appeal will
also invite piecemeal review; the issues at the detention hearing will
often be similar to the issues at the adjudication hearing. It might
therefore be more efficient to defer review until after the adjudication
hearing by treating the detention order as an interlocutory order.
While that would delay the parent's opportunity to appeal, it would
only delay it for a few months.
In conclusion, an order that ends a distinct phase of a multifaceted
special proceeding ought to be treated as final order. That is the easy
part. The hard part is deciding what constitutes a distinct phase.
That is where the policies that underlie the final judgment rule come
into play. There may be times when the importance of the rights at
issue and the impact of the order on those rights outweigh the costs of
allowing an immediate appeal. Those costs may vary, depending on
the circumstances. For example, immediate review of some orders
may facilitate rather than undermine the orderly progress of the proceeding or may be necessary to ensure meaningful review of issues
worth reviewing. Immediate review of other orders may not be. The
answers will often be obvious-but not always. Whatever the ultimate answer may be in a particular case, it is important for the court
to go beyond labels and to explain its reasoning. That will help to
252. See NEB REV. STAT. § 43-278 (Reissue 1998).
253. See In re Interest of Joshua M., 251 Neb. 614, 626, 558 N.W.2d 548, 558 (1997)
(holding that appeal from detention order divested juvenile court of jurisdiction
to rule on motion to terminate parental rights); see also In re Interest of Tabatha
R., 255 Neb. 818, 828-29, 587 N.W.2d 109, 117 (1998) (finding that appeal from
dispositional order divested juvenile court ofjurisdiction to enter order requiring
release of father's medical records in preparation for hearing on motion to terminate parental rights); In re Interest of Andrew H., 5 Neb. Ct. App. 716, 719, 564
N.W.2d 611, 614 (1997) (holding that appeal from adjudication order divested
juvenile court of jurisdiction to enter dispositional order).
It is not clear whether the pendency of an appeal from a detention order divests the juvenile court ofjurisdiction to hold an adjudication hearing. In Joshua
M., the adjudication and termination hearings were combined into one hearing.
That hearing was held approximately six months after the mother appealed from
the pre-adjudication detention order. See 251 Neb. at 619, 558 N.W.2d at 554.
Although the court said that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to terminate
the mother's parental rights because of the appeal, it said nothing about the effect of the appeal on the juvenile court's jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the
child was within section 43-247(3). The court's silence suggests that the court
believed that the juvenile court had the power to proceed with the adjudication
hearing despite the appeal from the detention order.
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create a coherent body of case law, which is important to judges and
lawyers alike.
B. Policy-Based Special Proceedings
The second type of special proceeding does not consist of orders
that are made in a special proceeding. It instead consists of interlocutory orders that are made in an action but labeled as being made in a
special proceeding. The label is attached when the order involves
matters sufficiently important to warrant an immediate appeal. In
that sense, the special proceedings label is an exception to the final
judgment rule and is much like the collateral order doctrine in federal
court. Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order is
immediately appealable if it (1) finally decides an important matter
(2) that is separate and distinct from the merits and (3) and is effectively unreviewable at the end of the litigation. 254 What often separates a collateral order from a noncollateral order is the judicial sense
that the order involves matters that are too important to await review
at the end of the litigation.2 5 5 That sense is reflected at the state level
primarily in the court's use of section 25-1902's requirement that the
order must affect a substantial right.
1.

The Old Wine: Special Proceedings

The special proceedings exception to the final judgment rule traces
its roots to the court's 1881 decision in Turpin v. Coates.25 6 In Turpin,
the court held that an order discharging garnishees was reviewable
even though no final judgment had been entered in the action. The
court said that the order affected a substantial right because discharging the garnishee deprived the plaintiff of the security he otherwise
254. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999); Swint v.
Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 43 (1995). For a detailed discussion of

the collateral order doctrine, see 15A WRIGHr & MILLR, supra note 195, at
§§ 3911 to 3914.14.
255. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 877-78 (1994)
(holding that order vacating settlement agreement was not a collateral order;
right not to stand trial conferred by a private agreement is not sufficiently important to warrant an immediate appeal); Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S.
495, 502-03 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that implicit in the statement that a right can be vindicated by an appeal from a final judgment is the
conclusion that the right is not important enough to warrant an immediate appeal). The relative importance of the right at issue was a consideration that the
Court identified as relevant in the case that first recognized the collateral order
doctrine, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen,
the Court described collateral orders as those "which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
256. 12 Neb. 321, 11 N.W. 300 (1882).
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would have had for any judgment that might later be entered against
the defendant.257 The court also said that the order was made in a
special proceeding, which the court defined as a "special statutory
remedy which is not in itself an action." 258 The garnishment proceeding was apparently treated as a separate proceeding because it involved matters separate from the merits. As the court said, "the
action, when there is personal service, in no manner depends on the
attachment. There may be a just cause of action, and no grounds for
2 59
order of the attachment."
The court could have limited its decision in Turpin to proceedings
that are connected to, but separate from, the action itself. Garnishments are arguably separate proceedings because they involve persons (the garnishees) who are not parties to the action. An order
discharging the garnishees is final-and therefore ought to be appealable-because it puts an end to those separate proceedings. The
court, however, subsequently took a different approach.
In 1952, the court decided Sullivan v. Storz260 and expanded the
scope of special proceedings to include proceedings that are part and
parcel of the action. The plaintiff in Sullivan sued the defendant for
seduction and for breaching his promise to marry her. The trial court
subsequently stayed the action for approximately two years pursuant
to a federal statute, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.2 61
Eight months after the entry of the stay, the plaintiff moved to vacate
the stay. The trial court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
The court held that the order denying the motion was appealable
because it had been made in a special proceeding and affected a sub257. See id. at 323, 11 N.W. at 301.
258. Id.; see also Seidentopf v. Annabil, 6 Neb. 524, 527 (1877) (noting that order on
motion to discharge attachment is made during a special proceeding and may be
reviewed during the pendency of the action).
259. Turpin, 12 Neb. at 323, 11 N.W. at 301 (quoting Watson & Co. v. Sullivan, 5 Ohio
St. 43, 45 (1855)). The quote comes from the portion of the court's opinion in
which it discussed the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in Watson & Co. The court
opened its discussion of Watson & Co. by saying that the Nebraska final order
statute "is a copy of section 512 of the code of Ohio." Id. at 322, 11 N.W. at 301.
The court's discussion of Watson & Co. and its subsequent pronouncement (without explanation) that an order discharging garnishees was made in a special proceeding suggests that the court agreed with the reasoning of Watson & Co.
260. 156 Neb. 177, 55 N.W.2d 499 (1952).
261. The Act provides that if a party to an action is in the military and moves for a
stay, the court must grant the stay unless it determines that the party's military
service will not affect his or her ability to prosecute or defend the action. See 50
U.S.C. app. § 521 (1994). The trial court's decision to stay the action seems
rather questionable given that the action was pending in Douglas County and the
defendant was a captain in the Strategic Air Command who was stationed at
Offutt Air Force Base in Douglas County. See Sullivan, 156 Neb. at 178-79, 55
N.W.2d at 501. Perhaps the trial court was influenced by the tense military situation of the times. The case was brought during the Korean and Cold Wars.
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stantial right. The court explained that the order affected a substantial right because it unreasonably and unnecessarily deprived the

plaintiff of her right to a trial.262 Although the court did not explain
why the order was made in a special proceeding, it did recite the same
definition of special proceeding that it formulated in Turpin: "every
2 63
This sugspecial statutory remedy which is not in itself an action."
gests that the statutory authorization for the order was the basis for
saying that it was made in a special proceeding.
Much the same seems true of the order at issue in the court's 1980
decision in State v. Guatney,2 64 the first criminal case in which the
court used the special proceedings clause of section 25-1902 to justify
an interlocutory appeal. The trial court determined that the defendant in a criminal case was incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to
section 29-1823 of the Criminal Code, the trial court entered an order
committing the accused to a mental facility until such time as he
regained his competency. The court held that the order was immediately appealable even though the criminal action was still pending.
The order was made in a special proceeding because section 29-1823 is
a "statutory remedy which is not itself an action."2 65 The order affected a substantial right because it "denied the [defendant] a right to
a speedy trial... and ha[d] likewise denied the [defendant] his liberty
26 6
for an undetermined time."
Although the statutory basis for the orders in Sullivan and
Guatney may have been the determining factor in those cases, it is
quite possible that the determining factor was something else. The
court may have decided that an interlocutory appeal was appropriate
as a matter of policy and then used the special proceedings label as a
262.
263.
264.
265.

See Sullivan, 156 Neb. at 180, 55 N.W.2d at 502.
Id. at 180, 55 N.W.2d at 502.
207 Neb. 501, 299 N.W.2d 538 (1980).
Id. at 506, 299 N.W.2d at 542 (quoting Sullivan v. Storz, 156 Neb. 177, 180, 55
N.W.2d 409, 502 (1952)).
266. Id. at 507-08, 299 N.W.2d at 543. In 1997, the legislature amended section 291823 to reduce the likelihood of an accused being committed indefinitely. The
statute as amended requires the court to hold a hearing every six months to determine whether the accused is competent to stand trial or whether there is a
substantial likelihood that the accused will become competent in the foreseeable
future. See NFB. REv. STAT. § 29-1823(2) (Gum. Supp. 2000). It also requires the
codrt to hold a hearing if the Department of Health and Human Services files a
report stating that the Department believes that the accused is competent to
stand trial. See NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 29-1823(3) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
Like an order under the old version of the statute, an order under the
amended version is an appealable order. See State v. Jones, 258 Neb. 695, 605
N.W.2d 434 (2000). In Jones, the court relied on Guatney to hold that an order
committing an accused and scheduling a review hearing in six months was a final
order. Echoing its reasoning in Guatney, the court said that the order affected a
substantial right because it deprived the accused of "his liberty for unascertainable and significant amount of time." Id. at 699, 605 N.W.2d at 438.
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justification. The issues raised by those orders-whether the defendant's ability to conduct his defense in Sullivan was affected by his
military service and whether the defendant in Guatney was competent
to stand trial-were distinct from the merits of the action. As a result,
there was no danger of duplicative review. Furthermore, the orders
could not be meaningfully reviewed at the end of the litigation. It
would make no sense to ask years later whether the trial court erred
in refusing to vacate a stay or in keeping a criminal defendant in a
mental facility. In short, the orders at issue in Sullivan and Guatney
are examples of orders that would be collateral orders at the federal
26 7
level.
267. Although stay orders are not normally appealable in federal court, see, e.g., Wolfson v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 141, 144 (8th Cir. 1995), stay orders that
effectively put the plaintiffout of court are appealable. They are final orders and,
even if they were not, they would be collateral orders. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983). One way in which a stay
order can effectively put the plaintiff out of court is by subjecting the plaintiff to
indefinite and unnecessary delay. See Rojas-Hernandez v. Puerto Rico Elec.
Power Auth., 925 F.2d 492, 494-95 (1st Cir. 1991) (indicating that indefinite and
unnecessary delay inherent in order refusing to set trial date until after completion of state court proceedings effectively put plaintiff out of court); Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 743 F.2d 1519, 1522-24 (11th Cir. 1984) (observing that
indefinite and unnecessary delay inherent in order staying federal action until
completion of state court proceedings effectively put plaintiffs out of court); Wimberly v. Rogers, 557 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that order staying civil
rights action until plaintiff was released from prison was a collateral order);
Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726, 731 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that order staying
employment discrimination action until plaintiffs pursued administrative remedies was a collateral order because it effectively put the plaintiffs out of court for
at least eighteen months).
Competency issues in federal criminal cases are resolved in three stages.
First, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is mentally
incompetent, the court can commit the defendant for up to thirty days (with a
possible fifteen day extension) for purposes of having him or her undergo a psychiatric evaluation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(a)-(b), 4247(b) (1994). The majority of
courts have held that a stage one order of commitment is immediately appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. See United States v. Deters, 143 F.3d 577,
580-81 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1289 (6th Cir.
1996). But see United States v. Barth, 28 F.3d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1994).
Second, if the court subsequently determines that the defendant is mentally
incompetent, the court must commit the defendant for up to four months to determine whether there is a substantial probability that the defendant will become
competent in the foreseeable future. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (1994). The majority of courts have held that a stage two order of commitment is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See United States v. Boigegrain, 122
F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1303
(11th Cir.) (1990). But see United States v. Ohnick, 803 F.2d 1485, 1486 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that only a stage three order is a final order).
Third, if the court subsequently determines that there is not a substantial
probability that the defendant will become competent and further determines
that the defendant is dangerous to others, the court must commit the defendant
until such time as (s)he is no longer dangerous. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d), 4246
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The similarities between special proceedings and collateral orders
became clearer in 1990 when the court decided State v.
Milenkovich.26s The issue in Milenkovich was whether the denial of a
plea in bar that raised a double jeopardy claim was immediately appealable. In holding that it was, the court relied heavily on the United
States Supreme Court's decision inAbney v. United States. 2 69 The Supreme Court in Abney held that an order denying a double jeopardy
claim was immediately appealable as a collateral order. 2 70 The claim
itself was separate from the merits of the criminal action (whether the
defendant was guilty) and could not be meaningfully reviewed at the
end of the litigation. The right not to be tried twice for the same offense would be lost, the Court said, "if the accused were forced to 'run
27
the gauntlet' a second time before an appeal could be taken." 1
In Milenkovich, the Nebraska Supreme Court took the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and translated them into the
language of special proceedings. The court said that the order denying
the defendant's plea in bar was made in a special proceeding because
the plea in bar statute "authorizes a defendant to bring a special application to a court to enforce the defendant's constitutional right to
avoid double jeopardy. The applicationis not made as a step in determining the merits of any issue in the criminalprosecutionitself."272 In
other words, the order was separate from the merits. The court explained why the order affected a substantial right by using the same
reasoning that the Supreme Court used to explain why the order in
Abney could not be meaningfully reviewed at the end of the litigation.
The court in Milenkovich said: "As the Abney decision points out, there
is no question that a determination of a nonfrivolous double jeopardy
claim affects the substantial right not to be tried twice for the same
offense." 2 73 In other words, the right would be lost unless the order
could be immediately appealed.
The need for an immediate appeal also played a major role in the
court's subsequent decision in State v. Jacques.2 74 In Jacques, the
court held that an order denying a motion to discharge on speedy trial

268.
269.
270.
271,
272.
273.

274.

(1994). A stage three order of commitment is immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 652
(9th Cir. 1953).
236 Neb. 42, 458 N.W.2d 747 (1990).
431 U.S. 651 (1977).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 662.
Milenkovich, 236 Neb. at 48, 458 N.W.2d at 751 (emphasis added).
Id. at 48, 458 N.W.2d at 751; see also State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. 177, 183-84, 542
N.W.2d 424, 429-30 (1996) (holding that a denial of plea in bar raising double
jeopardy claim based on civil driver's license revocation was a final order because
the defendant would be forced to run the gauntlet twice).
253 Neb. 247, 570 N.W.2d 331 (1997).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:239

grounds was a final order under section 25-1902.275 The order was
made in a special proceeding because a motion to discharge "is a statutory remedy which is not itself an action." 2 76 The order affected a substantial right because the "right to a speedy trial is obviously an
essential legal right, not a mere technical right
.....
'[Tihe rights conferred on an accused criminal by [the speedy trial statutes] would be
significantly undermined if appellate review of nonfrivolous speedy
277
trial claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence.'"
7s
The opposite was true of the rights at issue in State v. Pruett.2
The County Attorney filed an information against Pruett with two
counts: (1) manslaughter and (2) use of a firearm to commit a felony.
279
The information alleged that the manslaughter was unintentional.
Pruett moved to quash the second count on the ground that, as a matter of law, a defendant cannot be charged with using a firearm to commit an unintentional act. After the trial court denied the motion to
quash, Pruett appealed. The court dismissed his appeal for lack of a
final order, however. The order denying the motion to quash did not
affect a substantial right-and was therefore not final-because it
could be effectively reviewed at the end of the litigation. As the court
said, "If Pruett were to be convicted of the charges, he would not be
275. Id. at 254, 570 N.W.2d at 336. A criminal defendant is entitled to be brought to
trial within six months. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1995). If(s)he is
not, then (s)he is entitled to an "absolute discharge from the offense charged and
for any other offense required by law to be joined with that offense." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-1208 (Reissue 1995). The substantive issue in Jacques was whether a
particular period of time should have been excluded from the computation of the
six month period. See infra note 285.
Like orders denying a speedy trial claim based on sections 29-1207 and 291208, orders denying speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment and the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers are final, appealable orders. See State v.
Kula, 254 Neb. 962, 965-66, 579 N.W.2d 541, 545 (1998) (Sixth Amendment);
State v. Williams, 253 Neb. 619, 625-26, 573 N.W.2d 106, 111 (1997) (Interstate
Agreement on Detainers).
276. Jacques, 253 Neb. at 254, 570 N.W.2d at 336. The court also said that a motion to
discharge is a special proceeding because "a motion to discharge is a legally conferred right that authorizes a special application to a court for enforcement." Id.
277. Id. at 252, 570 N.W.2d at 335 (quoting State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 245, 570
N.W.2d 326, 330 (1997)). The court also said that "a motion to discharge unquestionably affects the subject matter of the litigation because denial of such a motion effectively denies an appellant's speedy trial rights." Id. Therefore, the
motion also fits the "diminishes a defense" definition of a substantial right.
278. 258 Neb. 797, 606 N.W.2d 781 (2000).
279. Pruett was apparently charged under the second clause of section 28-305, which
provides that a "person commits manslaughter if he ...causes the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-305(1) (Reissue 1995); see Brief for Appellant at 4, 13 & Brief for Appellee at 7, State v. Pruett, 258 Neb. 797, 606 N.W.2d 781 (2000) (No. A-98-1321).
The type of manslaughter described in the second clause of the statute is sometimes referred to as "involuntary manslaughter." See State v. Pettit, 233 Neb.
436, 454, 445 N.W.2d 890, 901 (1989).
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prohibited from raising on appeal the issue of whether one can be
28
charged with using a weapon to commit an unintentional act." 0
It is difficult to distinguish Jacques and Pruett using the court's
shorthand. The orders in both cases arguably affected a substantial
right because they both affected an essential legal right rather than a
mere technical right. The right to a speedy trial (Jacques)is neither
trivial nor a matter of form. The same is true of the right not to be
tried for a nonexistent crime (Pruett). Furthermore, the orders in both
cases affected the subject of the litigation by diminishing a defense
available to the defendant. The order in Jacques rejected the defendant's speedy trial defense while the order in Pruettrejected the de28 1
fendant's no-such-crime defense.
It is also difficult to distinguish Jacques and Pruett if one focuses
simply on the availability of effective review. Delaying review would
not affect the rights at issue in either case; it would only delay their
vindication. An appeal from an order denying a motion to discharge
may vindicate the right to a speedy trial-but it cannot restore the
right. The right was irretrievably lost the minute the statutorilymandated period ran. The remedy for the loss of that right will be the
same regardless of whether the appeal is taken immediately or after
the entry of the final judgment. The court will reverse and remand
with instructions to discharge the defendant. Admittedly, that remedy will not be quite as satisfying if it comes from an appeal after a
final judgment. The defendant will have incurred the inconvenience
and expense of a trial that (s)he could have avoided through an immediate appeal. But the same can be said of so many parties who find
themselves on the losing end of an interlocutory order, including the
defendant in Pruett. The consequence of delaying the appeal in Pruett
was to force Pruett to defend himself against a charge that he committed a crime that may not exist.
The availability of effective appellate review might provide a basis
for distinguishing the cases if one recasts the rights at issue. One
might make an analogy to the double jeopardy clause and say that the
280. Pruett,258 Neb. at 799, 606 N.W.2d at 782; see also State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb.
432, 445, 604 N.W.2d 169, 191 (2000) (finding that order denying new trial in a
criminal case did not affect a substantial right because all of the grounds raised
in the new trial motion could be addressed on an appeal from the final judgment).
281. The court in Pruettattempted to justify its conclusion that the order did not affect
a substantial right by pointing out that the order did not diminish any of Pruett's
defenses to the manslaughter count. See id. at 799, 606 N.W.2d at 782. It is
unclear what the court was trying to say. It may have been trying to say that the
order did not diminish a defense available with regard to the manslaughter count
or it may have been trying to say that the presence of the firearm count did not
affect Pruett's defense of the manslaughter count. In either case, the explanation
focused on the manslaughter count-which seems odd given that the order was
directed to the firearm count.
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right to a speedy trial encompasses a right not to be tried at all once
the statutory period runs. 28 2 Such a right could not be vindicated on
an appeal from the final judgment; by then, the defendant would have
been forced to undergo a trial that the speedy trial statutes were designed to prevent. One could then recast the right in Pruett as a right
not to be convicted (as opposed to tried) for a nonexistent crime. Such
a right could be vindicated by an appeal from the final judgment. In
fact, any appeal from an earlier ruling-whether it be a ruling on a
motion to quash or a motion to dismiss at the close of the State's
case-would be premature because there would be no violation of the
defendant's substantial rights unless and until (s)he is convicted.
But recasting the rights along these lines is semantical gamesmanship. Any right can be cast as a right that cannot be effectively reviewed on an appeal from the final judgment. That is a point that the
United States Supreme Court made in Digital Equipment Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc. 28 3 The parties in DigitalEquipment entered into
a settlement agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff dismissed its
action against the defendant. The plaintiff later moved to vacate the
dismissal on the ground that the defendant had made various misrepresentations during the settlement negotiations. After the district
court vacated the dismissal, the defendant appealed.
The defendant argued that the order vacating the dismissal was
appealable as a collateral order. The settlement agreement created a
right not to go to trial, the defendant argued, a right that would be
irretrievably lost absent an immediate appeal. The Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's argument and emphasized that appellate
jurisdiction
should not, and cannot, depend on a party's agility in... characterizing the
right asserted. This must be so because the strong bias... against piecemeal
appeals almost never operates without some cost. A fully litigated case can no
more be untried than the law's proverbial bell can be unrung, and almost
every pretrial or trial order might be called "effectively unreviewable" in the
sense that relief from error can never extend to rewriting history. Thus, erroneous evidentiary rulings, grants or denials of attorney disqualification....
and restrictions on the rights of intervening parties... may burden litigants
in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final
district court judgment,. . . and other errors, real enough, will not seem serious enough to warrant reversal at all, when reviewed after a long trial on the
merits .... But if immediate appellate review were available every such time,
[the] final decision rule would end up a pretty puny one, and so the mere identification of some interest that would be "irretrievably lost" has never sufficed
282. The federal courts have rejected attempts to analogize the speedy trial rights created by the Sixth Amendment and by the federal speedy trial statutes to the
rights created by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. MacDonald,
435 U.S. 850, 860-61 (1978) (explaining delay rather than the trial itself is what
violates the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial); United States v. Reale, 834
F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); see also infra note 285.
283. 511 U.S. 863 (1994).
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to meet the third [requirement of the collateral order doctrine, that2 the order
is effectively unreviewable on an appeal from the final judgment]. 84

When all is said and done, there are only two ways to distinguish
Jacques and Pruett. First, the right to a speedy trial implicates issues
separate from the merits.285 Assuming that the appellate court rejects the defendant's speedy trial claim and the defendant is later convicted, the court will not need to revisit any of the speedy trial issues
on the appeal from the conviction. Therefore, an immediate appeal
would not involve the kind of inefficient review that the final judgment rule is designed to prevent. Second, in the court's view, the right
to a speedy trial is much more important than the right not to be
charged with a nonexistent crime. Because the right to a speedy trial
is so important, the denial of that right warrants immediate review.28 6 In short, the discrete nature of the issues and importance of
the right justify making an exception to the final judgment rule.
284. Id. at 872. The Court concluded the order did not meet the third requirement
because the right was not sufficiently important to justify making an exception to
the final judgment rule. See id. at 877-81.
285. Both State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (1997)-the first supreme
court case to hold that an order denying a motion to discharge is immediately
appealable-and State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 570 N.W.2d 331 (1997)-a case
decided one week after Gibbs-involved the computation of the six-month time
period under the state speedy trial act. In Gibbs, the district court vacated the
defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial because of a fatally defective information. Rather than filing a new information in the original case, the State filed
a new information in a new case. The defendant subsequently filed two motions
for continuance in the new case and a motion for discharge in the original case.
The issue on appeal was whether the delay attributable to the continuances in
the new case should have been excluded in computing the time for trial.
In Jacques, the defense counsel stated at the pretrial conference that he
planned to file a motion to suppress in order to stop the speedy trial clock. He did
not file the motion until seventy-nine days after the pretrial conference, however.
The issue was whether the period between the pretrial conference and the filing
of the motion was excludable from the computation of the time for trial.
286. The federal courts do not allow an immediate appeal from orders denying speedy
trial claims. Regardless of whether the claims are based on the Sixth Amendment or on the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1994), the orders denying
such claims fail to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine. See,
e.g., United States v. Bratcher, 833 F.2d 69, 72 (6th Cir. 1987).
Because prejudice is a key element of a constitutional speedy trial claim, the
denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds is neither final nor
separate from the merits. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-59
(1978). Furthermore, the right to a speedy trial does not "encompass a 'right not
be tried' which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all. It is the
delay before trial, not the trial itself,that offends against the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial." Id. at 861. Therefore, an order denying a speedy trial
claim can be effectively reviewed on an appeal from the final judgment. See id.
Like an order denying a constitutional speedy trial claim, an order denying a
statutory speedy trial claim can be effectively reviewed on an appeal from the
final judgment. As the Second Circuit has explained,
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The New Bottles: Collateral Orders

Although it seems as though the court is creating these exceptions
to the final judgment rule by thinking in terms of collateral orders but
talking in terms of special proceedings, it is not clear that the court
sees collateral orders and special proceedings as one and the same. In
Richardson v. Griffiths,287 the court held that an order disqualifying
the defendant's lawyer in a civil case was not appealable under section
25-1902 because it did not affect the subject matter of the litigation by
diminishing a claim or defense. 288 The court said that the claims and
defenses in the action would be the same no matter who represented
the defendant. Therefore, the order disqualifying the defendant's attorney did not affect a substantial right. 28 9
The court nevertheless allowed the appeal by recognizing what it
called "an exception to the final order requirement."2 90 Even though
the court did not label the exception as "the collateral order exception," the label certainly fits. The court said that the exception applies
if (1) the order "involves issues collateral to the basic controversy" and
(2) "an appeal from the final judgment would not be likely to protect
the [party's] interests."291 The order disqualifying the defendants'

287.
288.

289.

290.
291.

The right to a speedy trial is meant to protect the defendant from delay,
not from the trial itself. That right can be vindicated by acquittal or by
reversal on direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction ....
By
further delaying the trial, allowing a speedy trial exception to the rule
requiring finality of judgments as a predicate for appellate jurisdiction
would disserve the very interests the [speedy trial] act seeks to protect.
United States v. Reale, 834 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v.
Buchanan, 946 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v.
Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
251 Neb. 825, 560 N.W.2d 430 (1997).
See id. at 830, 560 N.W.2d at 434. A party can challenge the denial of motion to
disqualify by filing a motion for a writ of mandamus, at least when the ground for
disqualification is an alleged conflict of interest. See State ex rel. Creighton Univ.
v. Hickman, 245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374 (1994); State ex rel. FirsTier Bank v.
Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838 (1993). Mandamus is issued to compel the
performance of an act, not to prevent the performance of an act. See Greenwalt v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 253 Neb. 32, 45, 567 N.W.2d 560, 569 (1997); State ex rel.
Bates v. Morgan, 154 Neb. 234, 239, 47 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1951). In other words,
mandamus can be used to compel the lower court to disqualify counsel (do something)-but it cannot be used to prevent the lower court from disqualifying counsel (do not do something). That presumably explains why the defendant in
Richardson filed an appeal rather than seeking a writ of mandamus.
See Richardson, 251 Neb. at 830, 560 N.W.2d at 434; see also State v. Schlund,
249 Neb. 173, 176, 542 N.W.2d 421, 423 (1996). In Schlund, the court held that
an order disqualifying court-appointed counsel in a criminal case did not affect a
substantial right for two reasons. First, there is no right to counsel of one's choice
when counsel is court-appointed. Second, an order disqualifying counsel does not
affect the subject matter of the litigation.
Richardson, 251 Neb. at 831, 560 N.W.2d at 435.
Id. at 831, 560 N.W.2d at 435 (quoting Maddocks v. Ricker, 531 N.E.2d 583, 588
(Mass. 1988)).
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lawyers met both of those requirements. It involved an issue collateral to the underlying action (i.e., separate from the merits): whether
one of the attorneys in the law firm representing the defendants had
previously represented the plaintiff on the same subject matter. Furthermore, an appeal from the final judgment "would not likely protect
the [defendants'] interests in the counsel of their own choosing and in
29 2
the time and expense associated with hiring new counsel."
Perhaps the reason that the court in Richardson did not see special
proceedings and collateral orders as one and the same is because the
court stepped into the analytical quicksand that its shorthand definitions keep stirring. The "diminishing a defense" shorthand for "substantial right" is just a collection of meaningless words and should be
dropped. When dealing with policy-based special proceedings, the
court should instead use the language of the collateral order doctrine:
an order is immediately appealable if it (1) finally decides an important matter (2) that is separate and distinct from the merits and (3) is
effectively unreviewable at the end of the litigation. 293 The reason the
court should use that language is simple. It squares with what the
court is doing.

294

292. Richardson, 251 Neb. at 831, 560 N.W.2d at 435; see also Mut. Group U.S. v.
Higgins, 259 Neb. 616, 619, 611 N.W.2d 404,408 (2000). The court later relied on
Richardsonto hear an immediate appeal of an order disqualifying private counsel
in a criminal case. See State v. Ehlers, 262 Neb. 247, 251, 631 N.W.2d 471, 478
(2001).
The federal courts do not allow immediate appeals from orders granting or
denying motions to disqualify. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S.
424, 438-40 (1985) (holding that an order granting motion to disqualify is not a
collateral order; such an order is not separate from the merits and, assuming
prejudice is not required to reverse an erroneous disqualification, such an order
can be effectively reviewed on an appeal for the final judgment); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1981) (holding that an order denying
motion to disqualify counsel is not a collateral order; such an order can be effectively reviewed on an appeal from the final judgment).
293. See supra note 253.
294. Like the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court eventually began
using the special proceedings clause of the final order statute to review interlocutory orders. See D'Amato v. Gen. Motors Corp., 423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981). In
DAmato, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a balancing test for determining
whether interlocutory orders are appealable under the special proceedings
clause. "This test weighs the harm to the 'prompt and orderly disposition of litigation,' and the consequent waste of judicial resources, resulting from the allowance of an appeal, with the need for immediate review because appeal after final
judgment is not practicable." Id. at 456. The court abandoned the test twelve
years later because it was too unpredictable. See Polikoffv. Adam, 616 N.E.2d
213, 217 (Ohio 1993). For further discussion of the Ohio Supreme Court's battle
with the special proceedings clause, see Daniel I. Gitlin, Note, Special Proceedings in Ohio: What Is the Ohio Supreme Court Doing with the Final Judgment
Rule?, 41 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 537 (1993).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:239

The doctrine, however, must remain rooted in section 25-1902. An
appellate court has only the jurisdiction that the statutes give. 2 9 5 The
court glossed over that fact in Richardson when it recognized an exception to the final judgment rule for which it cited no statutory basis.
It is unlikely that the omission of a statutory cite was inadvertent.
Section 25-1902 specifies three types of final orders, which implies
that there are no others. 2 9 6 The court therefore has no statutory basis
for recognizing another type of final order. By contrast, the federal
courts are in a much different position. The federal statutes give the
federal courts jurisdiction of appeals from "final decisions"2 97-but do
not define the phrase "final decisions." As a result, the federal courts
enjoy quite a bit of leeway when it comes to interpreting that phrase.
Yet it is possible to justify incorporating the collateral order doctrine into the section 25-1902. The vehicle for doing that is the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. "Ordinarily, where a statute has
been judicially construed and that construction has not evoked an
amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced
in the court's determination of the Legislature's intent."298 In 1950,
the court began interpreting the statute to encompass collateral orders. While the court's interpretation is neither supported by the language nor the history of the statute, the legislature apparently
approves of it; the legislature has not made any substantive changes
to the statute or passed any legislation prohibiting the court from asserting jurisdiction over collateral orders. Therefore, the collateral order doctrine should now be regarded as a part of section 25-1902.
That is how it should be. The final judgment rule is not perfect.
Delaying review until the end of the case creates a risk that the parties and the system will have to expend resources on proceedings that
will have to repeated on remand or that should never have occurred in
the first place. Furthermore, some orders may have immediate consequences which will be difficult, if not impossible, to undo later. The
collateral order doctrine allows a court to take those imperfections
295. See Watkins v. Dodson, 159 Neb. 745, 756, 68 N.W.2d 508, 515 (1955); Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 154 Neb. 371, 376, 48 N.W.2d
81, 83 (1951); State v. Ensign, 11 Neb. 529, 531, 10 N.W. 449, 450 (1881).
296. One of the canons of statutory construction is "expressio unius est exclusio alterins," which means "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the others."
Pfizer Inc. v. Lancaster County Bd. of Equal., 260 Neb. 265, 272, 616 N.W.2d 326,
335 (2000); see also Papillion/LaVista Sch. Principals & Supervisors Org. v. Papillion/LaVista Sch. Dist., 252 Neb. 308, 314, 562 N.W.2d 335, 339 (1997) (same);
Harrington v. Grieser, 154 Neb. 685, 689, 48 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1951) (same).
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). The collateral order doctrine is based on an interpretation of section 1291. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
545-46 (1949).
298. State v. Neiss, 260 Neb. 691, 701, 619 N.W.2d 222, 231 (2000); see also Johnson v.
Holdrege Med. Clinic, 249 Neb. 77, 83, 541 N.W.2d 399, 403 (1996); Erspamer
Adver. Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 214 Neb. 68, 74, 333 N.W.2d 646, 649 (1983).
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into account and make a particularized determination of whether, on
balance, the final judgment rule ought to apply to a particular class of
orders.
Making that determination will not always be easy. The three elements of the collateral order doctrine are not simple, black-and-white
standards that should be applied mechanically. They incorporate a
number of competing considerations that have to be carefully balanced. Those considerations include the systemic preference for delaying appeals until the end of the case; the intrinsic importance of the
right at issue; the likelihood of the trial courts making erroneous decisions with respect to the right at issue; the effectiveness of review at
the end of the litigation; the likelihood of parties using immediate appeals as a tactical weapon to beat down their adversaries; the effect
that an immediate appeal will have on the trial process; and the likelihood that if the court affirms the order, it will have to revisit the same
facts or law on an appeal from the final judgment (i.e., the likelihood
of duplicative review).
3.

To Appeal or Not to Appeal, That Is the Question

Because the elements of the collateral order doctrine cannot be applied mechanically, the doctrine can be somewhat unpredictable.
That in turn creates a problem for litigants. They cannot be sure
whether a particular interlocutory order is immediately appealable
unless the court has already decided that the order is or is not immediately appealable. Thus, litigants therefore have to make a guess,
and the costs of guessing wrong are high. The court has taken the
position that the failure to file an immediate appeal from an appealable interlocutory order constitutes a waiver of any right to challenge
that order on an appeal from the final judgment.
In State v. Jacques, a case discussed earlier, 29 9 the trial court denied Jacques' motion to discharge for lack of a speedy trial. Rather
than immediately appealing the trial court's order, Jacques waited until he was convicted and sentenced nearly four months later-in other
words, until the entry of a final judgment.3 0 0 His decision made sense
at the time because the supreme court had routinely reviewed speedy
trial claims on appeals from a final judgment.3 0 1 The court of appeals,
299. See supra text accompanying notes 274-77.
300. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 250, 570 N.W.2d 331, 334. A judgment is final in a criminal case when sentence is imposed. See, e.g., State v. Hess, 261 Neb. 368, 375,
622 N.W.2d 891, 899 (2001); State v. Nash, 246 Neb. 1030, 1031-32, 524 N.W.2d
351, 352 (1994); State v. Foster, 239 Neb. 598, 604, 476 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1991).
301. See, e.g., State v. Kearns, 245 Neb. 728, 731, 514 N.W.2d 844, 846 (1994) (speedy
trial motion denied on December 10, 1992; defendant appealed after being sentenced on January 15, 1993), overruled in part by State v. Boslau, 258 Neb. 39,
601 N.W.2d 769 (1999); State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 437, 461 N.W.2d 554, 558
(1990) (speedy trial motion denied on May 12; defendant appealed after being
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however, decided that Jacques' failure to appeal the district court's
30 2
order within 30 days deprived it of jurisdiction to review the order.
On Jacques' petition for further review, the supreme court agreed
with the court of appeals and held that it correctly refused to consider
30 3
Jacques' speedy trial claim.
That is not what the court should have held, however. The appeal
statutes give the appellate courts jurisdiction of appeals from judgments and final orders and say that a party must file his or her notice
30 4
of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or final order.
The statutes do not specifically say whether a party must immediately
appeal an interlocutory order that is appealable under section 251902. The statutes are instead ambiguous. They can be read to say
that a party must file an immediate appeal. But they can also be read
to say that a party has a choice. The party can either challenge the
order on an appeal from the order itself or on an appeal from the final
judgment.
sentenced on July 17); State v. Vrtiska, 227 Neb. 600, 602, 418 N.W.2d 758,
760-61 (1988) (speedy trial motion denied on April 17; defendant appealed after
being sentenced on May 23). Perhaps the oddest such case is State v. Turner, 252
Neb. 620, 564 N.W.2d 231 (1997). In Turner, the court reviewed the trial court's
decision to deny the defendant's speedy trial motion even though the decision was
made six months before the appeal was taken. The court brushed aside the
State's jurisdictional argument by saying, "we will assume without deciding that
we have jurisdiction." Id. at 627, 564 N.W.2d at 236.
302. State v. Jacques, No. A-95-1291, 1997 Neb. App. LEXIS 36, at *4-5 (Feb. 25,
1997). The court of appeals relied on its earlier decision in State v. Nearhood, 2
Neb. Ct. App. 915, 518 N.W.2d 165 (1994). That case involved the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on the failure to try the defendant within the time limits
specified by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. The court of appeals
held that the order was immediately appealable under the special proceeding
clause of section 25-1902. See id. at 920, 518 N.W.2d at 169. It did not discuss
the consequences of failing to take an immediate appeal from such an order,
however.
303. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 254, 570 N.W.2d 331, 336 (1997). This was not
the first case in which the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a collateral order on an appeal from the final judgment. The first case came twenty
months earlier. See State v. Sinsel, 249 Neb. 369, 543 N.W.2d 457 (1996) (holding that the court had no jurisdiction to review an order denying defendant's
double jeopardy challenge because defendant failed to appeal order within thirty
days). This was also not the first case in which the court decided that an order
denying a motion to discharge was appealable. The first case came one week
earlier. See State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (1997).
304. Section 25-1912 governs appeals from the district courts and provides: "The proceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation, or modification ofjudgments and decrees
rendered or final orders made.., shall be by filing..., within thirty days after
the entry of such judgment, decree, or final order, a notice of intention to prosecute such appeal... [and paying the docket fee]." NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 25-1912(1)
(Cum. Supp. 2000). Section 25-2729 governs appeals from the county courts and
provides: "In order to perfect an appeal.., the appealing party shall within thirty
days after the entry of the judgment or final order complained of [file a notice of
appeal and pay the docket fee]." NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2729 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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The second reading is the better one. It takes into account the unpredictability of the collateral order doctrine and protects parties from
the consequences of guessing wrong. Without that protection, prudent
parties would heed the old adage, "better safe than sorry," and immediately appeal any order that might be classified as a collateral order.
Requiring parties to file immediate appeals to protect themselves,
however, would be counterproductive from a systemic standpoint. It
would "turn the policy against piecemeal appeals on its head,"305 swell
the court's docket, and create chaos at the trial court level.
Related statutes should be construed together "so as to maintain a
consistent and sensible scheme." 3 06 Here that involves construing the
appeals statutes to allow a party to challenge a collateral order by filing an appeal within 30 days of the entry of either the order or the
judgment. That is how the federal courts construe the federal statuthe Nebraska courts should construe
tory scheme,3 0 7 and that is how 308
the Nebraska statutory scheme.
On a final note, it should be emphasized that giving parties the
choice of when to appeal should only be done in policy-based special
proceedings. It should not be done in multifaceted, procedure-based
special proceedings. Those special proceedings are a collection of distinct phases, each of which ends with its own final order. The phases
often are conducted on the assumption that the orders entered in the
earlier phases are valid. To allow a party to challenge an earlier order
on an appeal from a later order-for example, to allow a party to challenge the adjudication order in a juvenile proceeding four years later
305. In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1982).
306. Gottsch Feeding Corp. v. State, 261 Neb. 19, 30, 621 N.W.2d 109, 117 (2001); see,
e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Lee Janssen Motor Co., 248 Neb. 281,288,534 N.W.2d 568,
572 (1995); In re Estate of Morse, 241 Neb. 40, 42, 486 N.W.2d 195, 197 (1992).
307. See United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 1994); Jamison
v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 231 n.11 (4th Cir. 1994); Hunter v. Dep't of the Air Force
Agency, 846 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Martin, 620
F.2d 237, 239 n.1 (10th Cir.) (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Stipe v. United States,
449 U.S. 890 (1980).
In federal court, a notice of appeal in civil cases must be filed within thirty
days (or, if the government is a party, within sixty days) of the entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. FED. R. App. P. 4(a). In criminal
cases, the defendant's notice of appeal must be filed within ten days of either (a)
the entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken or (b) the filing
of a notice of appeal by the government, whichever occurs later. FED. R. APP. P.
4(b).
308. Doing so will not undermine the purpose for imposing time limits on appeals in
civil or criminal actions. The purpose is to promote finality by providing "a precisely ascertainable point of time at which litigation comes to an end." Files v.
City of Rockford, 440 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1971). That point will still be thirty
days after the entry ofjudgment. A party who fails to appeal within thirty days
of the entry of the order cannot appeal the order (or any other aspect of the case)
until the entry of judgment. If the party fails to file a notice of appeal within
thirty days after the entry of judgment, the litigation is over.
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on an appeal from the denial of a motion to modify the rehabilitation
plan-could have a serious disruptive effect on the proceedings overall. It would mean that nothing would be ever final; everything could
always be challenged. That warrants treating orders entered in multifaceted special proceedings differently than orders entered in
30 9
actions.
C.

Orders Made on Summary Applications

In addition to allowing an appeal from an order made in a special
proceeding, section 25-1902 authorizes an appeal from "an order affecting a substantial right made.., upon a summary application in an
action after judgment." This type of final order is the forgotten
stepchild of appellate practice. There is no definition of this type of
final order in the cases. Furthermore, there are only a few cases in
which the orders at issue were specifically identified as being made
upon a summary application in an action after judgment. They include orders amending a return of service after judgment in a divorce
action; 310 orders requiring the sheriff to return an order of sale in a
mortgage action;31 1 orders denying a motion to approve a supersedeas
bond;3i 2 and orders involving execution of the judgment-for example, orders requiring a defendant to appear for a debtor's
31 3
examination.
The court has actually hedged its bets on orders involving execution of the judgment. It has said that they are made both in a special
proceeding and upon a summary application in an action after judgment.31 4 That cannot be. Historically, special proceedings were civil
proceedings that were not actions. 31 5 If an order was made in a proceeding that was not an action, then logic indicates that it was not
made upon summary application "in an action." In other words, special proceedings and summary applications are mutually exclusive.
309. Another reason for treating actions differently is that taking an appeal from an
interlocutory order in an action disrupts the orderly progress of the case while
waiting until the entry of a final judgment in an action does not.
310. See De Lair v. De Lair, 146 Neb. 771, 775, 21 N.W.2d 498, 500 (1946). The exwife in De Lair sought to have the sheriffs return amended because the return
said that the sheriff had effected residence service when he had in fact effected
personal service. That mattered because residence service is not allowed in divorce actions as a matter of first resort. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-352 (Reissue
1999) (providing that only personal service and substitute service pursuant to
section 25-517.02 are permissible in divorce actions).
311. See State ex rel. Harris v. Laflin, 40 Neb. 441, 446, 58 N.W. 936, 938 (1894).
312. See State ex rel. Lion Ins. Co. v. Baker, 45 Neb. 39, 43, 63 N.W. 139, 141 (1895).
313. See Clarke v. Neb. Nat'l Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 802, 69 N.W. 104, 104 (1896).
314. See Bourlier v. Keithley, 141 Neb. 862, 865, 5 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1942); Clarke, 49
Neb. at 802, 69 N.W. at 104.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
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So what is a summary application? The term "summary application" means a short request-in other words, a motion.3 16 The only
reasonable interpretation of the words of the statute, therefore, is that
an order "upon a summary application in an action after judgment" is
an order ruling on a post-judgment motion in an action. That interpretation would cover a number of orders that the courts have reviewed without identifying any statutory basis for doing so-for
example, orders on motions to vacate a default judgment, 3 17 to re-tax
costs, 3 18 to modify a permanent injunction, 3 19 to award attorneys'
fees, 320 and to award expenses under Rule 37(c) of the Nebraska Discovery Rules.321 It would also cover orders on some matters that the
courts have classified as special proceedings but that are in fact summary applications in an action after judgment-for example, motions
316. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-908 (Reissue 1995) ("[A] motion is an application for an
order."); see also BiAcies LAW DicTioNARY 96, 1449 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "application" and "summary," respectively); BrALErrn's LAw DICTIONARY 84, 1238
(3d ed. 1969) (defining "application" and "summary," respectively).
317. The court has held that orders vacating a default judgment are appealable orders, see supranote 46, but has not yet identified a statutory basis for its holding.
318. See Muffv. Mahloch Farms Co., 186 Neb. 151, 181 N.W.2d 258 (1970) (ruling on
the merits of an appeal from an order re-taxing costs).
319. See, e.g., Latenser v. Intercessors of the Lamb, Inc., 250 Neb. 789, 553 N.W.2d
458 (1996) (ruling on the merits of an appeal from an order denying motion to
modify permanent injunction); Wasserburger v. Coffee, 201 Neb. 416,267 N.W.2d
760 (1978) (ruling on an appeal from the same type of order).
320. See Malicky v. Heyen, 251 Neb. 891, 560 N.W.2d 773 (1997) (ruling on merits of
appeal from post-judgment order awarding attorney's fees under NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-824); Robinson v. City of Omaha, 242 Neb. 408, 495 N.W.2d 281 (1993) (ruling on merits of appeal from award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988);
Summerville v. North Platte Valley Weather Control Dist., 171 Neb. 695, 107
N.W.2d 425 (1961) (ruling on the merits of an appeal from order denying postjudgment application for attorney's fees under common fund doctrine).
321. Rule 37(c) of the Nebraska Discovery Rules provides that
[ilf a party fails to admit the.., the truth of any matter as requested
under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter
proves the.., truth of the matter, he or she may... apply to the court
for an order requiring the other party to pay him or her the reasonable
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's
fees.
NEB. Disc. R. 37(c). In Kaminski v. Bass, 252 Neb. 760, 567 N.W.2d 118 (1997),
the court reviewed an order denying a Rule 37(c) motion but did not explain why
it was a final order. The court hinted, however, that the order was made in a
special proceeding. The key issue on appeal was whether a trial judge could consider the trial testimony in ruling on a Rule 37(c) motion if the trial transcripts
were not formally offered into evidence at the hearing. The plaintiff argued that
the trial judge could not do so because a Rule 37(c) hearing is a special proceeding. The court said that implicit in the plaintiffs argument was the idea that the
proceedings on a Rule 37(c) motion are "independent and separate from the proceedings of the underlying trial." Id. at 766, 567 N.W.2d at 123. The court
agreed with that idea. Id. at 768, 567 N.W.2d at 124.

314

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:239

for post-conviction relief,32 2 motions to vacate the forfeiture of bail,323
3 24
and motions to vacate a dismissal for want of prosecution.
What seems to have happened is that, over time, special proceedings have supplanted summary applications in the appellate lexicon.
It would be better if summary applications were resurrected as a separate category; that would make it easier to develop a coherent definition of "special proceeding." But it is not crucial that they be
resurrected. While there is a technical difference between summary
applications and special proceedings, there is no practical difference
between them. Regardless of whether an order is classified as being
made upon a summary application in an action after judgment or in a
special proceeding, the order is not appealable unless it affects a substantial right. Whether the order does so turns on the same principles
of finality that were previously discussed in the context of special
3 25
proceedings.
For example, the court classified the order at issue in Jarrett-an
order vacating a dismissal for want of prosecution-as having been
made in a special proceeding. 3 26 That was incorrect. The court
should have classified the order as having been made upon a summary
application in an action after judgment. But however it may have
classified the order, the court should have found that the order was
not final and therefore did not affect a substantial right. The only
effect of the order was to allow the litigation to go forward and to sub322. See State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 709, 587 N.W.2d 325, 331 (1998) (motions for
post-conviction relief). Post-conviction proceedings are "civil in nature" and are
instituted by motion. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1995).
323. See State v. Hernandez, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 830, 833, 511 N.W.2d 535, 537 (1993)
(finding that order denying motion to set aside forfeiture of a bond was made in a
special proceeding).
324. See Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 313, 506 N.W.2d 682, 685 (1993) (finding
that order vacating dismissal was made in a special proceeding).
325. For example, consider a proceeding to modify the custody, support, or visitation
provisions of a divorce or paternity decree. Such a proceeding is currently classified as a special proceeding. See State ex rel. Reitz v. Ringer, 244 Neb. 976, 98081, 510 N.W.2d 294, 299 (1994) (paternity); Paulsen v. Paulsen, 10 Neb. Ct. App.
269, 272, 634 N.W.2d 12, 15 (2001) (divorce). Modification could be classified as
an action, however, on the ground that it involves the use of pleadings and the
service of a summons. See NEB. UNIFORM D. CT. R. 4D. Alternatively, it could be
classified as a summary application after judgment in an action on the ground
that it is really a supplemental rather than an independent proceeding. See
State ex rel. Gurnon v. Harrison, 245 Neb. 295, 299, 512 N.W.2d 386, 389 (1994)
(paternity); Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890, 899, 46 N.W.2d 618, 623-24 (1951)
(divorce). But however the proceeding is classified, the underlying policy consideration remains the same: finality. There is generally no reason to allow an appeal until the end of the proceeding. Therefore, the only order in the proceeding
that will affect a substantial right is the order that ends the proceeding by finally
determining the rights of the parties (until the next modification, that is). See
supra note 226.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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ject the defendant to a possible trial. As the court has said on more
than one occasion, the "[ordinary burdens of trial do not affect a substantial right."327 The court held otherwise in Jarrettand allowed the
appeal. That was a mistake.
VI. BIDDING FAREWELL TO ORDERS THAT
PREVENT JUDGMENTS
The last type of final order in Nebraska is one "affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action
and prevents a judgment."3 28 The court has said that this type of order is one that ends the litigation, in other words, one that disposes "of
the whole merits of the case" and leaves "nothing for further consideration of the court." 32 9 But that cannot be. An order that disposes of
the whole merits of an action is a judgment, not a final order. Section
25-1301(1) says that "[a] judgment is the final determination of the
rights of the parties in an action."3 30 Section 25-1902 says that a final
order is, among other things, an order in an action that "in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment." An order cannot be a
judgment and prevent a judgment at the same time.
The court has not actually used the "prevents a judgment" clause of
section 25-1902 to review judgments in civil actions, however. It has
instead used the clause to fill in holes in the statutory scheme. More
specifically, it has used the clause to review two types of orders: (1)
appellate orders reversing and remanding a case for further proceedings and (2) trial court orders disposing of one or more but not all of
the parties or causes of action in a case. Using section 25-1902 to review those orders, however, is not only unnecessary but is also inconsistent with the language of the statute itself.

327. Hart v. Ronspies, 181 Neb. 38,39, 146 N.W.2d 795, 796 (1966) (holding that order
granting partial summary judgment is not appealable); see also In re Estate of
Peters, 259 Neb. 154, 159, 609 N.W.2d 23, 27 (2000) (same); Grantham v. Gen.
Tel. Co. of the Midwest, 187 Neb. 647, 648, 193 N.W.2d 449, 450 (1972) (same);
Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 472, 59 N.W.2d 614, 617 (1953) (same).
328. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1995).
329. Billingsley v. BFM Liquor Mgmt., Inc., 259 Neb. 992, 998, 613 N.W.2d 478, 483
(2000); see also Slaymaker v. Breyer, 258 Neb. 942, 949, 607 N.W.2d 506, 512
(2000) (same); O'Connor v. Kaufmnan, 255 Neb. 120, 122, 582 N.W.2d 350, 353
(1998) (same); Hake v. Hake, 8 Neb. Ct. App. 376, 382, 594 N.W.2d 648, 653
(1999) (same).
330. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1301(1) (Reissue 1995).
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The Contemporary Uses
1.

Reversals and Remands

In its 1978 decision in Martin v. Zweygardt,3 3 1 the supreme court
held that an order of an intermediate appellate court is not final when
it remands the case for a new trial. The court reversed itself 16 years
later in Rohde v. FarmersAlliance Mutual Insurance Co.332 In Rohde,
the plaintiff sued the defendant in county court for breach of contract.
At trial, the county court granted the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. On appeal, the district court reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial. The plaintiff then appealed to the court of appeals,
which dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order. The supreme
court reversed.
The court held that the district court's order was a final order. Although the court did not specifically say that the order fell under the
"9prevents a judgment" clause of section 25-1902, that is the clear implication of the decision. The court listed the three types of final orders in Nebraska but discussed the requirements for only one type: an
order that determines an action and prevents a judgment. 3 33 The
court then went on to say that the district court's order was final because it terminated the proceedings in the district court and could be
3 34
enforced without any further action by the district court.
If the court did in fact hold that the order at issue in Rohde was a
final order within the meaning of section 25-1902, then the court was
wrong. The order did not determine the action and prevent a judgment. It instead vacated the original judgment and instructed the
331.
332.
333.
334.

199 Neb. 770, 261 N.W.2d 379 (1978).
244 Neb. 863, 509 N.W.2d 618 (1994).
See id. at 868-69, 509 N.W.2d at 623.
See id. at 869, 509 N.W.2d at 623-24; Moulton v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 251 Neb.
95, 555 N.W.2d 39 (1996) (reviewing a district court decision that remanded a
matter to the Board of Zoning Appeals, setting out the standard for the first type
of final order, and then discussing the order in light of that standard without ever
specifically saying that the order was a final order under section 25-1902); see
also State v. Beyer, 260 Neb. 670, 678, 619 N.W.2d 213, 219 (2000) (applying
Rohde's holding to a criminal appeal without mentioning section 25-1902).
The court in Rohde quoted extensively from Ribble v. Furmin,69 Neb. 38, 94
N.W. 967 (1903), a turn of the century case in which the court held that a district
court order that reversed a county court order and remanded the matter for further proceedings was a final order. The court in Ribble, however, never identified
the statutory basis for its conclusion that the district court's order was final. The
same is true of the court's earlier decisions that reached the same conclusion. See
Dane County Bank v. Garrett, 48 Neb. 916, 67 N.W. 884 (1896) (stating that the
district court order setting aside a county court judgment was final even though
the district court had not yet disposed of the original case); Tootle, Hosea & Co. v.
Jones, 19 Neb. 588, 27 N.W. 635 (1886); (stating that the district court order vacating judgment of inferior court and setting the matter for trial is a final judgment); Banks v. Uhl, 5 Neb. 240 (1876) (same).
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county court to hold a new trial. The new trial is what would determine the action and, at the conclusion of that new trial, the county
court would enter a new judgment. The only thing the order prevented was enforcement of the original judgment.
While it is easy to criticize the court's use of section 25-1902, it is
not easy to offer an alternative. The problem is that, odd as it sounds,
there is no statutory provision that clearly authorizes the court of appeals to review a decision made by the district court in its capacity as
an appellate court. The statutes allow the court to review a 'judgment" or a "final order" of the district court. 33 5 An appellate decision
of the district court, however, is not a judgment as that term is defined
in the Code. The statutory definition of "judgment"-"the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action"3 3 6 -only applies to
the final determination made by a court exercising original jurisdiction (i.e., a trial court).
That conclusion finds support in both the organization of the Code
and the report of the Ohio Commissioners. The Code is organized to
track the development of a civil action chronologically. It discusses
service of process, then pleading, then provisional remedies, then trials, then judgments, then execution of judgments, and then appellate
review. 3 3 7 The fact that the definition of judgment appears after trials and before appellate review suggests that the definition only encompasses a trial court's determination of an action. That is also how
the Ohio Commissioners described it. In their report, they said:
335. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1911 (Reissue 1995). Section 25-1911 is the descendent of
section 522 of the 1858 Code. Section 522 provided that a "judgment rendered or
final order made by the district court, may be reversed, vacated or modified by
the supreme court, for errors appearing on the record." NEB. CODE Civ. P. § 522,
1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 197. Although section 522 provided for review by the supreme court, most district court decisions today are initially reviewed by the
court of appeals. Section 24-1106 provides that, except for cases involving the
imposition of the death penalty or the constitutionality of a statute, cases that
were appealable to the supreme court prior to September 6, 1991, are now appealable to the court of appeals. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1106(1) (Reissue 1995).
That includes district court cases. A number of district court decisions, however,
are initially reviewed by the supreme court pursuant to its power to remove cases
from the court of appeals. See NEB. S. CT. R. 2(C). The court usually removes
cases in order to regulate the workload of the two courts.
336. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
337. In the 1858 Code, service of process was discussed in sections 54-78 (Title V),
pleading was discussed in sections 81-143 (Title VII), provisional remedies were
discussed in sections 144-258 (Title XIII), trials were discussed in sections 259309 (Title IX), judgments were discussed in sections 386-411 (Title XI), executions were discussed in sections 432-504 (Title XIV), and error proceedings (i.e.,
review) were discussed in sections 520-41 (Title XVI). See 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws
117-58, 170-74, 178-93, 196-201. The Code still follows that same organization
today.
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The code provides that the final determination of the rights of the parties
in civil actions, will be the judgment. If we have but one form of proceeding,
one state of practice, we should have one common name for the act of the court
which determines the suit. Call the old decree in
chancery, a judgment, and
33 8
you will comprehend the code in this particular.

An appellate decision of the district court is also not a final order
as that term is defined in the Code. The definition covers certain
types of orders made in actions and special proceedings, but an appeal
is neither an action nor a special proceeding. Actions and special proceedings are proceedings instituted in courts of original jurisdiction. 3 39 Appeals are the means by which the judgments and orders in
those proceedings are reviewed.
There is a possible solution to the problem, however. One might
say that the Code's definition of "judgment"was not intended to be the
exclusive definition, or at least not for purposes of the sections of the
Code that address appellate review. Those sections originally contained phrases such as "the judgment of the appellate court," a "judgment of reversal," and "any judgment that may be rendered.., upon
34
... the affirmance" of the lower court's judgment. 0 Those phrases
would have made no sense if "judgment"only referred to a trial court's
judgment. The use of those phrases suggests that in the sections of
the Code that discuss appellate review, the drafters used the word
"judgment" more generically to encompass both the final determination of an action by a court exercising original jurisdiction and the final determination of a review proceeding by a court exercising
34
appellate jurisdiction. 1
338. OHIO REPORT, supranote 147, at 16-17; see also id. at 11 ("As judgments will take
about the same forms as our present judgments and decrees; so, too, they will be
executed in a similar way, according to the nature of the case and the relief
awarded.").
339. With one exception, all of the special proceedings that the New York Commissioners addressed in their final report were original rather than appellate proceedings. The one exception was the writ of certiorari, which the New York
Commissioners planned to rename as the "writ of review." FINAL REPORT, supra
note 92, at 535. The only question on a writ of certiorari would have been
whether the inferior tribunal, board, or officer acted without jurisdiction. Id. at
536.
340. NEB. CODE Civ. P. §§ 528(4), 529, 533, 541, 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 198-201. There
were similar phrases in the Ohio and New York Codes. See OHIO STAT., ch. 87,
§§ 520, 524, 526 (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1854); Amended Code, §§ 12,
337, 342, 347, 366-67, 1849 N.Y. Laws 616, 682-83, 686.
The Code also provided that when the supreme court affirmed a judgment or
final order, the court "shall also render judgment against the plaintiff in error"
for five percent of the amount due under the lower court's judgment or final order
unless the court determined that there were reasonable grounds for the error
proceedings. See NEB. CODE Civ. P. § 536, 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws 200.
341. The problem is a product of the way that the Ohio Commissioners drafted the
error statutes. As previously mentioned, the Commissioners wrote a separate
section for each of the courts that exercised appellate jurisdiction and gave each
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Arguably, then, when the court of appeals or supreme court is reviewing a decision of the district court in its capacity as an appellate
court, the court of appeals or supreme court is reviewing a judgment of
the district court. That is not an intellectually satisfying solution to
the problem of having no clear statutory authority to review such a
decision; the solution has a manufactured feel to it. But it is a better
solution than trying to twist section 25-1902 to cover a situation that
the language of the statute simply does not cover.
2. Multiple Claim / Multiple Party Litigation
Until recently, the court also used section 25-1902 to justify reviewing orders that do not dispose of the whole merits of the case but
instead dispose of one party or one cause of a action in a case with
multiple parties or causes of action. Those orders had been appealable
in Nebraska for some time before the court applied section 25-1902 to
them. In 1972, the court decided Green v. Village of Terrytown3 42 and
held that an order disposing of one or more but not all of the defendants in a multiple party case was immediately appealable. In 1983,
the court decided Interholzingerv. Estate of Dent34 3 and held that an
order disposing of one but not all of the causes of action in a case was
immediately appealable. In neither case did the court cite any statute
that supported its decision.
The court attempted to fill the statutory hole in 1994 when it decided Fritsch v. Hilton Land & Cattle Co.3 44 That case involved a dispute over two land sales contracts. In the first, the plaintiffs sold 1025
acres of land to the defendant and, in the second, the plaintiffs bought
back 298 of the 1025 acres. The plaintiffs later sued for rescission of
court the power to review the judgments and orders of the courts and tribunals
immediately below that court in the chain of command. See OHIO STAT., ch. 87,
§§ 511, 513-14 (Swan Comp. 1854). In drafting the statutes, however, the Commissioners failed to take into account the possibility of multi-level review.
That possibility existed in Ohio because the district courts and the courts of
common pleas had both original and appellate jurisdiction. See OHIO STAT., ch.
32, §§ 19, 33 (Swan Comp. 1854). For example, the court of common pleas could
render a judgment in action that was originally filed there and could also render
a judgment in error proceedings that were brought there to review a judgment
rendered by a justice of the peace. The first judgment would be a judgment as
defined in the Code (final determination of a action) but the second judgment

would not be.
In contrast to the Ohio Commissioners, the New York Commissioners took
into account the possibility of multi-level review when they drafted the original
Code. They gave the court of appeals the power to review the determinations
made by various courts "[iun a judgment in an action commenced therein, or
brought there from another court." Code § 11(1), 1848 N.Y. Laws 499 (emphasis
added).

342. 188 Neb. 840, 199 N.W.2d 610 (1972).
343. 214 Neb. 264, 333 N.W.2d 895 (1983).
344. 245 Neb. 469, 513 N.W.2d 534 (1994).
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the second contract, and the defendant counterclaimed for specific performance of both contracts. The case proceeded to trial. The trial
court found for the defendant, dismissed the plaintiffs petition, and
granted the defendant specific performance. That did not end the litigation, however. There was still an equitable accounting to be done in
connection with the grant of specific performance.
The court nevertheless held that it had jurisdiction to review the
trial court's ruling. Although the ruling did not put an end to the litigation, it did put an end to the plaintiffs claim for relief. Therefore, it
was a final order under the "prevents a judgment" clause of section 251902. As the court said, "There is no doubt that the trial court's dismissal of the [plaintiffs'] petition for rescission is a final order because
it prevents a judgment in favor of the [plaintiffs]."345
Two years later, the court took an analytical detour when it decided Currie v. Chief School Bus Service, Inc. 3 4 6 The plaintiff in that
case sued for negligence. The defendant counterclaimed for attorney
fees and costs, alleging that the plaintiffs negligence claim was frivolous. 34 7 The district court granted the defendant's motion for sum345. Id. at 476-77, 513 N.W.2d at 540.
346. 250 Neb. 872, 553 N.W.2d 469 (1996).
347. The counterclaim was based on NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-824(2) (Reissue 1995). Section 25-824 authorizes an award of attorney's fees against a party who brought
an action "which a court determines is frivolous or made in bad faith." The court
in Currie held that the counterclaim was a proper counterclaim because it arose
out of the same transaction as the plaintiffs claim. 250 Neb. at 877-78, 553
N.W.2d at 474; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-813 (Reissue 1995) (stating that
counterclaim must arise out of the same transaction as plaintiffs claim).
Although the court was correct about the transactional relationship, it was
incorrect about the counterclaim being a proper one. A counterclaim "must be a
claim upon which the defendant could, at the date of the commencement of the
plaintiffs suit, have maintained an action on the defendant's part against the
plaintiff." Becker v. Hobbs, 256 Neb. 432, 438, 590 N.W.2d 360, 364 (1999) (quoting Davis Erection Co. v. Jorgensen, 248 Neb. 297, 306, 534 N.W.2d 746, 751
(1995)); see also Weller v. Putnam, 184 Neb. 692, 699, 171 N.W.2d 767, 772 (1969)
(same); State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 6, 18, 281 N.W.2d 729, 737
(1979) (requiring counterclaim to be "an existing, valid, and enforceable cause of
action") (quoting McGerr v. Marsh, 148 Neb. 50, 58, 26 N.W.2d 374, 378 (1947));
Gurske v. Keplin, 61 Neb. 517, 519, 85 N.W. 557, 558 (1901) (holding that matters occurring subsequent to the commencement of original suit cannot be asserted as a counterclaim); SAMUEL MAXWELL, LAw OF PLEADING 543 (Chicago,
Callaghan & Co. 1892) (observing that a counterclaim under the Code must show
an existing liability on the part of the plaintiff to the defendant).
The defendant's counterclaim in Currie depended on the adjudication of the
plaintiffs claim; until that claim was adjudicated, the court could not determine
whether the plaintiffs claim was frivolous or made in bad faith. Therefore, the
counterclaim was not in existence at the commencement of the action and, as
such, was not a proper counterclaim. See Bio-Vita, Ltd. v. Rausch, 759 F. Supp.
33 (D. Mass. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 29 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Mich.
1962). But see Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kaminsky, 820 S.W.2d 878, 880-81
(Tex. App. 1991). The counterclaim should have been treated as a motion on a
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mary judgment on the plaintiffs claim. After the plaintiff appealed
the district court's disposition of her claim, the district court adjudicated the defendant's counterclaim and entered judgment for the defendant. The supreme court reversed, holding that pendency of the
plaintiffs appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction to adjudi3
cate the counterclaim. 4s
In doing so, the court did not rely on the "prevents a judgment"
clause of section 25-1902. The court instead relied on the "special proceeding" clause. The court said that the order granting the defendant
summary judgment was a final order because summary judgment is a
special proceeding and the adverse disposition of the plaintiffs claim
on summary judgment affected the plaintiffs substantial rights.
Therefore, the order was appealable as "an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding."3 49 While the order did not
fully adjudicate the case, the appeal of that order was sufficient to
transfer jurisdiction of the entire case to the appellate court.
The court continued down the same path &year later when it decided Tess v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.350 Tess sued two title
companies and asserted two causes of action against each: breach of
contract and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the first company on both causes of action and granted
summary judgment in favor of the second company on the negligence
cause of action. Tess appealed. The court held that the trial court's
summary judgment rulings were appealable even though the breach
of contract cause of action was still pending against the second company. Although it did not specifically say which clause of section 251902 made them final orders, the court implied that it was the "special
proceeding" clause. After identifying the three types of appealable orders, the court discussed the facts and reasoning of only one section
25-1902 case: Currie. The court then went on to discuss the orders at
issue in Tess.3 5i That supports the inference that, like the orders in
Currie,the orders in Tess affected a substantial right and were made
in a special proceeding.

348.
349.
350.
351.

matter collateral to the merits, a motion that the trial court could have entertained despite the pendency of the appeal. Cf. Kaminiski v. Bass, 252 Neb. 760,
766-67, 567 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1997) (holding that a hearing on motion for attorney's fees is a legal proceeding separate from underlying trial on the merits of the
case); Malicky v. Heyen, 251 Neb. 891, 560 N.W.2d 773 (1997) (entertaining appeal from sanctions imposed under section 25-824 where motion was filed and
determined after the underlying case was determined). The order disposing of
the motion would have been appealable under the "summary application" clause
of section 25-1902.
Currie, 250 Neb. at 881, 553 N.W.2d at 476.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1995), cited in Currie, 250 Neb. at 880-81,
553 N.W.2d at 475-76.
251 Neb. 501, 557 N.W.2d 696 (1997).
See id. at 507-08, 557 N.W.2d at 701-02.
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A year later, the court began to have second thoughts about what it
was doing or, perhaps more accurately, what it was saying. In
O'Connorv. Kaufman,352 the court decided that summary judgment is
only a special proceeding when it disposes of a cause of action as opposed to one or more issues. The plaintiff in O'Connor claimed that
the defendants had interfered with her right to use a well on their
land and, for her remedies, the plaintiff sought an injunction and
damages. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the
plaintiff on the issues of liability and injunctive relief. The court then
set the issue of damages for trial. Because the issue of damages was
still pending, the cause of action was still pending. Therefore, the order granting the plaintiff partial summary judgment was not made in
a special proceeding and, as a result, the order was not a final, appealable order.
The court subsequently retraced its steps and went back to where
it started: the "prevents a judgment" clause of section 25-1902 is what
allows appeals from o~iers that dispose of one or more but not all of
the causes of action in a case with multiple causes of action. In 1999,
the court decided Hernandez v. Blankenship353 and held that an order
declining jurisdiction under the Nebraska Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act was not a final order. In the course of doing so, the court put a
new spin on its two year old decision in Tess and said that the orders
in Tess had been appealable under the "prevents a judgment" clause of
section 25-1902. According to the court, the "prevents a judgment"
clause of the statute covers what
is sometimes described as a "death knell" order; that is, the decision by the
court effectively ends the litigation. This is clearly seen in Tess, where the
court dismissed a cause of action with prejudice, preventing a judgment regarding that cause of action, and dismissed a defendant, preventing a judg3 54
ment regarding that defendant.

There is a problem with this spin, however. It simply does not
square with what actually happened. The orders in Tess did not effectively end the litigation; a negligence cause of action was still pending
against one of the defendants. The order dismissing the breach of contract claim against that defendant did not prevent a judgment regarding that cause of action; a judgment regarding that cause of action
(and all the other causes of action) would be entered at the end of the
litigation. The order dismissing the other defendant did not prevent a
judgment regarding that defendant; a judgment regarding that defendant (and the other defendant) would be entered at the end of the litigation. The only thing that prevented-or more accurately, delayeda judgment in Tess was the court's willingness to entertain an appeal
352. 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998).
353. 257 Neb. 235, 596 N.W.2d 292 (1999).
354. Id. at 238, 596 N.W.2d at 295.
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from rulings that determined part of the action. The clause simply
does not fit the situation.
Perhaps the reason the court tried to make it fit is that the court
needed a statutory basis for entertaining appeals from orders that resolved one or more but not all of the causes of action in a multiple
party or multiple cause of action case. But that is no longer the case.
In 1999, the legislature enacted what is now section 25-1315.355 That
section-which is modeled on Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-provides that orders that dispose of one or more but not
all of the claims or parties in a case with multiple claims or parties are
interlocutory orders. They can only be made final (and therefore appealable) if the trial court expressly finds that there is no just cause
for delay and expressly directs the entry of a final judgment on the
claim or as to the party which was the subject of the order. As a result, the court's earlier decisions allowing appeals from orders in multiple party/multiple claim cases are no longer valid.356
355. Section 25-1315 was originally codified as section 25-706(5). It was moved to section 25-1315 in 2000. See LB 921, 96th Leg., 2d Sess. §§ 4, 10 (Neb. 2000).
356. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 260 Neb. 372, 373, 617 N.W.2d 806, 807
(2000) (taking "the opportunity to remind the practicing bar" of the effect of section 25-705(6)); Chief Indus., Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 771, 777-79, 612
N.W.2d 225, 230-31 (2000) (declaring that an order granting summary judgment
on one cause of action was not appealable because the order was made after the
effective date of section 25-705(6) and the trial court did not make the determinations required by the statute); Neb. Popcorn, Inc. v. Wing, 258 Neb. 60, 63, 602
N.W.2d 18, 22 (1999) (stating order dismissing one defendant was appealable because it was made prior to the effective date of section 25-705(6)).
The use of section 25-1902 in multiple claim cases seemed to enjoy a resurgence in Airport Authority of Greeley v. Dugan, 259 Neb. 860, 612 N.W.2d 913
(2000). The Airport Authority instituted condemnation proceedings to condemn
land belonging to the Dugans. After the board of appraisers assessed the damages, the Dugans took an appeal to the district court. In their appeal, the Dugans
asserted two causes of action. The first sought to enjoin the condemnation on the
ground that the Airport Authority failed to comply with various statutory requirements; the second cause of action challenged the award of damages as insufficient. The district court denied the Dugans' request for injunctive relief and
issued a writ of assistance placing the Airport Authority in possession of the
property. The Dugans then appealed.
The supreme court held that it had jurisdiction to review the order denying
the Dugans injunctive relief even though the district court had not yet ruled on
the Dugans' challenge to the award of damages. In doing so, the court seemed to
rely on the "prevents a judgment" clause of section 25-1902. The court said that
"the denial of a temporary injunction [it was actually a permanent injunction] in
the condemnation proceeding is an order that affects a substantial right and determines the action with regard to the request for equitable relief." Id. at 866,
612 N.W.2d at 918.
The "prevents ajudgment" clause of section 25-1902, however, had no application in Dugan. Condemnation is a special proceeding, not an action. See supra
note 203. Whether the order should have been appealable under the second
clause of section 25-1902 is debatable. Even though the order put the Airport
Authority in possession of the property, one could say that the order did not affect
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The Historical Meaning

So far, none of the uses to which the court has put the "prevents a
judgment" clause square with its language. That raises the question
of what, if anything, the language means. The answer is "nothing."
The language was taken from section 512 of the Ohio Code which in
turn was taken from section 11(2) of the New York Code. The language did not mean anything when it was first adopted in New York
over 150 years ago. It is therefore not surprising that, after having
been on the books in Nebraska for over 140 years, the language still
does not mean anything.
Section 11(2) of the New York Code gave the court of appeals jurisdiction to hear appeals from "an order affecting a substantial right,
made in such action, when such order in effect determines the action,
and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken."3 57
The Commissioners included this subsection in the final report that
they submitted to the legislature in 1850, but they did not provide
much of an explanation. All they said in their report was that "[tihe
second subdivision, which provides for an appeal from an order, in certain cases, appears proper."3 58
What those certain cases are is anyone's guess. It is extremely difficult to envision an order that would satisfy all three requirements of
section 11(2). While it may be possible to finesse the first two requirements, the third requirement is problematic. For example, an order
striking a defense from the defendant's answer might preordain the
outcome of an action. As such, the order might be classified as one
that "in effect" determined the action and affected a substantial right.
Yet the order would not prevent a judgment from which an appeal
might be taken. A judgment would be rendered after trial.
To take another example, an order finding that the plaintiff was
entitled to reformation of a contract and appointing a master to ascertain the balance due under the reformed contract would resolve the
substantive issues in the action. As such, the order might be classified
as one that "in effect" determined the action and affected a substantial
right. Yet the order would not prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken. A judgment would be rendered after confirmation of the master's report.
Perhaps the reason that the third requirement of section 11(2) is so
problematic is that it may have been the product of inept drafting.
Section 11(2) seems to have been a reworked version of section 349(3)
a substantial right. The Dugans could have vindicated their right to the property
on an appeal at the end of the proceedings and, in the meantime, sought a temporary injunction to enjoin the authority from making any changes to the property
during the pendency of the proceedings.
357. Amended Code, § 11(2), 1851 N.Y. Laws 876.
358. FINAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 21.
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of the Code. Section 349 was the statute that governed interlocutory
appeals within the supreme court, the superior court, and the court of
common pleas; it allowed the general term (i.e., the appellate branch
of the court) to review certain types of orders made by a single judge of
that court. At the time the Commissioners submitted their final report, section 349 read as follows:
An appeal may... be taken from an order made by a single judge of the
same court... in the following cases:
1. When the order grants or refuses a provisional remedy;
2. When it involves the merits of the action, or some part thereof;
3. When the orderdecides a question ofpractice which in effect determines
the action without a trial,or precludes an appeal;
in an action af4. When the order is made, upon a summary3 5application
9
ter judgment, and affects a substantial right.

Section 349(3) was not a section that the Commissioners proposed
or discussed in their reports. It was added by the legislature in
1849.360 Section 349(3) also had a short life; it was repealed in
1851.361 That makes it extremely difficult to say with any degree of
certainty what the statute meant. It is possible to make some educated guesses, however. The wording of section 349(3) indicates that
there were two different categories of appealable orders on matters of
practice. 36 2 The first category involved orders that in effect deter359. Amended Code § 349, 1849 N.Y. Laws 684 (emphasis added).
360. Section 349(3) was originally enacted in 1848 as section 299 and included the
first two subsections. Code § 299, 1848 N.Y. Laws 551. As originally enacted, the
section was identical to what the Commissioners proposed in their first report.
See FIRST REPORT, supra note 69, at 222. In their second report, the Commissioners proposed the addition of what eventually became the fourth subsection. See
SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 45 (Albany,
Weed, Parsons & Co. 1849). In 1849, the legislature added that subsection along

with the third subsection. Amended Code § 349, 1849 N.Y. Laws 684. In their
final report, the Commissioners proposed that section 349 be amended to allow
an appeal in the five following cases:
1. When the order grants or refuses a provisional remedy [subsection
(1) of the 1849 amended version]:
2. When it grants or refuses a new trial [new]:
3. When it involves the merits of the action, or some part thereof [subsection (2) of the 1849 amended version]:
4. When the order affects a substantial right, and involves the construction of the constitution or of a provision of this code [new]:
5. When the order is made, upon a summary application in an action
after judgment, and affects a substantial right [subsection (4) of the 1849
amended version].
FINA REPORT, supra note 92, at 503. It seems as though subsection (4) as proposed by the Commissioners was designed to replace subsection (3) of the 1849
amended version; both involved orders on matters of practice. In none of their
reports did the Commissioners explicitly discuss the 1849 amended version of
section 349(3) or propose the addition of that subsection.
361. See Amended Code § 349, 1851 N.Y. Laws 900-01.
362. It is not quite clear what the term "question of practice" meant. One possibility is
that it meant questions addressed by court rules or nonstatutory practices. Cf
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mined the action without a trial and the second category involved orders that in effect precluded an appeal. Those had to be different
categories of orders; the statute used the disjunctive "or" rather than
the conjunctive "and."
The first category might have included orders that dismissed the
action for failure to prosecute. For example, the Code provided that
the plaintiff only had to serve the defendant with a copy of the complaint if the defendant made a written demand within 10 days after
service of the summons. 3 63 If the plaintiff failed to serve a copy of the
complaint after such a demand, the defendant could move to dismiss
the action. 3 64 An order granting a motion to dismiss the action because of an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff in serving a
copy of the complaint would involve a matter of practice and would
determine the action without a trial.365 The same would be true of
St. John v. West, 4 How. Pr. 329, 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (stating that every
court regulates for itself mere matters of practice). But cf Mills v. Thursby, 11
How. Pr. 129, 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854) (describing failure to comply with Code
requirements for appeal undertakings as a slip in a matter of practice).
That possibility draws some support from sections 469 and 470 of the Code.
Section 469, which was part of the original Code, provided that the "present rules
and practice of the courts, in civil actions, inconsistent with this act are abrogated." Amended Code § 469, 1849 N.Y. Laws 704. Section 470, which was added in 1849, required the supreme court judges to promulgate rules for the
supreme court, the court of common pleas, the superior court, and the county
court "to carry into effect the provisions of this act, and such other rules as they
deem proper not inconsistent with this act." Amended Code § 470, 1849 N.Y.
Laws 704. Section 470 also expressly abrogated the existing rules of the supreme
court as of September 1, 1850. Id. The legislature may have enacted section
349(3) with the expectation that the new rules might include gap-filling rules on
the grounds for dismissals and the mechanics of perfecting appeals.
363. Amended Code § 130, 1849 N.Y. Laws 641-42.
364. See Colvin v. Bragden, 5 How. Pr. 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); Munson v. Willard, 5
How. Pr. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); Ecles v. Debeand, 2 Code Rptr. 144 (N.Y. C.P.
1850); Littlefield v. Murin, 4 How. Pr. 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
Motions to dismiss for failure to serve a copy of the complaint were generally
based on section 274 of the Code. Section 274 provided that, in an action involving multiple defendants, the court could dismiss a complaint "in case of unreasonable neglect on the part of the plaintiff to serve the summons on other
defendants, or to proceed in the cause against the defendant or defendants
served." Amended Code § 274, 1849 N.Y. Laws 670. By its own terms, section
274 only applied to actions involving multiple defendants. The courts, however,
entertained motions to dismiss an action under section 274 even when there was
only one defendant. See, e.g., Colvin v. Bragden, 5 How. Pr. 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1850).
The Code did not specify the time within which a complaint had to be served.
The courts filled that gap by requiring service within a reasonable time and by
analogizing to former rules of practice. See Munson v. Willard, 5 How. Pr. 263,
263-64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); Littlefield v. Murin, 4 How. Pr. 306, 307 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1849).
365. The Code defined a trial as "the judicial examination of the issues between the
parties, whether they be issues of law or fact." Amended Code § 252, 1849 N.Y.
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orders that dismissed the action for failure to appear at trial or for
366
failure to notice the action for trial in a timely manner.
The second category might have included orders dismissing an appeal because the appealing party either failed to comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal under the Code or failed to
comply with the rules of the appellate court.3 67 Dismissals on those
grounds would involve matters of practice and, in the words of the
statute, would preclude an appeal. Although the appeal itself would
be decided by the general term of the court, some motions to dismiss
an appeal could be decided by a single judge at special term.368 If the
Laws 666. Under the Code, issues were created the by pleadings. An issue of law
was created by a demurrer to the complaint, answer, or reply. Amended Code
§ 249, 1849 N.Y. Laws 665. In other words, a decision on a demurrer was a trial
of an issue of law. An issue of fact was created by allegations in the complaint
that were denied in the answer, allegations of new matter in the answer that
were denied by the reply, or by allegations of new matter in the reply. See
Amended Code § 250, 1849 N.Y. Laws 665. Because a motion was not a pleading,
a ruling on a motion was not a trial. Cf. Dodd v. Curry, 4 How. Pr. 123, 124 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct) (opinion undated; most likely 1849) (stating that dismissal of complaint
is not technically a trial within the meaning of the Code but is treated as such for
the purpose of awarding costs).
366. See Cusson v. Whalon, 5 How. Pr. 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). In Cusson, the court
granted a motion to dismiss a complaint because the plaintiff failed to notice the
action for trial in a timely fashion. The motion was authorized by a supreme
court rule that the court described as regulating a matter of practice. Id. at 303.
The effect of granting the motion was to terminate the case; the relief sought was
dismissal of the action. See id. at 303-04.
367. In order to perfect an appeal, the appellant had to serve a timely notice of appeal
on both the adverse party and the clerk of the court that entered the judgement
or order from which the appeal was taken. See Amended Code § 327, 1849 N.Y.
Laws 680. The appellant also had to give a written undertaking by two sureties
in the form and amount specified by the Code. See Amended Code § 334, 1849
N.Y. Laws 681. The undertaking had to be filed with the clerk of the court and
served on the adverse party. See Amended Code §§ 340, 343, 1849 N.Y. Laws
682-83. That was true of appeals taken to the court of appeals and appeals of
judgments taken to the general terms of the supreme court, court of common
pleas, and superior court. See Amended Code §§ 345, 348, 1849 N.Y. Laws 68384.
An appeal could be dismissed if the appellant failed to comply with the requirements of the Code. See Tripp v. DeBow, 5 How. Pr. 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
An appeal could also be dismissed if the appellant failed to comply with the rules
of the appellate court. See Livingston v. Miller, 1 Code Rptr. 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1849) (granting motion for judgment on appeal because appellant failed to serve
copy of judgment roll on adverse party as required by the rules of the supreme
court).
368. It seems as though a motion to dismiss an appeal could be decided at special term
when the appeal was taken from ajudgment rendered by an inferior court. When
the appeal was taken from a judgment rendered by a single judge of the same
court, however, a motion to dismiss could only be decided by the general term.
See People ex rel. Larocque v. Murphy, 1 Daly's Rpts. 462, 466-67 (N.Y. C.P.
1865); Barnum v. Seneca County Bank, 6 How. Pr. 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). Cf.
Griswold v. Van Deusen, 2 E.D. Smith Rpts. 178 (N.Y. C.P. 1853) (noting that
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judge granted the motion to dismiss the appeal, then section 349(3)
presumably allowed the aggrieved party to appeal that order to the
general term of the court.
Assuming that the Commissioners reworked section 349(3) into
section 11(2)-which seems to be a reasonable assumption given the
similarity in the language-then something must have been garbled
in transmission. The Commissioners apparently took two different
clauses aimed at two different types of orders and collapsed them into
one clause aimed at one type of order. Orders that decided a question
of practice that (1) in effect determined the action without a trial or (2)
precluded an appeal became orders affecting a substantial right that
in effect determined the action and prevented a judgment from which
an appeal might be taken. The end result of replacing "or" with "and"
was the creation of a hybrid provision that seems to make no sense.
That raises the question of whether the Commissioners had any
idea of what they were doing. The answer is a qualified maybe. One
possibility is that the Commissioners were attempting to give the
court of appeals jurisdiction to review orders that were made at general term and that dismissed an appeal. Under the Code, an appellate
court entered a judgment on an appeal. 36 9 Arguably, judgments on an
appeal did not include decisions that dismissed an appeal. They instead included decisions that affirmed, reversed or modified the judgment or order from which the appeal was taken. Section 330 of the
Code-a section entitled "Judgment on Appeal"-provided that,
"[ulpon an appeal from a judgment or order, the appellate court may
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or order appealed from."370
An order of the general term that dismissed an appeal would in
effect determine the action; it would leave intact the judgment or order from which the appeal was taken. Such an order would also prevent a judgment on the appeal; it would prevent the general term from
affirming, modifying, or reversing the judgment or order from which
the appeal was taken. As a result, the order would prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken to the court of appeals.
motion to dismiss appeal should be made at special term where the appeal is
taken from justice's court); Blood v. Wilder, 6 How. Pr. 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852)
(ordering appeal from county court judgment dismissed at special term); Bradley
v. Van Zandt, 3 Code Rptr. 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) (allowing only general term
of supreme court to decide motion to dismiss appeal from judgment rendered by
single judge of supreme court); Van Heusen v. Kirkpatrick, 5 How. 422 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1851) (requiring motion to dismiss appeal from county court judgment to be
decided at special term); Tripp v. DeBow, 5 How. Pr. 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1850)
(dismissing appeal from county court judgment made at special term and affirmed at general term).
369. See Amended Code §§ 337, 347, 367, 1849 N.Y. Laws, 682-83, 686.
370. Amended Code § 330, 1849 N.Y. Laws 681.
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This possibility draws some support from Genter v. Fields37l and
Bates v. Voorhees,37 2 two cases in which the court of appeals held that
section 11(2) allowed the court to review an order made by the general
term of the supreme court that dismissed an appeal. Yet it seems unlikely that the Commissioners wrote section 11(2) to give the court of
appeals jurisdiction to review orders dismissing appeals to the general
term. If that is what the Commissioners had in mind, then they would
have used more direct language. The language of section 11(2)-"[in
an order affecting a substantial right, made in such action, when such
order in effect determines the action, and prevents a judgment from
which an appeal might be taken"-seems to be a rather odd way of
saying "in an order when such order dismisses an appeal from a judgment in such action."
More to the point, an order that dismissed an appeal would presumably be a final order. Yet the word "final" does not appear in section 11(2). Section 11(2) says "an order," not "a final order." The
omission of the word "final" suggests that section 11(2) was aimed at
interlocutory orders, a suggestion consistent with the overall phrasing
of section 11(2). The phrase "in effect determines the action" implies
that the action has not yet been finally determined. The phrase "prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken" implies that
the order was entered before any judgment was rendered in the action. That phrase might mean an order that somehow prevented a
judgment from ever being rendered-or it might mean an order that
prevented a judgment from being rendered at that point because the
order did not end the action.
That raises another possibility. Section 11(2) may have been an
ineptly worded attempt by the Commissioners to give the court of appeals jurisdiction to review a limited class of interlocutory orders that
involved a construction of the Code. In their final report, the Commissioners said that some judges had interpreted the Code as though it
were "an inflexible statutory rule" rather than "a system of regulation,
having in view, as its sole object, the furtherance ofjustice and a disregard of technical strictness." 37 3
To ensure a more liberal interpretation of the Code, the Commissioners proposed expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the general
term of the supreme court to encompass interlocutory appeals from
orders "affecting a substantial right made in... an action, involving
the construction of ... a provision of this code."37 4 The Commission371.
372.
373.
374.

2 Abbott's N.Y. Rpts. 253 (1864).
20 N.Y. 525 (1859).
FINAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 5.
FiNAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 28. The quoted language is from proposed section 42(2). Section 42(2) would have allowed appeals from orders involving either
a construction of the constitution or the Code. Although the Commissioners did
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ers also proposed adding the same language to section 349 in place of
the then-existing language of section 349(3).375 The effect of adding
that language would have been to allow appeals to the general term of
the supreme court, the court of common pleas, or the superior court of
orders made by a single judge of the same court when those orders
affected a substantial right and involved a construction of the Code.
Given that the Commissioners sought to expand the appellate jurisdiction of the lower courts to encompass orders that involved an
interpretation of the Code, it stands to reason that they also sought to
expand the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals to encompass
at least some of those orders. It also stands to reason that the Commissioners would have used more restrictive language in order to prevent the court of appeals from being deluged with interlocutory
appeals. 37 6 The Commissioners may have found the seeds of that restrictive language in section 349(3), a provision that they did not write
and apparently reworked in a rather careless manner.
The language as reworked may not have made any sense but it did
have two attributes: the language was restrictive and also had a nice
ring to it. It is possible that the language subsequently took on a life
of its own, perhaps because the legislature saw the language as a more
elegant statement of old section 349(3). In other words, the legislature
not explain why they included orders involving a construction of the constitution,
one possibility is that the Code itself had been attacked as unconstitutional. See
Anonymous, 1 Code Rptr. 49 (Special Term of unspecified New York court 1848)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to Code); THiRD REPORT, supra note 102, at 811 (discussing various constitutional objections to the Code).
Proposed section 42(2) was one response that the Commissioners made to the
tendency of the judges to interpret the Code strictly. See THmD REPORT, supra
note 102, at 9. Another was a proposed revamping of section 467 of the 1849
Code. That section provided that the "rule of common law, that statutes in derogation of that law are to be strictly construed, has no application to this act."
Amended Code § 467, 1849 N.Y. Laws 704. The section as revamped by the Commissioners would have kept the quoted the language (with slight grammatical
changes) and added the following sentence: "The Code establishes the law of this
state, respecting the subjects to which it relates; and its provisions, and all proceedings under it, are to be liberally construed, with a view to promote its objects,
and to assist the parties in obtaining justice." FINAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 4
(proposed section 3). The legislature did not add that sentence. See Code as
amended, § 1, 1851 N.Y. Laws 904 (no amendment made to section 467).
375. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 503; note 359, supra.
376. When they proposed the initial version of section 11, the Commissioners underscored the need to limit the number of cases subject to review by the court of
appeals. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 92, at 18 ("One of the most certain means
of preventing unjust delay in the conduct of legal controversies, is to protect the
court of last resort from being borne down by an unnecessary amount of litigation."). That seems to explain why they originally limited appeals to judgments
and final orders (which excluded review of orders granting or denying new trials)
and expressly precluded appeals in cases that had been originally brought in a
justice's court. See id. at 20-22.
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may have adopted section 11(2) and incorporated the same language
into section 349, not because the legislature had a clear understanding of what the language meant or what purpose it served, but because the language sounded better than the language of old section
349(3).
The conclusion that section 11(2) had no meaning and served no
purpose finds support in the case law-or more accurately, in the absence of case law. The language of section 11(2) remained intact for 25
years. 3 77 During those 25 years, there were only three cases in which
the court of appeals found an order appealable under section 11(2).
Two were the Genter and Bates cases mentioned earlier.3 78 The other
was the rather odd case of Edson v. Dillaye.379 In Edson, the special
377. The language of section 11(2)-"in effect determines the action and prevents a
judgment from which an appeal might be taken"-was changed in 1876 to "in
effect determines the action, and prevents a final judgment." Code of Remedial
Justice, ch. 448, § 190, 1876 N.Y. Laws 34. That language was in turn eliminated
in 1917 when, for the most part, appeals to the court of appeals became a matter
of discretion rather than of right. See Act of Apr. 30, 1917, ch. 290, §§ 1-2, 1917
N.Y. Laws 996-97.
The corresponding language in the 1851 version of section 349(3) remains a
provision of the statute that governs the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 5701(a)(2)(vi) (Supp. 2001).
According to commentators, the provision is obsolete. 7 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET
AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRAcTIcE § 5701.20, at 57-38 (1991). It has been invoked
only three times this century. It was invoked once to allow an appeal from an
order striking an amended complaint, see Simmons v. Capra, 75 N.Y.S.2d 574
(App. Div. 1947) (stating without explanation that order was appealable under
section 609, subdivisions 4 (order affecting a substantial right) and 5 (order that
in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment)), and twice to allow an
appeal from a penalty order for failing to provide discovery, see Kirsch v. Herculean Prods. Co., 199 N.Y.S. 417 (App. Div. 1923) (involving an appeal from order
granting motion to strike answer and enter default judgment as discovery sanction; because default judgment is not appealable, order granting motion to strike
prevented judgment from which appeal could be taken); Banes v. Rainey, 114
N.Y.S. 986 (App. Div. 1909) (involving an appeal from order dismissing complaint
and entering judgment as discovery sanction; assuming judgment is unappealable, order is appealable because it led to entry of judgment from which appeal
could not be taken).
The discovery cases suggest one way of giving some meaning to the original
language of section 11(2). Both before and after adoption of the Code, default
judgments were not appealable in New York. See, e.g., Dorr v. Birge, 5 How. Pr.
323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); Jones v. Kip, 1 Code Rptr. 119 (N.Y. C.P. 1849). Arguably, section 11(2) may have been designed to allow an appeal from an order that
led to a default judgment; an appeal could not be taken from the judgment itself.
But see Briggs v. Bergen, 23 N.Y. 162, 163 (1861) (holding that order striking
sham answer not appealable under section 11(2)). That seems unlikely, however,
for the same reasons that it is unlikely that section 11(2) was designed to allow
an appeal from an order dismissing an appeal. See supratext accompanying note
371.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 371-72.
379. 17 N.Y. 158 (1858).
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term of the supreme court denied the defendant's motion to vacate a
judgment. On appeal, the general term reversed the special term and
vacated the judgment. The plaintiff then appealed the decision of the
general term to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals decided that section 11(2) authorized the
plaintiffs appeal. The reported opinion-which may have reflected
only the views of the judge who wrote it3SO-said that, by vacating the
judgment, the general term had determined that the plaintiff no
longer had a valid cause of action and "virtually direct[ed] a perpetual
stay of all further proceedings in the action."38 1 As such, the order in
effect determined the action and prevented a judgment. The opinion,
however, did not explain why the decision of the general term "virtually direct[ed] a perpetual stay."38 2 The opinion also did not mention
any of the earlier cases in which the court of appeals held that it
lacked jurisdiction to review orders granting or denying motions to vacate a judgment. 38 3 One wonders whether the talk of a perpetual stay
380. The opinion was written by Judge Strong. One judge did not sit in the case, one
expressed no opinion, one dissented, and the remainder "concurred in the judgment without stating the grounds of their concurrence in respect to the merits."
Id. at 162. It is not clear whether the other judges concurred in the grounds
given by Judge Strong for hearing the appeal.
381. Id. at 160-61.
382. There is a possible explanation. The case involved a note that had apparently
been given as collateral for a mortgage. The special term granted the plaintiffs
motion to strike the defendants' answer, and the defendants subsequently appealed that order to the general term. The general term affirmed. See id. at 15960.
After the general term affirmed the order granting the motion to strike, the
defendants moved at special term to vacate the judgment. The motion to vacate
was apparently based on the ground that the note had been satisfied by the sale
of the mortgaged property, a sale that took place at some point after the motion to
strike was granted but before judgment was entered. The special term denied the
motion to vacate. On appeal, the general term reversed the special term and
vacated the judgment. See id.
There is no indication that, in vacating the judgment, the general term vacated its earlier decision affirming the order granting the motion to strike. If not,
then arguably the case was left in a state of limbo. A judgment could not be
rendered for the defendants because their answer had been stricken. A default
judgment could not be rendered for the plaintiff because the general term had
determined that the note had been satisfied and that the plaintiff had no cause of
action.
383. See Jones v. Derby, 16 N.Y. 242, 244-46 (1857) (holding that order made at general term setting aside judgment and execution was not appealable under section
11(2) or section 11(3)). Both before and after Edson, the court of appeals ruled
that orders on motions to vacate a judgment were not appealable under section
11(3) as orders made on a summary application after judgment. According to the
court, orders made on a summary application were limited to final orders "in proceedings based upon the judgment and assuming its validity." Starke v.
Dinehart, 40 N.Y. 342, 343 (1869); see also Clarke v. City of Rochester, 34 N.Y.
355, 356 (1866) (same); Salles v. Butler, 27 N.Y. 638, 639-40 (1863) (same); Bank
of Genessee v. Spencer, 18 N.Y. 150, 152 (1858) (same); Thompson v. Bullock, 16

20011

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

was simply talk designed to justify the review of an unreviewable
order.
3 4
In conclusion, section 11(2) "comes to us on faded parchment." s
The language of the statute is too obscure and the historical record is
too sparse to offer any meaningful insights into the purpose and
meaning of section 11(2) or its progeny. When all is said and done,
there are only two statements that one can make about the statute
with any degree of confidence. First, section 11(2) cannot be interpreted on the basis of its plain meaning. The section has no plain
meaning because it makes no sense. Second, section 11(2) cannot be
interpreted on the basis of its intended meaning. Even if the Commissioners and the legislature attached a specific purpose and meaning to
section 11(2), both its purpose and meaning have been lost to history.
C.

The Farewell

The court's use of the "prevents a judgment" clause to cover various
holes in the statutory scheme is understandable. But it is also unwise. It undermines the court's credibility because it puts the court in
the position of attributing a meaning to a statute that is patently inconsistent with the language of the statute. The "prevents a judgment" clause ought to be written off as superfluous. One of the basic
principles of statutory construction is that a court must, "if possible,
give effect to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute, since the
Legislature is presumed to have intended every provision of a statute
to have a meaning."3 s5 It is not possible to give effect to the "prevents
a judgment" clause of section 25-1902, however. The clause has never
meant anything-and it never will.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The law on final orders in Nebraska is a mess. The primary responsibility for that mess belongs to the legislature. It has left the
court to struggle with a bad statute for over 140 years. The court can
clean up the mess, however, by jettisoning some of its language, by
adopting a new set of definitions, by placing a greater emphasis on
policy, and by being more complete in its explanations. The last is
How. Pr. 213, 219 (N.Y. 1858) same); Humphrey v. Chamberlain, 11 N.Y. 274,
275-76 (1854) (same); Dunlop v. Edwards, 3 N.Y. 341, 343 (1850) (same); Sherman v. Felt, 2 N.Y. 186, 187 (1849) (same).
384. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan used the phrase quoted in the text to describe the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment.
385. Sorenson v. Meyer, 220 Neb. 457, 463, 370 N.W.2d 173, 177 (1985) (emphasis
added). See also In re Estate of Tvrz, 260 Neb. 991, 998, 620 N.W.2d 757, 762
(2001) (same); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lancaster County Bd. Of Equal., 260 Neb. 265, 272,
616 N.W.2d 326, 335 (2000) (same).
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perhaps the most important. The more careful and complete the
court's explanations are, the easier it is for lawyers to do their job.
They can make informed decisions about when to appeal and, when
their decisions are challenged, they can make arguments rather than
assertions. That in turn benefits the court. It reduces the number of
cases on the court's docket and gives the court the benefit of arguments with content rather than assertions with citations.

